(With Reference to Nyerere, Cabral, Fanon and Lenin.)
By Takura Zhangazha.*
It ostensibly started in the poorer parts of Harare and Bulawayo. At least according to viral
social media posts. Both as representing
events as they occurred as well as how they were/are generally preferred by
those with smart phones.
Fact, rumour and conjecture intermingled as the day wore on
from mid-morning to midday Monday 14 January 2019 and its eventual deluge of
late afternoon rainfall (at least in Harare).By the time the state shut down
the internet and its off shoot, social media next day, Tuesday 15 January 2019,
all of the major cities were eerily quiet.
People had decided to stay at home for probably two key reasons: the
safety of their families and also the shock at how the government had decided
to add proverbial fuel to the fire through now widely reported disproportionate use of the army against civilians.
At the heart of it all was what is referred to as the ‘ghetto’. Also representative of Zimbabwe’s urban
‘underbelly’ or urban poor working class (formerly/informally employed and
unemployed). Or where an urban majority
who would be most affected by the Mnangagwa governments recent decision to
double fuel prices at least in terms of the local unofficial currency (bond
notes/RTGS/mobile-money).
The effect was almost immediate. Local transport fares soared and public
opprobrium was the national temperament.
For varying reasons that sociologists
and political scientists will historically and eventually come to explain.
In the mainstream print media, the versions of what was to
come and what has occurred almost had a religious tone. For some private newspapers, the fuel price
increase had all the makings of Zimbabwean version of ‘armageddon’. Or a dystopian end to the Zimbabwean state as
we (still) know it. Even if ephemerally.
For state controlled media (print and electronic) the
editorial lines of their stories sought more to defend the neoliberal policy
decisions of Mnangagwa’s government.
With the added attempt at giving policy direction as to potential
inquiries into how fuel imports were being distributed or corruptly repatriated
across our national borders. While all the time blaming the opposition for the violence.
One thing that was apparent however in the midst of the
demonstrations (and stayaway) was that they eventually had their epicenters
being the ‘ghetto’. And that where they
were at their most violent, it all occurred in places with the
highest urban proximity to poverty. Both
historically and in contemporary reality.
Hence the jokes on social media about people in more
affluent suburbs not knowing what’s happening in poorer parts of town.
Sadly the minister of state for national security in the
presidents office has already confirmed the needless and tragic loss of
life. And there are and will be many
unconfirmed reports of injuries more as a direct result of the actions of the
state or those of protesters.
The reality of the matter is that there are class dimensions
to these events. And the state with
its violent apparatus (security services) is very much aware of this. Not only in the moment but also in the long
term. Hence the evident political
approach of the ruling party not viewing the urban working class as more important than the working/ farming peasant. Let alone panicking about the former.
To talk about class in our context however is no longer
‘fashionable’. Nor is it preferable for
many an opinion maker. Mainly because
the latter are largely schooled in viewing our national political economy from
what is now referred to as an ‘entrepreneurial’ perspective. One that prioritises ‘ease of doing business’ theoretical hand me down approaches from the global north. Or relatively abstract
motivational books and bio-pics of the leaders of global private capital (Davos
anyone?)
Hence the term the ‘people’ invariably refers to the lower
economic strata/class of our society.
It is important to point out that in our
historical context, political perceptions of class, politics, the economy and progress have had
clearly Marxist leanings. A trajectory that was long since abandoned in the
late 1980s (ESAP) via the ruling party and in 2005 via the mainstream
opposition MDC (still) labour backed party.
And in the case of the current public disaffection with the
fuel price (with its knock on effect) this would have been a Leninist
moment. That is, an organized grouping
of committed radical leftists taking advantage of the situation to announce and
effect a much larger political programme of state takeover. On ideological
grounds. With the support of a
disaffected and war/poverty ravaged proletariat.
In our specific case it did not and will not happen that way. Even though no one seriously expected the
equivalent of Lenin’s ‘ State and Revolution’ or ‘ What is To Be Done’ seminal
essays prior to the contextual fuel price increases.
Where we take a Fanonian perspective to the recent urban mass action, there would be strands of similarities in the
latter’s analysis. Especially in
relation to what he then referred to as the propensity of the post-colonial
state for violence with equal but ill-equipped counter fervor and violence on the part of what he referred to as
the lumpen proletariat. Coupled with the evident betrayal of what was
an original nationalist liberation project by the post- independence elite
which fails to deal with what Fanon referred to as a ‘racism of contempt’ with regards to how it deals with global capital or the global north.
Our own
local national political and comprador bourgeoisie has however not turned its back to what Fanon refers to as ‘the interior’. It has survived at least
politically by manipulating and subduing the interior's (rural Zimbabwe) historical consciousness to the
extent that the same ‘interior’ appears to be acting of its own volition in support
of the former. Even if the center (urban) is volatile as in our current
situation.
The current government for all its fawning to global capital will
never get the investments it wants and as a result it will fail in its
neoliberal economic model that it touts as a panacea. The same goes for the opposition which is
largely comprador bourgeoisie in nature but rides on a vague form of
personalized but ideologically similar nationalism that Fanon abhors even as as
he emphasizes the supremacy of the organic political party.
In Nyerere’s instance, the clarity was always in the
placement of African countries in the global scheme of things. Both from a Marxist and Pan-African
perspective. He understood how global
capital intermingled with globalized economics worked or at least was going to
work. And the clarity he perpetually
sought was one that required context.
Hence his little cited phrase, ‘the mechanisms of democracy are not the
meaning of democracy’ said at the twilight of his meaningful political
career. A point that is increasingly
apparent as a result of the collusion of state actors and private capital who
more or less do not expect elections and other democratic processes to change
global neoliberal economic policy.
Even
if these electoral processes are held as regularly as they are in a majority of states across the world. And this is where in
part the irony of class consciousness or a lack of it emerges in our recent
mass action local context. The collusion
between the state and private capital (local and global) has led to a class
consciousness on the part of those that would be urban working people that
sympathise with principles of the free market and access to the United States
dollar. There is little differentiation
of class interests. Instead there is a
merger in consciousness- across the class divide- but in favour of the
narratives of the global bourgeoisie and its local comprador counterpart. It is ironic beyond measure that the demands of a person in the affluent residential area are similar to those of someone in a dirt poor part of a city. Adn that the movers and shakers of demands for the US$ or even more neoliberalism are generally not the ones that bear the brunt of state sanctioned violence.
Where we examine Cabral’s approach to class, there is merit
to his postulation that what he refers to as the ‘petit/petty’ bourgeoisie
playing a prominent role in national liberation (ditto Zanu and Zapu). He adds however (and I quote him extensively here) that ‘no matter the degree of
revolutionary consciousness of the sector of the petty bourgeoisie, called on
to undertake this historical function, it cannot free itself from an objective
reality: the petty bourgeoisie, as a service class (that is not directly
involved in the process of production) does not have at its disposal the
economic bases to guarantee the taking over of power for it….And it never could,
since political power (the state) has its foundations in the economic capacity
of the ruling class. In the
circumstances of colonial and neocolonial society, this capacity is retained in
the hands of two entities: imperialist capital and the native classes of
workers’
In our national context, Cabral’s assertions point to a
petty bourgeoisie that seeks to give ‘free rein to its natural tendencies to become bourgeoisie..
that is to deny the revolution and necessarily subject itself to imperialist
capital.’
This is why the
Zimbabwean government insists in the midst of an economic crisis on attending
the annual get together of the transnational neoliberal elite at Davos. And even on the opposition side, despite its
origins in labour or the classes of workers (urban and rural), is not prepared,
for now, to commit the metaphorical ‘class suicide’ that Cabral refers to. Or to demonstrate a capacity to ‘remain
faithful to the principles and the fundamental cause of the struggle.’ In what Fanon refers to as a
‘liturgical sense’.
So it is fair to ask ourselves the key question in the immediate aftermath of the recent urban mass action in Zimbabwe, whose 'class consciousness' and contradictions are we dealing with?
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)
No comments:
Post a Comment