The Zimbabwean’s government recently announced that it is
preparing to amend the national constitution.
This was announced via the Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs,
Mr. Ziyambi who informed the Zimbabwean public that government in following up
on the recommendations of the Monthlante Commission was seeking, as reported by
the mainstream state-controlled print media, to ‘deepen democracy’ in an
arguable Second Republic.
All this, when taken into our contemporary political context,
in the aftermath of post electoral violence that has had the end effect of
creating a binary international perception of whether Zimbabwe has indeed moved
on from Robert Mugabe’s repressive regime, makes one pause for clearer political
thought. Even if it further delays the full
international re-engagement intentions of
Mnangagwa’s foreign policy. A policy which
the latter does not appear to be giving up on.
Just yet or as easily as the opposition would assume.
The government, according to Ziyambi, is “really under
pressure to make sure that all the legislation to do with the ease of doing
business to support our TSP and Vision 2030 is in place much earlier.”
They therefore intend to amend the constitution to introduce
new roles for chiefs, a more technical definition of ‘devolution’ (which will
remove MPs from provincial councils) and also consider introducing the constitutional
office of leader of the opposition in parliament. All before year end 2019.
It is however important to crosscheck what appears to be the
fundamental motivations to these proposed constitutional amendments. The first and perhaps most obvious is that
the Mnangagwa government is prioritising re-engagement with what it considers
the ‘international’ (read as Western) community as was the case with the July
2018 general election.
It is seeking to rid itself of what it has referred to as an
inherited ‘pariah status’ from Robert Mugabe’s leadership of the country. Both
in Africa and the rest of the world.
Essentially it would like to get rid of ‘politics’ (however
it defines it) as an albatross around Zimbabwe’s economic neck. So it will concede ‘democratic reforms’ for almost any form of international recognition
or (financial) support. West or East, with the former valuing more the private
capital side of things than any assumptions of revolution outside a neoliberal
framework. And the latter following suit
with greater trepidation about the ‘liberal’ side of ‘neoliberal’.
And that is what any current proposed amendments to the
national constitution are about. They
are not about the people of Zimbabwe.
But about how the state (and state power) must be repositioned in order
to meet the pre-requisites of a rapacious global private capital. And how it
will not brook any challenges to its hegemonic dominance, including crosschecking
whether incumbent regimes pay the utmost respect to private (land) property
rights. As of colonial old.
Secondly, there is the issue that the Zimbabwean government
has to grapple with domestically. This being its ability to harness a local/domestic
performance legitimacy question as derived from its neoliberal economic
trajectory. Its ‘no pain-no gain’
economic policy mantra does not endear it to the Zimbabwean populace. Instead it establishes breeding ground for
very legitimate dialogue, debate and dissent.
Demonstrations included. Even if it blames hidden hands or ulterior
political motives on the part of those that would organize them.
In order to handle this delicate political situation around questions
of its political performance legitimacy, the government has decided to engage
in what it calls a ‘national dialogue’.
With the help of some political party leaders and a sprinkling of
churches, secular civil society organisations (including private capital /domestic
business) and a newly appointed Presidential Advisory Council (PAC), it intends
to bring everyone together regardless of political affiliation (bias) in order
to move the country forward. What it
will not brook are questions of its legitimacy or any queries of the same
around the national president.
Even if one were to argue that the latter point is fair
enough, the primary challenge is that it does not quite solve anything. It instead perpetuates political polarization. As of old or as a return to the highly personalized politics of the Mugabe
and Tsvangirai. Where political personalities
matter more than political institutions.
Let alone political loyalties based on not just charismatic leaders (or
a lack thereof) but ethnocentrism, mafia like political economies being more important
than contextual or organic ideological considerations for a people centered
democratic future of the country.
But then again we deal the hand we are dealt. And we have to find solutions that are beyond
the immediate.
We will, in the contemporary turn of events, never be fully
able to comprehend the November 2017 ‘coup-not-a-coup’. Especially the marches to oust Mugabe as
permitted by Zanu Pf’s military political complex with the direct support of
even our now nascent opposition political leaders. Nor will we come to an immediate factual
understanding of the role played (and continuing to be played) by disparate pro
Mugabe Zanu Pf factions in assisting the opposition in a last gasp attempt at
post coup-not-a- coup electoral power. That is now for historians to explain with hindsight.
What we do know, is that any talk of a raft of proposed
amendments of the national constitution as proposed by Mnangagwa, are meaningless
for whatever would remain of our country’s democratic future if they do not introduce
a 100% proportional representation system to the executive, parliament and
local government. Not in order to mimic
South Africa’s representative democracy electoral system but to ensure the
diversity of our own. Meaning, that our
national contextual perceptions of what democracy should mean would be enhanced
by a more representative and more diverse parliament and local government political
system. And with it, a more attendant,
professional mainstream media . As
reflecting both the past, the present and a potentially even more democratic
future.
The counter argument will easily be and become that we must accept
what is considered to be incremental (slow but sure) change.
The changes to the constitution being planned by Mnangagwa’s
government may appear to be somewhat progressive but regrettably they play more
to an international gallery over which we have no control. By way of how it perceives us, how it may manipulate
us and how in the final analysis, we would be asking, ‘who dunnit?’
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity
(takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)
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