By Takura Zhangazha*
A cde recently argued about how China is taking all of
Zimbabwe’s mineral wealth from the country.
Inter alia mentioning the major mining projects that China and its
private companies have invested in Zimbabwe.
These include the Manhize iron mining and steel production company which
is now referred to as the Dinson Iron and Steel Company (DISCO). The cde went further and cited other mining initiatives
such as the Bikita Lithium mining company (Sinomone Bikita) and others in Penhalonga or Shurugwi.
These conversations occurred against the backdrop of an
invitation to Zimbabwe’s current president Emmerson Mnangagwa for an 80th
anniversary commemoration of the Chinese defeat of the Japanese at the height of the second world
war.
And it is fair to argue around the fact of the closeness of
the Zimbabwean government to China.
In the contemporary, it’s a relationship that is frowned
upon because of specific global narratives against China and its economic
rise. Let alone assumption of its 'communism' and attempt at what it refers to as a ‘multi-polar’ world order.
But when you put this into perspective, Zimbabwe’s
relationship with China is much deeper than the mainstream media puts out. Both
state media or private media.
China is historically a revolutionary society. Internally and globally. From their long drawn wars against the
Kuomintang, the Japanese and eventual victory of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) there are elements of revolutionary praxis that can be drawn from
them. Even if you did not ideologically
want to. As Zimbabweans we are in debt
to them for the lessons they taught us about ‘guerilla warfare’ in tandem with what
then appeared as convoluted 5 year national development programmes.
In the late 1980s we were also beholden to the fact of how
phenomenal national development can take place in a neo-liberal global economic
context. Inclusive of the re-drawing of the lines between the role of the state
and private capital in national and global economic development.
In this, and between the lines, it is not so easy to see a
new narrative about the role of a centrist state in tandem with global and
financialised capital. As it is linked
mainly to China or by relative default the very profit motivated global north
financialised private capital.
That’s the catch for the ruling Zanu Pf party. They have a relatively clear (though
factionalised) ideological assumption that they can mimic the Chinese economic
development model. They even have both
the financial and political investment to match it. Hence we are there at the 80th
anniversary celebrations in China this week.
But it is a mimicry that comes with political and economic
costs.
Politically it means that the ruling Zanu Pf party cannot lose power in the long term. The heavy investments that the Chinese have made in mining, energy and infrastructural development need to be politically protected. This can only be done if the primary political partner (Zanu PF) retains political power. This also indicates that our politics while purporting to be about democratic elections every five years are beholden to Chinese economic interests in Zimbabwe.
As was the case in the early 1980s with
British private capital and its London-Rhodesia (LONRHO) interests when it
directly affected the Lancaster House conference resolutions on private
property (land) and also ensured we had neoliberal finance minsters during the
times of Economic structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs) in the late 80s and
through the 1990s.
Now most of us are wont to accuse the Chiense of a new form of imperialism. Akin to the global Western superpowers.
At the risk of appearing as though I am doing some
public relations for Chinese foreign policy, I would quickly argue that this is
patently untrue. Chinese foreign policy
functions on a clearly different terrain.
And it is also embedded in a majority of African countries’
liberation history. Like with the West,
it is now increasingly business and profit motivated. But less financially and materially extractive
unless you will it to do so as a sovereign country. But it listens more than it extracts. Except that it listens to governments and analyses their global placement in a global political economy.
Hence China (and Russia) stuck by Zimbabwe when we were
supposed to be placed under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions in
July 2008. Something that I will always
repeat that we quite literally dodged a bullet because of them during an age of
a Blair-Bush led era of global liberal-military interventionism in the affairs
of UN member states.
As was the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and
Venezuela.
But we need to bring the debate to its local context. Many Zimbabweans have a xenophobic tendency against
the Chinese. Almost as though they would
prefer the British or Americans being the ones setting up major mining or infrastructural
investments in the country.
The reality of the matter is that the Chinese are more
grounded in their investments. Even if
we accuse them of a multitude of environmental degradation issues or
cross-check their human rights records, they have a standing policy of non
interference. In other words, they
simply listen to what your current or serving government wants in return for
their investments.
So if you are Zimbabwean and have a problem with the Chinese
in your country, you probably have to take it up with the ruling government and
party, Zanu Pf. Because the Chinese do
no listen to popular and populist protests. They only deal with your government.
And while doing so, always remembering that global economics
in the moment is also about ‘narratives’ that pit the 'global north’ versus the ‘global
east'. Moreso in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine
war and the ongoing genocide by Israel in Palestine.
To conclude on a controversial point. There is an assumption that many Zimbabweans
hold that the Chinese are ‘bad’ investors in Zimbabwe due to their proximity to
the ruling Zanu Pf party. This is a
mistaken view. The Chinese are here to
measure and get results for their primary economic and political interests. They are not as imperialistic as their counterparts
from the global west because of our limited but shared struggle against colonialism
history.
So it matters that we understand more ourselves than we do
the Chinese. Or the Americans, British
or the Europeans and what we want from them within our on cultural, economic
and ideological ambits. But for now, I
do not fault the Chinese.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his own personal capacity.
