Wednesday 25 November 2020

Zimbabwe New TV Licenses: Profit, Media and Incrementalism.

 By Takura Zhangazha*

The Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) recently licensed six (6) new free to air national commercial television stations.  This is a first since our national independence in 1980 that this has been done at this magnitude and in this age of the internet.  It had previously been conservatively done in the mid-1990s with the brief outsourcing of a second channel from the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) to private players such as Joy TV and Munhumutapa Broadcasting Corporation .

The full scale licensing of private television stations for national broadcasting on their own designated frequencies is however as unprecedented as it has in some instances been viewed by key media stakeholders as controversial.  Not only based on real and perceived inconsistencies within the enabling Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) or its attendant licensing regulations which do not emphasize the necessity of diversity in private media ownership. Especially as it applies to cross/multi-media ownership frameworks where some newly licensed companies own media across the print, radio and television spectrum.  And examples of this type of media ownership are best exemplified by Rupert Murdoch’s Newscorp multi-media empire.  Or even on social media with companies such as for example Facebook that already owns a number of popular content and information platforms.

It is almost like a throwback media licensing regime framework in Zimbabwe wherein the  major players in the print media as registered by the Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC) became the licensees of the of the commercial radio licenses.

What is however interesting to take note of, in the case Zimbabwe's new TV licenses, is that they are emblematic of at least two things.

Firstly, the licensing process itself has been couched in the official policy of the government on the ‘ease of doing business’.  While it may be considered a coincidence since the Information and Media Panel of Inquiry (IMPI)  report strongly recommended that government considers the ‘media as a business’, this suits the ‘media for profit’ trajectory of not only the current government but also media owners.  While the viability of the new TV broadcasters is yet to be seen, it is fairly apparent that the assumption is that they will compete on Zimbabwe’s relatively small media market primarily for eyeballs that rake in the money. (Please do not ask why Nigeria either always won the most on Big Brother Africa or why its still the only African country to run its own domestic version of the same).    Media diversity or a multiplicity of ethical journalistic content and diverse views is not high on the list of priorities. 

The second element is that of a relatively incremental approach taken by government and accepted by some media stakeholders to media reforms.  And largely based more on a quantitative approach than one that looks for the quality of free expression and media freedom as a democratic imperative in Zimbabwe.  This was the case with the quantitative expansion of national and local commercial radio stations.  It will be the case with the  new television stations though at greater expense to their owners. It however would no longer be easy to argue that Zimbabwe has a state  broadcasting monopoly. And the government would be in a position to counter such an argument with not only quantitative examples of what now obtains in the country but also citing media reform models of countries from the global north.    What then  becomes significant is that media stakeholders have to ‘deal the hand that they have been dealt’ by the state.  Not by way of imposition but also by way of not having been alwys clear about the parameters of reform that they required.  In this case of the new television stations, the medium becomes its own message and eventually Zimbabweans will get used to them.  Just like they did with the radio stations. 

Barring major policy changes on the part of government these newly licensed television stations are now part of our fixed long term media reality.  No matter any controversies raised about the licensing process. Colleagues in the content creation sectors of the arts will probably view them as an opportunity to breakaway from ZBC’s stringent and monopolistic contractual conditions.  Political parties may see some of them as new platforms to spread their messages to wider audiences beyond ZBC.  Journalists/media professionals will look at these developments as new employment opportunities for their profession (as they did with the radio stations).  While non- governmental organizations will seek to spread their public interest issues via these same said new platforms. Or sports associations leagues will relish income from selling TV rights. 

In this a hegemonic reality is then created in which these television stations become part of a ‘new normal’ in our broadcasting sector.  And for sure, even if one were to argue that these new TV stations cannot compete with social media, it is certain that they will also attempt to occupy the same spaces.  But with the unique advantage of being permitted by the state to broadcast as nationally as they can on designated easier for Zimbabweans to access frequencies. And on that one time status symbol called the television set. 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Thursday 19 November 2020

Zim’s November 2017: National Shock, Catharsis, Populism

 Conversations around the military takeover of the country in November 2017 now revolve around, at least according to a majority of pro-opposition opinion leaders, defining popular support for it as ‘a mistake’. 

On social media some memes have gone relatively viral about how the 18 November 2017 march as enabled by the military and calling for Robert Mugabe’s ouster was “National Dzungu Day”. Translated into English this would be “National Confusion Day”.  All because of subsequent disappointment at the Emerson Mnangagwa successor regime. Mainly in relation to the fact that it won the subsequent 2018 elections in their occurrence as well as the fact that a constitutional court challenge of the results ruled in its favour. 

With hindsight, what was fairly evident is that November 2017 was rather dramatic for many Zimbabweans.  Almost like a soap opera and its typical character plots. That is, an ageing oligarch with a young(ish) ambitious wife and her hangers one and the austere, sly uncle biding his time to take over the family business. 

And very few people can claim to have seen this coming.  Not by a long shot.  

I remember that I was in Johannesburg the week of 14 November 2017 attending a Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum conference on, wait for it,  “Possible Scenarios as Zimbabwe Heads for the 2018 Elections”.  The night before my presentation, I met up with a friend based in the Diaspora to discuss issues back home. And he shared videos form his social media feed of soldiers driving into town and raised his own suspicions as to what was going on in Harare.  I refused to believe his immediate conspiracy that there was a coup de tat underway in Zimbabwe.  

It turned out the following morning that he was correct.  He shared the video of now Foreign Affairs Minister S B Moyo early morning statement announcing that then President Mugabe and his family were safe. Adding that the military had moved in to protect their commander in chief from ‘criminals’ surrounding him.

The conference I was attending changed tone and in a media report by South African newspaper the Sowetan, I highlighted the following, “The crisis around leadership and succession did not emerge in the villages‚ not in the townships. It comes from within the ZANU-PF politburo‚ the ZANU-PF central committee and in part in the first family and its involvement in ZANU-PF’s succession policies.” And I flew back that evening to a heavily guarded Robert Mugabe International Airport.

The subsequent events that followed such as the war veterans organized rally at Zimbabwe Grounds in Highfields, the attempted march on state house, a visitation by a South African delegation to Mugabe and his infamous ‘Asante Sana’ statement were as eerie as they were unpredictable. By the time his resignation letter was read by the Speaker of Parliament to a joint sitting of both houses of the same, the process of national shock and fear had morphed into a national cathartic moment. 

Where we fast forward from 2017 to the contemporary, it is now apparent that with most moments of catharsis the aftermath sees an occupation with either regret at having been ‘overjoyed’ or high expectations of what that moment should have come to mean.

In this, and for emphasis, it worth recalling a couple of key issues about Zanu Pf’s leadership transition in November 2017. 

One of these being the fact that the ruling party and establishment (including the military and private capital) strategically decided to turn the general lack of popular support for Robert Mugabe and his wife Grace to its own populist advantage.  At great risk to the country’s political stability.  I am quite certain that they asked themselves the question who would not want to see the back of Mugabe?  And critically knew that the answer from a majority of SADC heads of states/government would be an affirmation of a desire to see the ‘old man’ retire.  Or that the mainstream opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai would accept Mugabe’s departure with relative enthusiasm at what he would have considered a new opportunity at the presidency.  And of course the broader ‘international community’ which viewed Mugabe as too much of a symbol of Pan African resistance to the intentions of globalization and global private capital. 

The populist elements of the events of November 2017 therefore eventually worked to confirm the lack of popularity of Mugabe across multiple societal and global interests.

What is however also interesting in the contemporary is our continued desire for some sort of catharsis.  Or our apparent search for a seismic event that would hopefully and once again, change everything.   That was the case with the 2018 harmonized elections which the ruling establishment decided to go ahead with.  And all events that have occurred in between then and now around SADC, African Union or United Nations summits. 

In recalling the tumultuous events of November 2017 we would do well to remember that the ruling Zanu Pf put our country at great political risk with what it allowed to occur or refused to see coming.  That it eventually got away with it via reverse populism and an awkward shared desire by many to see the back of Mugabe is something we will have to live with.  And for historians to eventually give us multiple versions of the details that led to it.  What we should collectively agree on with hindsight and in the present is that if we improve our politics, this will never happen again. And should have never happened.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Monday 9 November 2020

Under Currents of Mediated Celebrity Urban Culture in Zimbabwe

By Takura Zhangazha*

I am sure there are sociologists, social anthropologists, social psychologists and cultural studies experts that are examining emerging urban cultures in Zimbabwe in great detail.  I am only writing on it in relation to its immediate occurrence and mediation.

I am focusing mainly on the urban because it is historically the most rapid in shifting its character and popular appreciation. Mainly due to population density, easier communication and the general view that ‘urban life’ represents arrival at what would be considered ‘individual success’ by many Zimbabweans.  Including those based in the rural areas. 

But in the construction of this emerging popular urban culture there are what I consider ‘structured causes for it.  And these are four-fold.  Namely, historical materialism/consumption culture associated with (post) colonial cities such as for example Harare, Bulawayo, Gweru, Mutare.  Secondly, the challenge of cultural mimicry of other global cities that are presented to us in the global south as the definition of ‘normality’.  Thirdly, the evident defeat of local/contextual cultures to fit into the narrative of urban life. Fourthly, the advent of the mediation of social media and its algorithmic fortification of specific cultural tendencies that suit the aforementioned three key points.

I will expand on each point below.

In the first instance there is need to understand that contemporary urban cities and their attendant cultures are as complex as they are historical.  The set up of what we in popular parlance refer to as the ‘ghetto’ and our claims to authenticity as to having come from it are effectively colonial carry overs.  And our evident desire to depart from it as exemplified in popular music that is now referred to as ‘dancehall’, ‘urban grooves’ or ‘hip hop’ points to narratives of a desire for arrival in its exact opposite, the colonial ‘leafy suburb’.  In this, we suffer the vicissitudes of a capitalist/neo-liberal political economy that informs the functioning of the city and its class based work culture.  From housing through to access to water, electricity, education, health services and transport, the city annotates that access is for those that have the individual wealth as opposed to those that live in it.  This also included nascent African businessmen who while genuinely improving the well-being of their immediate neighborhoods never hid their ambition to mimic white private wealth as represented and culturally practiced in the suburbs. And as soon as independence allowed it, they took to it like ducks to water.

The end effect becomes the age old Marxian one of base and superstructure in creating cultural habits that give character to the above cited consumerism in popular culture. Inclusive of the fact that historically products such as beautification soaps, lotions and clothes, in their differentiation intentions, were first promoted culturally (musicians, churches, drama) in order for them to capture African hearts and minds. I am quite certain a number of us would remember Shimmer Chinodya’s famous line of how some of these would produce ‘Fanta faces and Coca-Cola legs’. 

This materialist ring to our popular urban culture has not gone away.  Hence sometimes with our contemporary musicians, artists and their cultural products we sometimes are not sure if they are promoting certain products or are genuinely doing their art.  Or how cross over marketing of cultural content to promote commodities also comes in tandem with promoting materialist lifestyles. As of colonial old. And as promoted by mainstream print and electronic media.

In the second instance, our popular urban cultures have come to mimic those of bigger and more recognized ‘global’ cities.  All of them, whether you pick New York, London, Kingston, Paris or one-time apartheid Johannesburg have essentially similar histories and backgrounds.  Either on the basis of racial discrimination or even in the contemporary, the maintenance of that same history’s legacy ghettos.  And in all of these cities, popular cultural productions tend to emanate from the downtrodden but captured by private and elite interests to reinvent poverty as something that if one individually can sing, draw, sculpture, trade or beautify themselves out of, then they will be deemed individually successful. And this is something also affecting ‘local entrepreneurs who once successful transfer their wealth to the ‘leafy’ suburbs.  And also become feted representatives of the same said downtrodden in the hope that there is a wealth trickledown effect.  Ditto most successful artists, entrepreneurs  are wont to remind all and sundry that they are from a ‘ghetto’.  But the same said ‘ghetto’ never really changes despite their individual successes. Its just basic popular culture as captured and commodified by an elite.

In the third instance, there is the worrying departure of local urban culture from local cultural origin contexts.  That is, a desire for recognition globally or beyond borders that limits the protection of the intellectual property of local cultural products.  So when an artists lauds his/her recognition in London as a major achievement, it points to the fact that local recognition is either individually despised or is of limited contribution to their individual success.  Whereas and on the contrary, if you try and use a song or content from an artist in the Global North, social media and other platforms will immediately call you out for plagiarism. 

Which brings me to my final point on the role that social media is playing in fortifying a new urban popular culture. All in relation to the above cited three major issues around the same. Namely, materialism/hedonism as informed by a neoliberal political economy framework, our cultural mimicry of others and in the third instance a loss of local content and context in a desire for global recognition. Social media, access to the internet and as still endorsed by mainstream media, has expanded these traits of our urban popular culture. 

Hence we sometimes cry more than the bereaved on behalf of celebrities that we only knew via social media and via a materialist urban political culture. And we claim them as our own while waiting for new social media stars to emerge and remind us that they left the ghetto. And tell us, in mediated algorithms that if we are like them, we may do so too. 

If we rethink the city, democratize it further and expand our own understanding of urban popular culture in order to give it greater value and meaning within our own contexts we probably would not be where we are at the moment.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)