'One Man One Vote'' s Revolutionary Praxis in Zimbabwe (Politics Belongs to the Masses)

The late Professor Masipula Sithole and I would occasionally argue about what was a 'majority vote' in Zimbabwe.  And we would also argue about something called a 'qualified franchise' as it related to the period between 1962 and 1965 before the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). 

As well as how it sort of worked with the Internal Settlement of 1978-1980 where Bishop Muzorewa was the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. In both cited cases, the major issue was the lack of a clear concept of 'majority rule'.  A debate that we went long into the night arguing about the aversion of Rhodesians to it.

With me as the student and 'Prof Mas' as the mentor. These debates would end with Prof Mas saying with a slight stammer, "Mwanangu, democracy has many forms, but it must not only be accepted but owned by the masses'.   

We had traversed concepts of a 'one party state' as exemplified by pre-1990 Tanzania, the proportional representation system as seen in post 1994 South Africa and our own Lancaster House constitutional order that had an initial parliamentary system that guaranteed white representation in our legislature.   

My key take away from that conversation with Prof Mas was that democracy must be popularly legitimate and organic. It must also be reflective of historical nuances as they relate to contemporary global developments. 

And within the contemporary or the now' we are faced with this new perspective of democracy that is called Constitutional Amendment Bill Number 3 (CAB3) of 2026.  Wherein the current government and ruling Zanu Pf party intends to do away with a direct presidential election voting system that has been used over the last 30 years in Zimbabwe.  

This abrupt change would be done via empowering Parliament to elect the president as an electoral college.  

The public reaction to this has been apparent.  It is not a popular move on the part of the ruling party.  But it retains a technical and constitutional dimension that appears unassailable given the current composition of our Parliament.   And also the divided state of the mainstream political opposition. Together with a severely handicapped civil society. 

But the counter narrative that caught my attention has been that of how these CAB3 maneuvers are against the liberation struggle of 'one man-one vote' for a free Zimbabwe.   This has been put into the public domain largely via war veterans of the liberation struggle but more significantly with current vice president Chiwenga's public acknowledgements of the same.  

There is no doubt that this argument of one man one vote is important in Zimbabwe's political lexicon.  One need not only listen to war veterans but also go to the national archives to encounter multiple pro-liberation flyers, magazines, radio programmes that talked to the very same matter. Especially as the liberation struggle escalated from 1972-1979.  

It was not subject to the multiple, legalistic and elitist interpretations that we are witnessing today.  It was  not only a phrase but a common understanding as to being one of the key reasons why the liberation struggle was fought.   

The liberatory consciousness assumption was that once independence was acquired there would be a direct form of democracy via an electoral process that allows all Zimbabweans, educated, uneducated, rich, poor, rural or urban to vote for leaders of their choice.   Hence the phenomenal turnout in the 1980 general election which brough Zanu Pf into power.  One in which quite literally, one man/one womn voted for the party/candidate of their choice based on their political party preference.  

It was an election that had an immediate dual effect.   One that would elect not only a member of parliament but also by dint of the same process, a prime minister and therefore executive authority over the country.

Where we look at CAB3 we are being offered a disenfranchisement of a direct democratic process.   It is couched in the language of legal elitism and abstract intentions of protecting an already existent political oligarchy via the ruling Zanu PF party and its 'zviganandas'.   

These newfound Zimbabwean oligarchs are intent on creating a false impression that they mean well for the country while feathering not only their political but also economic nests for protection beyond the incumbent president. Via an elitist constitutional amendment. 

The only problem for them is that legitimacy is not merely legal. It derives from the people, or what in the liberation struggle was referred to as the 'masses'.  

So while technically the minister of justice Ziyambi Ziyambi and his principal ED Mnangagwa can get away with this CAB3 proposal via passing it through parliament, they cannot skirt the fact of the revolutionary legitimizing intentions of the mantra of 'one-man-one vote'. 

Our compromised national parliament (house of assembly and senate) can pass CAB3 but it will not change the political perception in the short and long term future of its members being considered the proverbial 'sellouts'.  All in order to extend their own terms of office and the perks that come with the same.  

One man one vote remains an historical revolutionary lesson/praxis for all Zimbabweans.  It was never meant to be mitigated by abstract legalistic and elitist arguments.  It was always meant to be enabled as far best as possible.   

It might not be the definitive meaning of a democratic order but it remains its foundation and its beginning. 

And no, our people are not politically ignorant to require a parliament to select a national president without their say so or via political party influenced gerrymandering. There is no sustainable stability or 'development' that comes from elitist pacts.  More so if they give the impression of being embedded in the constitution.  Politics is not written on paper.  It belongs to the masses ma cdes. 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity  

  

 

 

The Problematic Vagueness of Mnangagwa’s ‘Fourth Chimurenga’

The Problematic Vagueness of Mnangagwa’s ‘Fourth Chimurenga’

By Takura Zhangazha*

Tuesday 5 May 2026. 

Zimbabwe’s president Emmerson Mnangagwa recently made reference to a familiar narrative from the ruling Zanu Pf party.  He was speaking  at the burial of national liberation hero retired Air Commodore  Bere at the national heroes acre. 

In  his remarks he made reference to the thematic narrative of ‘Chimurenga’.  He advised the  mourners in a familiar historical narrative that Zimbabwe has undergone a first Chimurenga against direct colonialism.  A second Chimurenga for ‘political independence’.  A third one for the repossession of land.   

He then added a new one that has not been formulated as such in previous  official statemetns from the government.  One that he referred toas a ‘fourth Chimurenga’ for economic control of our national wealth.   

The curiosity is an assumption of ‘continuity’ of phases within Zimbabwe’s liberation narratives.  Or the political assumption that all these now four time based aspects of ‘liberation’ in Zimbabwe in inherently inter-linked. 

And by way of the same logic, therefore organic to what occurred in the time periods between the first and now the fourth ‘chimurengas’.  

On the face of it this is the easier argument to make.  Especially if it is couched in a necessary and historical nationalist narrative as it relates to our struggles against colonialism and repression.  

It is a given historical argument across time and across the entirety of the African continent that experienced direct or indirect colonialism and won liberation either via war or negotiated settlements.  

And the same goes for any reference to a first or a second ‘chimurenga’. 

This was the case in countries such as Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Tanzania, South Africa, Mozambique in which there were many versions of a first pre-colonial or second(directly anti-colonial) ‘chimurenga.  

While the first struggles are recognized as sowing the mustard seed, the second have tended to be more historically significant in their political meaning due to the fact that generally brought about majority rule.   Both as a political fact and also as a new vision for the future of a free and liberated Africa.

  

And in the majority of cases these second chimurengas’ were ideologically leftist in outlook.  In fact they did not have much of a choice given the manner in which they had been fought and the promises that had been made when they were being waged.  

Zimbabwe’s uniqueness begins with the narrative of a ‘third’ chimurenga in the year 2000. 

 And Mnangagwa here is correct in making reference to it as being about land.  But it was defended largely by war veterans, rural farmers  and a ruling party that was faced with a legitimacy crisis.

More as a reaction to a potential loss of state power to a nascent labour backed opposition, the then Movement for Demcoratic Change.  

So the third Chimurenga was a default position after almost 20 years of national independence stemming from the second one. With the latter having also had the intentions of that which the third was beginning to claim.  

Despite the international approbation, sanctions and economic meltdown that Zimbabwe experienced between 2002-2013, the third chimurenga as defined by the ruling Zanu Pf party, came to create a new elitist state.  

One which was characterised by land barons, foreign exchange specualtors, money launderers, speculative financialised capital and a US dollar cash economy that has largely benefitted those that are politically connected.   

Or simply put, the 3rd chimurenga created a new base for elitist consolidation of patronage and a new alliance between political actors, private actors and global middle men in the fields of mining and agriculture. 

 Hence we even had at some point the expansion of the indigenization programme under Robert Mugabe’s leadership. One in which Mnangagwa still played a major role as a deputy president.   

So while the third Chimurenga had its rural and urban beneficiaries, it did not demonstrate an organic sequence with the first and second ones.   

Or at least not enough of it to the extent that popular opposition to Zanu Pf policies remained nationally high between 2013 and 2023.  

 It was never considered nationally holistic by the people.  Instead, as it still historically does today, it was seen as highly partisan and in many cases repressive to the democratic intentions of the first and second chimurengas.  

Now we are being told of a fourth chimurenga.  One which we assume is sequential in its narrative.  As though we have solved the objectives of the first, second and third! 

What is apparent is that this recent claim at a fourth Chimurenga may not quite be intrinsic to the Zanu Pf narrative.  Mainly due to the fact of their very evident divisions about Constitutional Amendment Bill no 3 (CAB3) and the extension of the term of office of the current president.  

Or more significantly their public arguments about the meaning of the ‘one man/one vote!’ slogan that they assiduosly promoted during the second chimurenga!

So if the fourth chimurenga is about Zimbabweans owning the economy its disjuncture with previous ones is found in the key questions, “for whom?” And also “by whom?”

Given the now popularized term of ‘zvigananda’ one that has its origins in the second chimurenga, it is speculatively apparent that the ‘fourth chimurenga is less about the people and more about those with proximity to power (political, economic and financialised capital).  

With the intention of creating a ‘trickle down’ economic system that functions on distributing material patronage for political support as Zanu PF seeks to transition from its own liberation war ethos.

 Not only ideologically but also by way of generational praxis and doing away with the direct role of war veterans in its historical and contemporary narratives.  

So remember this when you next  hear a jingle about a ‘fourth chimurenga!’ 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity