By Takura Zhangazha*
There are many ways to review Zimbabwe’s political year that became 2017. Whichever way
one tries to look at it, it’s a given that it was seismic and borderline catastrophic. The military
intervention/ coup or as officially described ‘Operation Restore Legacy’ was the most significant event that never had
to happen. At least politically
speaking.
It put the nation at high risk of direct intervention (militarily
so) by SADC and as a result thereof, greater political instability and
uncertainty.
But so far, they pulled it off to what turned out initially to
be popular support which has now become more or less popular acceptance.
With hindsight it never had to happen. And the military would never have had to
leave their barracks in order to solve what was an internal and political
ruling Zanu Pf party succession battle. But it
happened under former president Mugabe’s ‘confined’ watch and with some self
confessed orchestration by his former deputy and now president Mnangagwa (he claimed
he was in perpetual contact with the ZDF commanders during his exile).
In the run-up to this major and unprecedented military
intervention/coup, Zimbabweans had been subjected to rallies and the playing out of
Zanu pf’s succession politics on state television and the mainstream media.
There had also been widespread public outcry against the
state of the national economy though protests as driven by social media
motivated movements had declined. The extractive
role of the state (via the pernicious actions of the Zimbabwe Republic Police),
allegations of massive corruption and
the precarious nature of social service provision however remained a sore
spot.
These issues dominated social media
conversations alongside Zanu Pf succession politics satire and derogation.
The official opposition was hamstrung by its own internal succession
dilemmas’ and the self -inflicted but
complex challenges of building a coalition to oppose Mugabe or what they considered
a would be ‘weaker’ successor in the scheduled
2018 elections. They, as with everyone else save for those in the Zanu Pf elite
loop, did not anticipate a direct intervention by the ZDF on behalf of Zanu
PF.
What is clear as the year 2017 is considered in retrospect is that the events of November
did not occur in strict isolation. Even
if they were motivated by immediate causes such as the firing of then vice
president Mnangagwa and the reported targeting of then commander of the ZDF,
General Chiwenga. A combination of the
lack of popularity of the then Zanu Pf leader, Mugabe and his wife together
with a national economy that was/is bleak, an ever ambiguous and undemocratic constitution
together with a lackadaisical political opposition
and a politically hamstrung media created the optimum conditions for what we now
know as ‘Operation Restore Legacy’.
But the effects of the latter are not going to disappear
with the turn of the year. They are here
to stay for the long term. These being
the militarization of our national
politics in a more direct manner in the
name of the ‘legacy’ of the liberation struggle hence we now have those that are
senior war veterans (in the literal sense) occupying top echelons of government.
And also why there are statements by presidential advisor and war veterans
leader Chris Mutsvangwa that Zanu Pf will also use the ZDF in the 2018
electoral campaign, a statement that he later denied. But the import to the same subtly betrays
the intent of the ruling party at winning the election by all means at its
disposal. At the moment the strongest of these is the overtly
military-political complex that it has become.
The only rider here is that there is a public perception
that ‘any change’ from Mugabe (as president of the country) is good. So a lot of Zimbabweans may not see the undemocratic
undercurrents of this 'new' regime. Or they may not be allowed to. It has no major democratic reforms on its
cards. Its claim to legitimacy apart
from the post ‘Operation Restore Legacy’ constitutional provisions it utilized to get Mnangagwa
into power is that of promising a better performing national economy.
They are going to pull out all stops to
appear to make this work, including rejuvenating the propaganda around any of
their economic policies but also more significantly giving the impression of a ‘progressive’ neo-liberal economic outlook to court foreign
direct investment. It may work in the
short term for electoral politics but austerity always has serious political
ramifications for small economies like Zimbabwe’s. And we have the Economic Structural
Adjustment Programme (ESAP) of the late 1980s and 1990s as history’s instructive
lesson to draw from.
But they are going to try it anyway and ensure that there is
limited national opposition to their policies in a number of ways. First and perhaps most important to the new’
establishment is to dominate the national political narrative through what they
hope will be an internationally accepted (at least by SADC and the African
Union) 2018 election. In the process their envisaged
electoral victory will make any question of their legitimacy significantly undisputed
and as a raison d’etre for continuing with a neo-liberal Zimbabwean national economy.
But that also requires that the ruling establishment ‘manufactures consent’ hence
the media and its offshoots are going to be key. State and private media will be under severe
pressure to carry the narrative of ‘progressive change’, never mind the
de-unionisation of workers, the benevolent (as opposed to actual observance) attitude toward human rights and seeking long
duree Zanu Pf leadership of the country’s government(s).
This means they will also keep the opposition in safe check,
including the possibility of co-option into their neo-liberal project. In this they warmly welcomed the initial
support of the opposition for their ‘Operation Restore Legacy’ and will work to
ensure that the opposition continues to support it as a fundamental point of
political departure that can only be attributed to themselves or where its denigrated,
they will remind the same opposition of having initially supported it. Both in its occurrence but more significantly
in its meaning (‘give the new government a chance’).
So 2017 is a year that is going to stay with us for a
while. Even to the point of making 2018
of limited significance without thinking of its ‘predecessor’ year. And also 2023 as its probable most significant
political future year.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity
(takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)
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