Tuesday 28 January 2020

‘Eat Quickly, We May Get Arrested’ Remembering ZCTU’s Lovemore Matombo.


By Takura Zhangazha*

Cde Lovemore Matombo, the former president of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) quietly passed on this week.  An organic intellectual and left leaning trade unionist for many years, he had an unassuming aura about his person that never betrayed the immense role he had played in keeping trade unionism afloat after the formation of the then worker’s party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). 

And also as a successor ZCTU president to the inimitable and regrettably also late, Gibson Sibanda.  Together with then secretary general, Wellington Chibebe, Matombo, ensured that the ZCTU would have a smooth leadership transition after the resignation of its then charismatic secretary general, again also late,  Morgan Tsvangirai. 

Matombo was to ably steer the ZCTU through the difficult years of being accused of being an affiliate of the opposition MDC, the hyperinflation years of 2008-2010, the informalisation of the economy and the general crackdown on human rights by the Mugabe government. This also included phases in which he, together with his colleagues in the trade union movement would be arrested and tortured for irgansiing either national stay-aways’ or demonstrations against either unfair labour practices, the high cost of living or the dire state of human rights in the country.   

Matombo also sought to maintain the ZCTU’s critical historical role in challenging the hegemony of the ruling Zanu Pf party.  I specifically mention ‘hegemony’ because ideologically Matombo was as clea as daylight on his social democratic credentials.  He did not challenge Zanu PF merely because it was in power and ruling badly.  He challenged Zanu Pf primarily on the basis of how he directly disagreed with it’s ideological outlook.  One which was largely a radical neoliberal nationalism that relied more on the past than it sought solutions for the future.

In conversation with him he would also aver that in part the opposition MDC, as initially formed by the congress of trade unions, was also beginning to lose its ideological social democratic radar to neoliberalism.  In mentioning this he would however point out the difficulties he was facing in the labour movement trying to navigate various blind loyalties to either political parties or embassies by some of his colleagues and affiliate unions. And how in part he could not however risk any further division of the union in the difficult operating environment that was already increasingly hostile to unionism. 
A unique characteristic that Matombo demonstrated was his evident willingness to interact with civil society.  The ZCTU was still by far the largest organization outside of the state and churches, but he never had a high browed approach to meet with CSOs’.  I always fondly remember his hearty welcomes at the annual May Day/Workers Day rallies.  

He also never hesitated to participate in broader multi-stakeholder engagements such as that which would bring about the Zimbabwe People’s Charter.  Or to directly engage with the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and challenge the Zanu-PF- MDC constitutional reform process of 2010-2013 on the basis of democratic principle.   

The latter was also to make him lose some allies in civil society, affiliate unions and the international community.  But he stuck to his principles.  I do not recall him expressing regret on the decisions he made about his ideological persuasions or strategic considerations on either constitutionalism or the national political economy. 

This was demonstrable via one particular example concerning the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU).  Matombo was a keen supporter of student and youth activism.  He however had a keen intent that it not be directly similar to the way it was done in Zanu Pf, that is be based on materialism and raw populism.  At a time when the MDC-T was fighting for control of ZINASU, Matombo chose to support an organic student leadership that was not influenced ether by populism, donors or mercenary politicians.  Together with the NCA, the ZCTU supported a progressive ZINASU and refused to succumb to undue pressure on the matter.   

On matters beyond unionism Matombo would always demonstrate organic and progressive knowledge. And always in its left leaning assessment of global events and how a better world is possible. 

And he also had an amazing sense of caustic humour.  At one time we had travelled to Chinhoyi for a Zinasu national congress in 2010 as solidarity delegates.  We were slightly late but had not had breakfast and so we headed to the dining hall.  Once there I noticed how quickly he was handling his breakfast.  He noticed my startled expression and looked up at me and said, “Cde Zhangazha, eat quickly.  We might get arrested. And we don’t want that on empty stomachs!”
Or the way he would specially mention the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) for its propaganda against the ZCTU by mockingly referring to it as ‘Zete Biii Ciii!’
Cde Matombo is a man that will be sorely missed by Zimbabwe’s left and its progressive civil society.  Even more significantly his brand of labour unionism that can only be admired and urgently learnt from. 
Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Tuesday 14 January 2020

Zim's 2nd Constitutional Amendment: An Exercise in Symbolism and Power.


By Takura Zhangazha*

The Constitution of Zimbabwe is due to be amended this year.  The changes to be made according to the gazette constitutional amendment bill No 2 of 2019 include repealing clauses that allow for presidential running mates, the extension for two more parliaments of the women’s quota system and the new addition of ten parliamentary seats for the youth quota.  The latter point also interestingly being done with names of candidates that are interchanged by way of gender.  

Other proposed constitutional amendments include the extension of the tenure of office of judges who have reached retirement age and the constitutional establishment of the office of a public protector and deputy. Further proposed constitutional amendments relate to provincial and metropolitan councils wherein members of the same are to be elected by proportional representation.  Also add to these the proposed changes the greater role the president would be expected to play with respect to the disciplinary procedures of the office of the prosecutor general.

These proposed constitutional amendments are a handful.  And somewhat varied in their import.  Arguments put out by either civil society organisations or opposition parties relate to at least three issues.  The first being that the amendments are too soon after the constitution was passed and therefore fly against the spirit and letter of democratic constitutionalism.  A point that is relatively moot if anything else. 

The second being that the proposed amendments give the president considerably more power via changing the running mate clause and allow him/her to appoint deputies as well as with the greater role the president plays in the dismissal or retention of the prosecutor general or the appointment of judges.  A fair point in so far as it relates to the dynamics that were present during the COPAC led constitutional reform exercise.  As determined by the larger than life political figure that was Robert Mugabe.

Thirdly, the argument is why change a constitution that has not even been fully aligned with the existent subservient laws?  For them the issue to is first fulfill the alignment requirements before seeking to change it.  The only problem with this is that Mnangagwa’s government has no legal obligation to do that. It can always argue that it is all ‘work in progress’.

The ruling Zanu Pf party has also given some reasons why it wants to change the constitution.  On the issue of presidential running mates it has argued that it does not require two centers of power.  On devolution it is arguing that it is fulfilling its electoral campaign promises.  Same with the extension of the women’s quota and the introduction of the youth quota in Parliament.

Beyond these arguments against  or for amending the constitution as proposed by Constitutional Amendment Bill No 2 of 2019, there are some stark political realities that may be lost in translation.  The first and what should be the most obvious one is that the government wants to change the constitution because it can.  The ruling Zanu Pf party has a two thirds majority in both houses of Parliament (Section 328 (5) and can therefore constitutionally do so.  Except for Chapter 4 (Bill of Rights) and Chapter 16 (Agricultural Land) where it will require a constitutional referendum.  So on the face of it, it is within Zanu Pf’s legal right to do so. Unless someone takes them to the Constitutional court on some technicality or the other.

The next hidden element to these proposed amendments is a desultory political public.  Amending the constitution is not high on the Zimbabwean public’s priority or concern list.  Instead it’s the  political economy (with an emphasis on economy and economic survival) that is top of the list.  This does not mean there will be no entertainment of the subject in general or in its parliamentary specificity and televised antics when it is read for the first and second times.  

The general lack of populism around the matter indicates a continued public ignorance of the provisions of the constitution but more significantly a continued lack of desire at public ownership of the same.  In other words, the constitution of Zimbabwe is not an organic but entirely functional one. Especially for the political elite that wrote it and got their supporters to vote for it. 

A final hidden element to the constitutional amendments as proposed is the fact of their symbolism in the exercise of political power.  First of all the recognizable source of the changes is the ruling party which in doing so is asserting not only its authority for public recognition but also for its own party structures.  That is giving meaning via this sort of action to its own exercise of power.  In the second instance is the benevolent attitude toward women and the youth via extending, for the former, the quota system and for the latter, introducing it.  Add to this, the new Chinese facilitated massive new Parliament building made in the image of Great Zimbabwe and you have a sum total of the exercise of power and symbolism.  Even if the majority of us don’t see it.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

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Saturday 4 January 2020

Anticipating Zimbabwe’s 2020: Four Reasonable Considerations.


By Takura Zhangazha*

Happy new year, 2020 Comrades. Hope everything that you have individually or collectively planned works out as approximately close to what you intend in the next 12 months. This blog, being my first of the year will be comparatively shorter than most that I put up.   

Because I am not a prophet, neither do I harbor ambitions to be one (unless I get really broke and use my limited intellect to cram the Bible and have a go at the few dollars of the most gullible and vulnerable in our society), this write up is about what to reasonably expect in Zimbabwe’s political economy in 2020.  Note that I used the turn of phrase ‘reasonably’.  Not ‘emotionally’ nor ‘religiously’. 

And because we are generally supposed to plan ahead, we must do so in realistic context.  So here are 4 things you/we must anticipate to occur in Zimbabwe’s year 2020. 

Firstly, on the political front, the ruling Zanu Pf party will try to fully undertake policies that point to ‘performance legitimacy’.  This being to appear to be a government and party that listens to the most vulnerable in our society while at the same time having a holistic neo-liberal/free market economic framework.  It will also up the ante with its devolution drive not necessarily for democratic purposes but in order to shift political centers of activity from Harare and Bulawayo.   

Mnangagwa’s team however will be beholden to the international community and will be hoping to have the newly elected British Prime Minster Boris Johnson on their side in their re-engagement foreign policy strategy.  Domestically there will be limited political reforms, some of which are already in motion such as amendments to the constitution (running mates, devolution and extension of gender quotas among others). Issues such as political dialogue will remain largely domesticated with Mnangagwa being fully in charge of the process. All based largely on the political fact that he has an unassailable two thirds majority in Parliament. 

The largest official opposition, MDC Alliance, will remain actively popular in urban areas while at the same time struggling to gain new ground in the rural.  The latter area being not only unfairly closed out to them but also from them not having a sustained rural mobilization strategy.  The same party may also face challenges in countering the ‘performance legitimacy’ strategy of Zanu Pf in the local governments it controls.  Not only for lack of knowledge but also for lack of resources that will largely come from central government.  

Like Zanu Pf, the MDC Alliance will seek to court the eye of the international community.  With the difference being an intention to still call out the question of legitimacy while Zanu will focus on courting global capital, be it from the West or the East.

There will be no new major political parties that will be formed beyond the largest official two. Despite the Zanu Pf faction’s Generation 40’s  (G40) intentions.  But like in Uganda, there will be new celebrity politicians drawn from the entertainment industry who will make political ripples and eventually be co-opted into the major formations. 

 Secondly, with regard to the national economy, the most significant issue is that we have a drought on our hands.  And that will affect everything else mainly because agriculture remains the backbone of the economy, particularly peasant agriculture.  So the state will be forced to be benevolent.  It will have to subsidize those things that tis neo-liberal approach would not countenance.  This would be for services such as drought relief, rural health services and public transport.  In this Mnangagwa will have no choice if he wants to retain a modicum of popularity, despite what his finance guru Mthuli Ncube says/wants.  Foreign direct investment will largely remain bilateral i.e. Chinese support for infrastructure, Russian investment in mining or United Arab Emirates support in pharmaceuticals.  

Private global capital will remain hesitant despite changes to the indigenisation laws. The local currency will still be rammed down the throats of reluctant Zimbabweans with the United States Dollar still being the arbiter of value (Chicken Inn anyone?)  We will however remain a consumerist society focusing largely on individualist desires as opposed to collective well being.  Hence Private Public Partnerships (PPPs) will appear to initially work out, but eventually break down due to high costs of public services and also our running out of money. 

Thirdly on the human rights and social welfare front, central government will continue being benevolent in observing the rule of law, respecting human rights and ensuring overall good governance.  This as was the case in 2019 only because of fear of the gaze of the western international community (which probably won’t relent on the matter.) Bu the opposition will still put the state to the test, not always on what would be clear issues but also to gain the attention of the international gaze, by way of the media. 

Socially, urban poverty will increase based on a increasing rural-urban migration and the continuing expansion of urban settlements.  Rural poverty will be exacerbated by the evident drought and also again, an ageing population that is losing its young ones to the cities and the Diaspora. 
The influence of religion will remain exceedingly high, but not perhaps for as political reasons as in 2019.  Churches as major owners of fixed capital will seek to maximize the electoral vulnerabilities of political leaders for institutional and in some cases individual gain. 

Fourthly and finally, the role of social media in the national consciousness will be enhanced.  Even if there are electricity shortages and in the worst case, government internet shut downs.  It is a role that will however remain ephemeral, based on events as they occur.  Such as if the president makes a bad joke or a celebrity leaks some untoward video of themselves.  But all the same the mobile telephone and its connectivity to social media (not necessarily the internet) is now the new medium of consciousness.  It may not be the immediate motivator of direct political action but it will definitely define the meaning of the same.  It will most certainly modify our political, economic and social behavior especially in urban areas.
Once again here’s to an organic 2020 and thinking beyond. For posterity.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)