An Overview of Zimbabwe’s Rural Political Economy 2022

By Takura Zhangazha*

Many years ago my brother and I had a discussion on the meaning of the ‘rural’  in Zimbabwe.  The discussion focused on how we could balance the fact that we were originally from there via our parents and how in the moment we had to confront the reality of success as being determined by urban lifestyle expectations vis a vis the ‘rural’.    

The key question we grappled with was whether urbanisation of the rural was preferable.  We agreed on the technicality of this question.  There is no rural area that does not desire electricity or running water.  In this we also agreed that we need to modernise the rural in order to achieve equitability in Zimbabwe’s human development agenda.  

We sort of got stuck in relation to customary and civil law.  We had to interrogate the question of whether the rural in its modernisation was ready for a civil legal system.  We never came to an agreement.    And this is a matter that remains outstanding between us.

Over the national Heroes holiday which is held every August, I however noticed a number of emerging trends about our rural political economy.  Albeit from one district in Masvingo but I am sure these are likely to be occurring elsewhere. 

The first is that there is a default urban culture creep in the rural.   With or without the assistance of central or local government.  There is an increasing use of battery power to charge mobile phones and listen to radio broadcasts. Mostly via singular solar energy panels that connect to old car batteries or newer smaller ones that are designed for that particular purpose. 

There is the expansion of shopping centres in places that were previously remote and isolated for basic goods and commodities.    This also includes emerging bars and places of leisure that immediately link up young rural Zimbabweans with entertainment such as watching European football on generator or solar powered televisions. 

Another interesting factor has been the general expansion of what we still refer to as ‘growth points’. These pre-urban areas have increased residential settlements which are more formal and run by rural district councils and in some instances land barons who know how to work the system about land use permits and changes.  Especially for land that is in the immediate vicinity of these same said growth points. 

There is an evident rural-urban migration that transcends what would have been previous rural-major city migrations of the past.  Migratory patterns on the face of it appear to be young rural men seeking employment opportunities in mining towns or disused mining areas in various parts of the country. An employment term that is commonly referred to as ‘chikorokoza’ in our local lingo.  Though South Africa is still in vogue for many of these young men as an option barring birth certificate and passport access.

For young women, it is intra-rural migration that appears to be unique.  Particularly for the purposes of providing domestic work services to the wealthier rural families.   There is however still a decent number of rural –urban migration to provide the same services in urban centres that is viewed as a major employment option, even though it can be ephemeral particularly due to the challenges caused by the Covid 19 lockdowns.

But perhaps what is more immediate is political perceptions of what the future portends.   There is a clear generational gap in rural political consciousness.  At least from my own personal perspective.  What I noticed was that there was an eagerness by those that have been travelling between cities and mining areas but based in the rural to demonstrate support for the opposition. At least to me. And as motivated by what is clearly a desire to find the elusive US dollar in the rural political economy.  It is as emotional as it is populist in fashion and form.  Almost as a declaration of desire, intent while being a testament to realistic placement in the national political economy. 

This includes historical recognition of previous episodes of political violence and the general import of being defiant that older generations are quick to remind younger ones of.  With warnings of the danger of going against the political grain of the ruling establishment in the rural realm. 

There are many other nuances that I considered but did not get enough of conversation on.  These include the directly gendered dimensions of the rural political economy. Especially after the Covid 19 lockdowns and the changing role of young women in bearing the brunt of job losses for breadwinners during this period. Or that of the bubbling role of religion via new emergent small Christian church congregations and allegations of witchcraft that occasionally emerged in casual conversations.  Or the increased uptake of illicit alcohol and attendant violent episodes particularly with young men.

What I did get a sense of is that the rural provided a temporary reprieve for many who had been working in cities and mining areas during the lockdown.  And that a probable decent number of young Zimbabweans resorted to their parents\guardians in the difficult economic times caused by lockdowns.  Particularly to look after their children while they sought new opportunities locally and across the Limpopo or Save rivers.

To conclude, we have an increasingly urbanising/modernising rural political economy.  Both by way of material developments or cultural desires (solar energy use, batteries, enclosure of fields, expansion of growth points and default privatisation of land ownership.) What I definitely got a sense of is that Zimbabwe’s rural political economy is changing. Both by way of physical/human geography and culture.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)