By Takura Zhangazha. *
On Tuesday, 29 August 2012, the Zimbabwean Prime Minister held his
monthly press conference. In his statement, the PM touched on a number
of issues related to political developments in the country. His
pronouncements were given, perhaps as they should be, with an aura of
finality. This was particularly apparent when he addressed the
contentious matter of our current constitution making process. To quote
the PM directly, he informed the media and in the process, the nation
that,
' Article 6 of the GPA is clear that the Constitution-making process
should be driven by Parliament. Some of us have no wish to revise that
position and in any case, the Principals cannot renegotiate a document
agreed by those with our delegated authority. We cannot
negotiate in perpetuity. This Constitution is a product of years of hard
work which included sourcing the views of the people and negotiations
between the political parties. So we say no to any attempts to dedicate
more time in a process where the country has already committed huge
resources and time. It is time the people made a decision
through a referendum and political parties should refrain from
pretending to speak on behalf of the people when the people reserve the
right to speak for themselves in a referendum.'
Such words
from the PM appear somewhat persuasive, or even 'principled' to say the
least, but in effect, the PM is not being as honest as one would expect.
By saying this, I am aware that some of my own colleagues may get 'angry'
on behalf of the PM at my 'daring' to question such a statement for
various reasons. Top of the list of such reasons would be that there
is a general understanding (arguably so) that most colleagues
in civil society do not query or challenge positions that are
made with an air of finality by leaders in the inclusive government. From my own personal vantage point
as a Zimbabwean citizen, I will however depart from what has come to be viewed
as the 'norm' of towing a political party line and state that on the important issue of the constitution,
I respectfully disagree with the PM Tsvangirayi (not
that it may matter to him or his office).
My disagreement is premised on a number of factors but for brevity I
will focus only on three of them. The first being that the PM is not
being politically honest where he seeks to claim finality with the
phrase, 'we cannot negotiate in perpetuity' on the constitution when in
fact, the entirety of COPAC has been perpetual political party
negotiation and sadly will be concluded in the same manner. Similarly
the reference that is made about 'refraining' political parties from
speaking on behalf of the people is ironic.
The inclusive government has
been exactly just that, and it is unfortunate that after the COPAC
process has come to a full undemocratic circle, the PM wishes us to
bestow him with the credit of taking an undemocratically (with
or without Zanu Pf amendments) arrived at document to the people. In any event,
even if the PM's arguments were based on the need to save resources, a
cost-benefit analysis of COPAC logically leads to the fact that what has
been spent and is still intended to be spent far outweighs the real
output.
The second
reason why I disagree with the PM's recent statement on the constitution is
that while he insists on going to the people for a verdict, the end
product of such brinksmanship is obviously a popularity contest between
Zanu Pf and the MDC-T. To explain further, this would mean what the
country would be faced with is not a vote on a constitution, but a
preamble to a Presidential election based on President Mugabe and PM
Tsvangirai's opinion on the same document. Not that it would be a bad thing in itself, but it
would be an extremely deceptive and unfortunate pretense at 'democracy' by
seeking evidently partisan means to establish a people's charter.
The
PM also states rather controversially that, " A new Constitution is
central to elections and to the reform agenda in
Zimbabwe and if this process is collapsed, it will spell doom to the
prospects for a credible, free and fair election". The truth of the
matter is that Parliament recently passed the Electoral Ammendment Bill
and a number of other Bills which have been part of and approved as the inclusive government's 'reform
agenda'. Perhaps the constitution would be the sum total of these
Bills, but to argue that the COPAC draft (in whatever form) is the only
route to elections, is unfortunately to ignore the very matters that
have given credence to the 'incremental change' arguments of both the
MDCs and components of civil society.
The third and final reason
why I hold a different opinion from the PM is that I am certain that
given the usage of a huge amount of resources for COPAC and the
involvement of SADC, negotiations will be the PM's only option (not that
it will make the process or the draft anymore democratic). There is no
real reason why the three political parties, who have been in the
inclusive government for over three years will not be made to agree on
another version of the draft by SADC or even after the extensive Monday
meetings of the political principals. So perhaps the PM's statement is
one that is intended to call Zanu PF's bluff and drive some sort of hard
bargain or at least appear to be doing so. But it will potentially all
come full circle, back to another negotiation and the re-representation
of an undemocratically arrived at constitution to the people of
Zimbabwe.
Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)
Thursday, 30 August 2012
Tuesday, 21 August 2012
Southern African Implications of The Marikana Lonmin Mineworkers Shooting Tragedy
Southern African Implications of Marikana Mine Shooting Tragedy
By Takura Zhangazha *
The tragic and fatal shooting of 34 mineworkers in South Africa has sadly brought back memories of the violence of the apartheid years. And because memories of apartheid are not only limited to South Africa, the killing fields of Marikana must also be viewed as part of the Southern African narrative of repression, violence and the historical de-humanisation of the African. And this, even in the aftermath of the liberation of the continent from colonial and settler minority rule. This point on its own is a controversial but necessary one. The reason why it must be raised is because parts of the Southern African media debate in the tragic aftermath of these shootings has mistakenly centered around the assumed failures of the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) as well as general derision of South African 'exceptionalism' on human rights observation in the region.
Some debates have gone so far as to argue that had such a tragedy occurred on Zimbabwean soil, there perhaps may have been an immediate invoking of the Responsibility to Protect liberal intervention doctrine that has been used in parts of North and West Africa in 2012. That too is an argument that misses the meaning and full implications of the dreadful shooting of the miners. In other circles, others are arguing (including some South African labour unions) that because the Marikana miners actions are said to have led to the murder of at least two police officers and that the strikers were also armed, the South African police were acting in self defence. That is an even more controversial argument but one that still skirts the serious meaning of the Marikana shooting tragedy.
In fact, there must now be a distinction that is made between the tragic event as it occurred and the broader and much more important underlying causes to these most unfortunate of incidences. If not for just this one tragic event but also in order to prevent further such from occurring again. I am sure for the nation of South Africa, this may be a task for the Commission that has been established by President Jacob Zuma.
For Southern African citizens this tragedy however must be viewed with the utmost seriousness and examination of our collective regional history as it relates to mining operations, the de-humanisation of migrant labour and finally the emergence of new resource extraction oligarchies that are generally acting in collusion with many of our governments in the region to extract/mine without attendant democratic socio-economic accountability. In effect, such an analysis, given the unaccountable state of affairs in mining and resource extraction in most (if not all) of Southern Africa, a 'Marikana' can unfortunately occur anywhere else in the region, if it has not silently occurred in worse formats in countries such as Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This is before we even begin to discuss the processes that are unfolding in Tanzania and Mozambique over gas, coal and potential oil discoveries by international mining companies.
It is therefore of importance that we see the borderline heinous shooting of striking miners in South Africa as a tragic but now necessary wake-up call for all of us to reflect on how issues of mining and mineral wealth discoveries are being handled by our own governments and the regional body SADC. In doing so, we must however, unlike most of our governments, place emphasis on the necessity of prioritizing the people's welfare and above all, tackling with finality, the repressive legacy of colonial mineral and labour extraction in our post-independence societies. This would entail a reflection on how initially most of the workers at big or small mines were mainly migrant as well as chibaro (forced labour) recruits from across the entirety of the Southern African region. We must also examine whether it is the same 'colonial' frameworks and attitudes that inform the structure, function and profit of our contemporary mines. Questions such as to what extent do most mines or extractive mineral operations retain the structure of the oppressive colonial past and the extent to which our contemporary leaders are acting as 'replacements' for colonial governments will be critical for such an appraisal.
Further still, we must begin to examine the entirety of the Marikana tragedy, not only from the purview of the state (inclusive of the South African Police Service) but from its most 'human rights' and 'humanity' related angle. This would be from the point of view of the mine workers, their families and their socio-economic circumstances. This not only for South Africa but for the entirety of the region. In this there should be no exceptionalism. Whether one is discussing the controversial diamond mines in Eastern Zimbabwe or the revived copper mines in Zambia, a key question must resonate, 'where in this do we find the people's socio-economic rights?' Even if the investor appears to make the central or provincial governments in our respective countries happy, we must measure whether there is no deliberate elite cohesion in extractive wealth accumulation for the few at the expense of the poor majority.
As it is, the lessons of Marikana may appear specific to socio-economic and political developments in South Africa. Some may have even chosen to view them in relation to the internal politics of the ANC as well in order to falsely claim that all 'African' politics remain the same. The truth of the matter is, Marikana is indicative of a continually emerging and re-emerging Southern African problem around resource extraction, elite collusion against workers and families and in the same process, an active lack of democratic frameworks around resource extraction in the region.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)
By Takura Zhangazha *
The tragic and fatal shooting of 34 mineworkers in South Africa has sadly brought back memories of the violence of the apartheid years. And because memories of apartheid are not only limited to South Africa, the killing fields of Marikana must also be viewed as part of the Southern African narrative of repression, violence and the historical de-humanisation of the African. And this, even in the aftermath of the liberation of the continent from colonial and settler minority rule. This point on its own is a controversial but necessary one. The reason why it must be raised is because parts of the Southern African media debate in the tragic aftermath of these shootings has mistakenly centered around the assumed failures of the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) as well as general derision of South African 'exceptionalism' on human rights observation in the region.
Some debates have gone so far as to argue that had such a tragedy occurred on Zimbabwean soil, there perhaps may have been an immediate invoking of the Responsibility to Protect liberal intervention doctrine that has been used in parts of North and West Africa in 2012. That too is an argument that misses the meaning and full implications of the dreadful shooting of the miners. In other circles, others are arguing (including some South African labour unions) that because the Marikana miners actions are said to have led to the murder of at least two police officers and that the strikers were also armed, the South African police were acting in self defence. That is an even more controversial argument but one that still skirts the serious meaning of the Marikana shooting tragedy.
In fact, there must now be a distinction that is made between the tragic event as it occurred and the broader and much more important underlying causes to these most unfortunate of incidences. If not for just this one tragic event but also in order to prevent further such from occurring again. I am sure for the nation of South Africa, this may be a task for the Commission that has been established by President Jacob Zuma.
For Southern African citizens this tragedy however must be viewed with the utmost seriousness and examination of our collective regional history as it relates to mining operations, the de-humanisation of migrant labour and finally the emergence of new resource extraction oligarchies that are generally acting in collusion with many of our governments in the region to extract/mine without attendant democratic socio-economic accountability. In effect, such an analysis, given the unaccountable state of affairs in mining and resource extraction in most (if not all) of Southern Africa, a 'Marikana' can unfortunately occur anywhere else in the region, if it has not silently occurred in worse formats in countries such as Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This is before we even begin to discuss the processes that are unfolding in Tanzania and Mozambique over gas, coal and potential oil discoveries by international mining companies.
It is therefore of importance that we see the borderline heinous shooting of striking miners in South Africa as a tragic but now necessary wake-up call for all of us to reflect on how issues of mining and mineral wealth discoveries are being handled by our own governments and the regional body SADC. In doing so, we must however, unlike most of our governments, place emphasis on the necessity of prioritizing the people's welfare and above all, tackling with finality, the repressive legacy of colonial mineral and labour extraction in our post-independence societies. This would entail a reflection on how initially most of the workers at big or small mines were mainly migrant as well as chibaro (forced labour) recruits from across the entirety of the Southern African region. We must also examine whether it is the same 'colonial' frameworks and attitudes that inform the structure, function and profit of our contemporary mines. Questions such as to what extent do most mines or extractive mineral operations retain the structure of the oppressive colonial past and the extent to which our contemporary leaders are acting as 'replacements' for colonial governments will be critical for such an appraisal.
Further still, we must begin to examine the entirety of the Marikana tragedy, not only from the purview of the state (inclusive of the South African Police Service) but from its most 'human rights' and 'humanity' related angle. This would be from the point of view of the mine workers, their families and their socio-economic circumstances. This not only for South Africa but for the entirety of the region. In this there should be no exceptionalism. Whether one is discussing the controversial diamond mines in Eastern Zimbabwe or the revived copper mines in Zambia, a key question must resonate, 'where in this do we find the people's socio-economic rights?' Even if the investor appears to make the central or provincial governments in our respective countries happy, we must measure whether there is no deliberate elite cohesion in extractive wealth accumulation for the few at the expense of the poor majority.
As it is, the lessons of Marikana may appear specific to socio-economic and political developments in South Africa. Some may have even chosen to view them in relation to the internal politics of the ANC as well in order to falsely claim that all 'African' politics remain the same. The truth of the matter is, Marikana is indicative of a continually emerging and re-emerging Southern African problem around resource extraction, elite collusion against workers and families and in the same process, an active lack of democratic frameworks around resource extraction in the region.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)
Tuesday, 7 August 2012
Becoming heroes of our own time
By Takura Zhangazha*
Each year Zimbabwe has correctly set
aside a public holiday in August to remember the heroes of our national
liberation struggle. The conferring of
hero status upon individual Zimbabweans however remains a contentious issue
given the fact that it is Zanu Pf that decides on the matter. In fact, there
was an occasion where President Mugabe spoke at the funeral of one national
hero where he stated that the Warren Hills Heroes Acre in Harare essentially belonged only to
those that went to the liberation struggle. He added that should anyone else
who was not in that struggle directly or indirectly seek to be interred at the same venue, he or she might as well find their own hillside elsewhere and build one for themselves.
There have been many other debates
about who and what it is to be a Zimbabwean national hero especially after the passing on
of a prominent national political leader or popular celebrity who had/has no direct
link with Zanu Pf. It is however
unfortunate that hero status is normally conferred upon only those that will
have passed on. There is rare conferment of hero status on those that are
living (young or old) who have served the country in varying capacities
inclusive of but not limited to the liberation struggle or post-independence politics.
It is this latter point that is
perhaps in need of expansion. We
have, as a country and in the last
thirty plus years correctly made it a
priority to honour the comrades that passed on in the course of the liberation
struggle as well as those that participated in it and are with us today. This
has however been politically contentious with each passing year and especially
in the aftermath of the establishment of an inclusive govermnent which to all
intents and purposes was/is a sure sign of weakening Zanu Pf political
hegemony. (Hence the regular contestation by political parties around hero status)
The primary issue however is that
where we have remembered our national heroes of the liberation struggle we have
failed to remember that though their heroism led to the founding of the nation,
it is primarily a heroism that was intended to create further heroic deeds in the
name of the struggle and the revolutionary values that established the country. And
this is the primary challenge for all Zimbabweans today. It is not so much to
hold the gun like our freedom fighters but to demonstrate the same commitment and purpose in understanding
our society better and charting principled democratic way forwards that are remembered for
posterity and emulated by generations to come.
The heroic deeds of the armed and
political wings of our liberation war movements were also undertaken with a specific
intention to ensure that while the war was inevitably necessary and tragic, the
struggle itself required that their conduct be consistently revolutionary,
honest and principled on key democratic values that served the best public interest of all Zimbabweans.
With time, it has become
evident that those that led us after independence and those that lead us today
have failed to understand the need to be conscious and stay on the right path
of a continual and democratic people's
victory. In most instances and of their own volition, our contemporary leaders have
sought more self aggrandizement than democratic national leadership and have
tended to function out of sync with the democratic intentions of the liberation
struggle. They have departed further and further from democratically conscious
leadership and are patently failing in becoming revolutionaries of their own time.
Instead of being conscious not only of the liberation struggle and
sticking to democratic values and principles, our leaders are increasingly
involved in elitist cohesion and are functioning in part as though the country
were personal property or belongs to three political parties. They have further
found comfort in believing that all of their actions should be defined by ‘compromises’
in order to acquire or retain political power as an end and without the
necessary social democratic clarity. In the short and long term, the effect of
these tendencies has been inept politcal leadership of government and elite
cohesion around covering up each other’s weaknesses. I fear that perhaps they
too have missed their ‘heroic’ moment despite either having been jailed or tortured at the hands of then oppressors.
And this is why perhaps all
Zimbabweans must discover the hero in themselves and in activities outside of the
political mainstream. By doing so, perhaps we can be heroes and democratic
revolutionaries of our own time. This is regardless of whatever vocation one finds him/herself in. We must act with clarity and appreciation of how our own contributions to our society can be heroic with or without the approval of politicians and politicized matters. This must however be done with the spirit and intent of those that
fought the liberation struggle conscientiously and with belief in democracy,
social and economic justice and the necessity of performing their generational duty
for posterity and not self.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his own personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)
Wednesday, 25 July 2012
The Deception of Zimbabwes Draft Constitution
By Takura Zhangazha*
I have not yet read the COPAC draft constitution. And I will probably not read it because I do not have to. Its a document that can no longer take my views into account. No matter how many times academics or political gladiators defend or disparage it. I am also aware that some colleagues in civil society are under tremendous pressure to defend it, warts and all, as a 'better than before' document, and sure enough they will be convening various public meetings to discuss the document's content from a legal perspective. The politics of the document will be conveniently forgotten and an initially silent campaign to seek to persuade Zimbabweans to vote 'yes' to the draft is most definitely underway, even though its final content is yet to be approved by the principals of the inclusive government. Not that such approval makes the document any more democratic. It just simply means this draft constitution is imbued with the personalities and politics of President Mugabe, Prime Minister Tsvangirai, Deputy Prime Minister Mutambara and Minister Ncube.
Even the COPAC management committee together with its select committee cannot do anything else to this document. They have haggled, had numerous workshops and spent over US$20 million (another figure made public has been US$45million) on a draft whose final contents will be determined by just four individuals. But that is not the essential point, even though it makes one wonder,where the COPAC chairpersons get the wherewithal to still claim to have been running a 'people-centered' constitutional reform process.
The key issue is that for all our analysis of the COPAC draft, it is a document that can only now be changed by four individuals. To seek to claim that it is a better document by way of legal analysis and to have Zimbabweans support it, is an exercise in political hypocrisy. This is because to all intents and purposes, even without reading the draft, the political processes that have informed this document are very similar to those that led to the first Kariba draft. In fact, this new draft should merely be referred to as the Kariba 2 document because the politicians that wrote the first version are the players that are now in charge of the second version. And if anyone wants to change the content of the draft, they would be well advised to simply make a beeline to the offices of the President, Prime Minister and the other two ministers.
A second element that points to the hypocrisy of our politicians has been their intention to conveniently forget the monumental disaster that has been COPAC itself. From its beginning to present day, COPAC has failed to demonstrate the requisite seriousness that is nomrally reserved for processes as important as the drafting of a national constitution. Against better advice, it ignored its own outreach findings, sidelined civil society and spent lavishly on hotels, conferences for things and issues which it, in the final analysis has not even seriously considered. Even if its mandate was patently undemocratic, it failed meet the requirements of performance criteria it had set for itself.
Thirdly, the fact that the conversations around constitutional reform have shifted to content does not make the process any more democratic. To argue about the content pre-supposes that it can be changed. Alternatively to debate the content can also be taken to mean indirect approval of the document and therefore, to be a willing player in an undemocratically arrived at draft constitution.
The truth of the matter is that the Kariba 2 draft constitution is not going to undergo any major changes, and even if it does, those changes will not be coming from civil society but the four principals in government. Added to this is that the defence of the document that has begun to be undertaken by some colleagues in civil society means that they are already campaigning for a 'yes' vote for a draft constitution that was arrived at undemocratically. And they are probably doing this under pressure from the MDCs who keep arguing wrongly that the 2000 'no vote' was a mistake, yet it was a democratically arrived at verdict of the peoples wishes.
These colleagues in civil society and in the MDCs would be well advised that constitutions are not written merely for the removal of individuals from power, they are intended for holistic democratic governance. To want to mix up issues of how to get rid of Zanu Pf from power with the constitution making process even at this late stage, is to deliberately deceive the people of Zimbabwe.But then again, the whole COPAC process and the attendant civil society support for it, has been an exercise in elitist political deception.
Finally, I am aware that there is an assumption that it is the political principals that will be able to get Zimbabweans to vote yes to the draft and that anyone else campaigning for a 'no vote' will most certainly lose. This would be a fair analysis were it not for the fact that the people of Zimbabwe do not have a limited understanding of constitutional reform issues. And I am certain that even with all the cajoling and the politicized 'yes' vote campaigns that will follow, a significant number will register their displeasure with the great deception that has been COPAC.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com
I have not yet read the COPAC draft constitution. And I will probably not read it because I do not have to. Its a document that can no longer take my views into account. No matter how many times academics or political gladiators defend or disparage it. I am also aware that some colleagues in civil society are under tremendous pressure to defend it, warts and all, as a 'better than before' document, and sure enough they will be convening various public meetings to discuss the document's content from a legal perspective. The politics of the document will be conveniently forgotten and an initially silent campaign to seek to persuade Zimbabweans to vote 'yes' to the draft is most definitely underway, even though its final content is yet to be approved by the principals of the inclusive government. Not that such approval makes the document any more democratic. It just simply means this draft constitution is imbued with the personalities and politics of President Mugabe, Prime Minister Tsvangirai, Deputy Prime Minister Mutambara and Minister Ncube.
Even the COPAC management committee together with its select committee cannot do anything else to this document. They have haggled, had numerous workshops and spent over US$20 million (another figure made public has been US$45million) on a draft whose final contents will be determined by just four individuals. But that is not the essential point, even though it makes one wonder,where the COPAC chairpersons get the wherewithal to still claim to have been running a 'people-centered' constitutional reform process.
The key issue is that for all our analysis of the COPAC draft, it is a document that can only now be changed by four individuals. To seek to claim that it is a better document by way of legal analysis and to have Zimbabweans support it, is an exercise in political hypocrisy. This is because to all intents and purposes, even without reading the draft, the political processes that have informed this document are very similar to those that led to the first Kariba draft. In fact, this new draft should merely be referred to as the Kariba 2 document because the politicians that wrote the first version are the players that are now in charge of the second version. And if anyone wants to change the content of the draft, they would be well advised to simply make a beeline to the offices of the President, Prime Minister and the other two ministers.
A second element that points to the hypocrisy of our politicians has been their intention to conveniently forget the monumental disaster that has been COPAC itself. From its beginning to present day, COPAC has failed to demonstrate the requisite seriousness that is nomrally reserved for processes as important as the drafting of a national constitution. Against better advice, it ignored its own outreach findings, sidelined civil society and spent lavishly on hotels, conferences for things and issues which it, in the final analysis has not even seriously considered. Even if its mandate was patently undemocratic, it failed meet the requirements of performance criteria it had set for itself.
Thirdly, the fact that the conversations around constitutional reform have shifted to content does not make the process any more democratic. To argue about the content pre-supposes that it can be changed. Alternatively to debate the content can also be taken to mean indirect approval of the document and therefore, to be a willing player in an undemocratically arrived at draft constitution.
The truth of the matter is that the Kariba 2 draft constitution is not going to undergo any major changes, and even if it does, those changes will not be coming from civil society but the four principals in government. Added to this is that the defence of the document that has begun to be undertaken by some colleagues in civil society means that they are already campaigning for a 'yes' vote for a draft constitution that was arrived at undemocratically. And they are probably doing this under pressure from the MDCs who keep arguing wrongly that the 2000 'no vote' was a mistake, yet it was a democratically arrived at verdict of the peoples wishes.
These colleagues in civil society and in the MDCs would be well advised that constitutions are not written merely for the removal of individuals from power, they are intended for holistic democratic governance. To want to mix up issues of how to get rid of Zanu Pf from power with the constitution making process even at this late stage, is to deliberately deceive the people of Zimbabwe.But then again, the whole COPAC process and the attendant civil society support for it, has been an exercise in elitist political deception.
Finally, I am aware that there is an assumption that it is the political principals that will be able to get Zimbabweans to vote yes to the draft and that anyone else campaigning for a 'no vote' will most certainly lose. This would be a fair analysis were it not for the fact that the people of Zimbabwe do not have a limited understanding of constitutional reform issues. And I am certain that even with all the cajoling and the politicized 'yes' vote campaigns that will follow, a significant number will register their displeasure with the great deception that has been COPAC.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com
Monday, 23 July 2012
Debating the EU's 'credible referendum' conditionality on Zimbabwean sanctions
By Takura Zhangazha*
The European Union has decided to put a conditionality on the long standing issue of sanctions on Zimbabwe and Zimbabwean individuals. In a statement released on Monday, July 23, 2010, EU foreign ministers stated that they would suspend sanctions on Zimbabwe only after the country has held a 'credible referendum' on a new constitution. The same statement also sought to make it clear that the sanctions being referred to are not those that relate directly to President Mugabe or any one who is linked to political violence. The latter point is one that will obviously rile members of President Mugabe's party and may also cause SADC to warn against selective application of the sanctions when the country has an 'inclusive' government and a political agreement that calls for the lifting of all sanctions on Zimbabwe.
It is however the prerogative of the EU to decide its foreign policy and the onus of changing its 'cold' approach to Zimbabwe resides more in the ability of Zimbabwean leaders to negotiate for the reneging of these sanctions. That the Zimbabwean leaders have failed to find a common strategy on how to get the sanctions lifted is no longer in any doubt especially after this new conditionality of a 'credible referendum' that has been announced by the EU foreign ministers.
It would however be necessary to examine what this new EU position on sanctions means for Zimbabwe and our politics. The first effect of this new conditionality will be that of making the constitutional reform process as the 'only' mechanism through which free and fair elections can be held. This in itself is a disputed point but what the EU has essentially placed on the table is that either the inclusive government comes up with reforms that lead to a 'credible referendum' and with it a 'credible' referendum result or the sanctions will be extended. Whether this will mean a new law on referendums in Zimbabwe that is approved by the EU or alternatively, a constitutional campaign that will lead to a 'yes' vote to the COPAC draft is really up to the three principals in the inclusive government. What is however self evident is that the EU has literally placed the ball in the court of the three parties in the inclusive government, and either way, the same parties will have to dance to the tune of EU should they want sanctions suspended or lifted in the short term.
It is also important to observe that because of the rather condescending announcement by the EU foreign ministers, the three parties in the inclusive governemtn are going to react differently on the matter. Zanu Pf is going to be slighted and will raise its internal party stakes around the exact purpose of the whole COPAC process. The same party will also be more shrill in seeking to put the blame for sanctions firmly at the MDCs doorsteps after this particular development. There will however also be internal divisions as to whether to call the EU's bluff and go ahead with the referendum or put a stop to the constitution drafting process all-together citing controversial arguments such as 'interference with sovereignty' or the oft-used refrain of 'regime change agenda of the West'
The MDCs on the other hand, will view this as a 'victory' in the sense that it makes their case for a new constitution via a referendum internationally recognized and therefore seemingly irreversible domestically. These parties will also seek to raise the matter with SADC in order for the issue to have resonance with Zimbabwe's neighbours and in terms of the much vaunted electoral road-map. They will however face the challenge of being accused by Zanu Pf and some ruling parties in the region of not having done enough thus far to get the sanctions lifted or to have actively played a part in their retention. This more so where Prime Minister Tsvangirai is reported to have stated that sanctions must be suspended, not lifted, while in Australia this week. In true fashion, the MDCs will issue ambiguous statements on the same matter in the confidence that their actual position on sanctions is of limited interest to their supporters or their electoral base.
To all intents and purposes, the announcement by the EU foreign ministers on the conditionality of a 'credible' constitutional referendum as the basis of a review of sanctions, is a serious development in Zimbabwe's politics. Whether the EU ministers made this decision on the advice of any other players is of limited consequence because it remains their right to determine their foreign policy. This is also true of Zimbabwe's political leaders who also remain with the sovereign right to respond to the EU's announcement hopefully in the best interests of Zimbabwe and not of themselves. Now that the constitutional referendum has been internationalized, the political stakes are higher, and it is my fervent hope that our own common sense will prevail.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)
Thursday, 12 July 2012
Potential implications of a deteriorating media freedom climate in South Africa on Southern Africa.
Remarks made at the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) Public Discussion on Media Developments in South Africa and their potential impact in Southern Africa.
Wednesday, 12 July 2012: Rosebank Crowne Plaza Hotel, Rosebank, Johannesburg, South Africa
By Takura Zhangazha.*
Mr Chairman,
Let me begin by expressing the gratitude of the Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwefor the invitation to attend this public discussion at the behest of our colleagues from the Media Institute of Southern Africa(MISA). The topic under discussion is an important one because it relates to the state of media freedom in the Southern African region with particular emphasis on recent media policy developments in South Africa.
It is an historically understood point that in the aftermath of the anti-apartheid struggle and on the basis of its democratic constitution, the influence of South Africa on broad regional debates concerning democratization issues has been and continues to be substantial.
This should also be taken to mean that it is generally perceived within the Southern African region and beyond that South Africa is a good example of a functional democratic state. Such comparisons are even more poignant where the Zimbabwean state is compared with the South African one either in direct relation to democratic practice or where it concerns issues of the perfomance legitimacy of former liberation movements that are in power in both of our countries.
In the last ten or so years, one of the key components of measuring and comparing the democratic perfomances of various SADC states has been whether or not the citizens of the same are enjoying their right to freedom of expression, and whether the freedom of the press is also guaranteed. South Africa has had the distinction of being singled out as having some of the most democratic clauses in its constitution and attendant enabling laws concerning freedom of expression, media freedom and media diversity. In fact, it has been cited by many Zimbabwean media stakeholders as an example of where lessons can be drawn from in order for the Zimbabwean media landscape to be fully democratised, particularly with regards to media self regulation, broadcasting diversity as well as media sustainability.
It has however come to pass that the South African government has decided that it must introduce the Protection of State Information Bill, a development that has had the unfortunate impact of making some governments in the rest of the SADC region claim that their laws are not so bad after all (even if they remain much worse, eg. Zapiro would probably have been a police cell in Zimbabwe charged with undermining the authority of the President).
Add to this, the now stalled Media Appeals Tribunal (MAT) which is currently a policy document of the ruling African National Congress, then indeed there is serious cause for concern about media freedom in South Africa. And given the regional ‘democratic example’ role that South Africa has been playing, it would also mean that if the MAT were to be made government policy, it would be a significant setback for media freedom in the region by way of example.
It would also appear as if the South African ruling party is getting lessons from some of its neighboring ruling parties in the region who insist on statutory regulation as well as criminalization of the media profession. From our own Zimbabwean experiences, such tendencies can only be those of governments that have more to hide than share in the best democratic public interest.
Apart from the new undemocratic policy trends in South Africa as regards the mainstream media, again there is the new threat that is emerging from governments across the world against those that utilize social media for citizen journalism or even just expressing their opinion on political matters. Given the global government panic over the impact of Wikileaks as well as the invoking of anti-terrorism laws by governments that have been at the forefront of promoting democracy globally are now preferring criminal charges against whistle blowers and investigative journalists. This is an unfortunate emerging trend that the Southern African region would do well to avoid.
With regards to the important issue of media self regulation in the region, it is imperative that we continue to emphasize the democratic symbiosis of the rights of media freedom with freedom of expression and access to information. None can exist without any of the other two.
Where governments both within our SADC region and across the oceans have started to talk about exercising either of the triumvirate rights separately, it must be viewed as being tantamount to seeking to make freedom of expression either a ‘qualified’ (depending on your political loyalties) franchise right or ‘privilege’ rights to be enjoyed solely by those in power.
This is why ‘co-regulation’ of the media by the state and the media itself, though being touted as a ‘compromise’, is patently inadequate in allowing the media to carry out its public interest mandate.
Governments, South Africa’s included, have adopted a ‘self righteous’ approach that seeks more to threaten the media than to engage in progressive dialogue with the media and allow media self regulation breathing space.
This is a habit that is now generally seen across the sub-region, and the new media policy direction being debated by the South African Parliament, unfortunately serves to strengthen the emergence of governments with predatory tendencies against the media.
It is therefore of utmost importance that we do not seek compromises that seek to protect those in power or those that claim and wrongly seek to confer responsibilities that are undemocratic on the media while they skirt the democratic mandates that have been given to them by electorates.
Media self regulation is of the utmost importance in Southern Africa and indeed to our South African media colleagues because it has not yet been fully implemented. In effect it is work in progress. We therefore must not at this juncture permit democratic values to be compromised on the basis of the sole whim of governments that are more keen on control than they are on democratic media public accountability and serving the best public interest.
Where media self regulation has been faulted by governments in the region or elsewhere, these are accusations of those that either misunderstand the organic triumvirate of the right to freedom of expression, access to information and media freedom (which is inclusive of media self regulation).
It is however not only governments that must be reminded on these matters. Owners of the media products/houses must also commit themselves more and more to learning to balance their valid concerns on profit and sustainability with those of the public interest as well as media ethics. This would include ensuring that at least they collectively continue to agree on particular media ethics and commit to supporting media self regulatory mechanisms. Journalists must also demonstrate commitment to the same said media ethics and media self regulatory mechanisms with the primary intention of proving that the profession is essentially there to work in the best public interest and with democratic media public accountability.
To conclude, I must emphasize that the debate around media self regulation is a big debate about the triumvirate rights to freedom of expression, access to information and media freedom. Where we begin to see this clearly, we can argue on the basis of the democratic rights of the people of South Africa, Southern Africa and the world to enjoy these rights without undue interference. It would therefore be wrong for regional governments to seek to criminalise the three rights all at once via threatening journalists, whistleblowers and human rights activists for publishing information which in most circumstances is directly in the public interest. Where some of the technical arguments against media self regulation relate to how ‘no one is above the law’, criminalizing the work of journalists will always, in the final analysis , be patently undemocratic.
Thank You.
*Takura Zhangazha is the Executive Director of the Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe (www.vmcz.co.zw)
Tuesday, 3 July 2012
Electoral End Games of Zimbabwe's Inclusive Government.
Electoral End Games of Zimbabwe's Inclusive Government.
By Takura Zhangazha. *
The political parties in Zimbabwe's inclusive government have now begun playing out their electoral end games eleven months prior to the expiry of its constitutional term of office in June 2013. There have been varying public statements from the three parties in government about the actual date of elections and which ever way one looks at it, election season is now firmly upon us again. Whereas Zanu Pf has been insisting on elections being held this year, that can now be considered a moot point given the hints by some of its newspaper columnists that it is well nigh impossible to have both a constitutional referendum and an election in terms of a new constitution in the next eleven months.
The MDCs, on the other hand, have been arguing for the full implementation of the SADC facilitated election road map. They however must most certainly know that again in the limited time period available , they will not get everything that they are requesting short of a constitutional amendment that extends the lifespan of this current government. And for this, they would require an almost impossible to get two thirds majority in Parliament. At best the MDCs will probably have to revert back (amidst Zanu Pf resistance) to the Electoral Amendment Bill (amongst other potential or existent laws) to try and integrate the provisions of the SADC facilitated road map into domestic law.
Regardless of the outcome of all of these contestations, the issue of elections is no longer as distant as it was two years ago. In fact, it has become evidently more urgent for political parties within and without of the inclusive government and as such, the Zimbabwean public must brace themselves for highly politicized debates and an increasingly polarized political environment. In this, there will be the revival of the old rivalries of 2008 and mudslinging between leaders in the inclusive government about the performance of rivals in the last four years.
The images of friendly leadership handshakes will decrease and we will all be asked to demonstrate loyalty to one party over the other without really questioning issues of the policy substance that has been provided by the inclusive government in the period that it has existed. It is because of such a potential development that one can reasonably argue that we are now entering a political period in which we should no longer expect much by way of non-partisan or 'common ground' policy from the inclusive government.
Each party will angle what it would call its own 'exclusive' policies in the inclusive government as evidence of its ability to govern and therefore its electability over the others. Zanu Pf will insist that it's indigenisation programme has been a success while MDC will argue that were it not for its control of broader economic policies, hyper-inflation would still be knocking on every citizens door. Blame games for the undemocratic and expensive constitutional reform process under COPAC will reach a particular partisan crescendo because it is the one thing that all parties in the inclusive government cannot skirt collective responsibility on.
The actual reality for the everyday citizens will however not be as frenetic or as emotive as that of those that will be seeking their votes. They will view and participate in the electoral processes either out of cultural and political coercion or even self aggrandizement than belief in any particular principles. This being a direct result of the fact that the inclusive government has had little to offer by way of inspiring its own people to believe in anything else but survival of the 'fittest' and the cliched 'kiya-kiya' political economy. Add to this, the clear distinction between the profligate lifestyles of those in government and the majority populace has already led to a cynical electorate which may seek more to gain materially in the immediate than to challenge political leaders on the country's future. So there will be the positioning of money, jobs and drought relief handouts in direct return for votes from a public that knows that without taking advantage of the elections, these material benefits would be few and far between.
So as Zimbabwe enters this protracted election season, it is of importance that civil society organisations take non-partisan stock of the inclusive government based on democratic values and principles. Where this is not done, it is the country that will be the worse off in the present and in the future. It is also imperative that the inclusive government be brought to account not merely on the basis of the personalities that comprise it, but on its performance when measured by social democratic value and principles.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)
By Takura Zhangazha. *
The political parties in Zimbabwe's inclusive government have now begun playing out their electoral end games eleven months prior to the expiry of its constitutional term of office in June 2013. There have been varying public statements from the three parties in government about the actual date of elections and which ever way one looks at it, election season is now firmly upon us again. Whereas Zanu Pf has been insisting on elections being held this year, that can now be considered a moot point given the hints by some of its newspaper columnists that it is well nigh impossible to have both a constitutional referendum and an election in terms of a new constitution in the next eleven months.
The MDCs, on the other hand, have been arguing for the full implementation of the SADC facilitated election road map. They however must most certainly know that again in the limited time period available , they will not get everything that they are requesting short of a constitutional amendment that extends the lifespan of this current government. And for this, they would require an almost impossible to get two thirds majority in Parliament. At best the MDCs will probably have to revert back (amidst Zanu Pf resistance) to the Electoral Amendment Bill (amongst other potential or existent laws) to try and integrate the provisions of the SADC facilitated road map into domestic law.
Regardless of the outcome of all of these contestations, the issue of elections is no longer as distant as it was two years ago. In fact, it has become evidently more urgent for political parties within and without of the inclusive government and as such, the Zimbabwean public must brace themselves for highly politicized debates and an increasingly polarized political environment. In this, there will be the revival of the old rivalries of 2008 and mudslinging between leaders in the inclusive government about the performance of rivals in the last four years.
The images of friendly leadership handshakes will decrease and we will all be asked to demonstrate loyalty to one party over the other without really questioning issues of the policy substance that has been provided by the inclusive government in the period that it has existed. It is because of such a potential development that one can reasonably argue that we are now entering a political period in which we should no longer expect much by way of non-partisan or 'common ground' policy from the inclusive government.
Each party will angle what it would call its own 'exclusive' policies in the inclusive government as evidence of its ability to govern and therefore its electability over the others. Zanu Pf will insist that it's indigenisation programme has been a success while MDC will argue that were it not for its control of broader economic policies, hyper-inflation would still be knocking on every citizens door. Blame games for the undemocratic and expensive constitutional reform process under COPAC will reach a particular partisan crescendo because it is the one thing that all parties in the inclusive government cannot skirt collective responsibility on.
The actual reality for the everyday citizens will however not be as frenetic or as emotive as that of those that will be seeking their votes. They will view and participate in the electoral processes either out of cultural and political coercion or even self aggrandizement than belief in any particular principles. This being a direct result of the fact that the inclusive government has had little to offer by way of inspiring its own people to believe in anything else but survival of the 'fittest' and the cliched 'kiya-kiya' political economy. Add to this, the clear distinction between the profligate lifestyles of those in government and the majority populace has already led to a cynical electorate which may seek more to gain materially in the immediate than to challenge political leaders on the country's future. So there will be the positioning of money, jobs and drought relief handouts in direct return for votes from a public that knows that without taking advantage of the elections, these material benefits would be few and far between.
So as Zimbabwe enters this protracted election season, it is of importance that civil society organisations take non-partisan stock of the inclusive government based on democratic values and principles. Where this is not done, it is the country that will be the worse off in the present and in the future. It is also imperative that the inclusive government be brought to account not merely on the basis of the personalities that comprise it, but on its performance when measured by social democratic value and principles.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)
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