Robert Mugabe’s True Legacy: A Nasty, Materialist and Populist Individualism.

By Takura Zhangazha*

There have been a number of books written on Robert Mugabe in his many leadership roles.  As a leader of a guerrilla movement/army, as a prime minister, as a president and even from a western perspective as a complicated/sophisticated dapper dictator.  And make no mistake, many more will be written about him.  As an ousted or disgraced long ruling repressive leader and also as a belatedly glorified Pan Africanist. 

And it is the assumptions of future published perspectives on Mugabe’s long rule that are of interest. What I am however concerned with is the lived realities of Mugabe’s legacy.  And by legacy here I am not inferring something to be celebrated but more something to be understood.

In the aftermath of the coup that toppled him, Mugabe has largely been holed up in his Borrowdale mansion and giving the impression of a bitter self-righteousness.  He emerged publicly at least twice.  The first time to endorse the mainstream opposition presidential candidate in a long drawn statement and questions and answer session with the press. The second time to vote for the latter in Highfields, Harare. 

I am sure he has had other interviews and publicized conversations with visiting leaders from African countries.  Or his wife as his spokesperson has occasionally put out the same.  Together with his still many apologists and runners either in remnants of the G40 faction he spawned or on social media and in the mainstream opposition. 

Beyond the immediacy of his ouster from power, we are however reeling from the effects of his leadership of the state.  And there is little that is positive that can be objectively discerned from it or assumed to be as a result of his own individual leadership effort.

Having ridden on the noble but painful cause and struggle that was the liberation struggle, Mugabe managed in his at least 37 years in power, to undermine the values and principles that the liberation struggle was motivated by.  

While conveniently embracing socialism as his then ruling party’s ideological foundation, he was to actively undermine it in practice.  Foregoing the democratic values of socialism, he went on to attempt a violent clampdown on his then main opposition rivals in the form of Joshua Nkomo’s Pf Zapu under the pretext of preventing a civil war in the southern parts of the country.  An attempt that has come to be infamously called ‘Gukurahundi’. 

After co-opting the same opposition, Mugabe was to try to establish a ‘one party state’ which was eventually rejected via the activism of his former colleagues in the struggle but also due to the fact that it was no longer popular in Southern Africa after Nyerere had abandoned the same in Tanzania. 

What was to prove colossal in his intentions at retaining power with global western power endorsement, was his economic about turn to embrace neoliberalism/ capitalism as advised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.   

Where he had previously had some sort of obligation to collective and people centered economics he abandoned this to begin his worship at the altar of free market economics.  Contrary to the values of the liberation struggle.  And this was the beginning of the unraveling of our national consciousness as had been established by the liberation struggle.  It quite literally became about Mugabe and his hold on power while serving the interests of global capital. 

It was labour that was to try and rein in Mugabe’s neoliberalism by first of all recalling the values of the liberation struggle and using the same to challenge an elitist political economy.   The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and its allies in the students and womens' movements as well as human rights focused civil society organisations went on to establish what was then referred to as a working people’s party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). 

Mugabe in populist turn decided to by embark on what we officially know to be the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP. All in a vainglorious and individualist attempt at retaining the loyalty of war veterans and the peasantry.  While at the same time echoing long abandoned principles and values that had motivated the liberation struggle. 

It worked, albeit briefly.  Mugabe’s neoliberal economy could not sustain the FTLRP and it expectedly reeled under not only sanctions but also the fact that its populism was never going to make it revolutionary. 

That it happened and has been said by Mnangagwa’s government to be irreversible does not make it any less violent or populist in serving Mugabe’s intention at retaining power.

Even by the time he was forced by SADC to form an inclusive government with the opposition, Mugabe’s particular version of individualism in politics would not allow him to even consider his own succession.  In his own party nor for posterity. 

And where we fast forward to his ouster from power, his particular streak of individual political stubbornness eventually led him to be hoist by his own petard. He quite literally fell on his own sword. Even if he didn’t see it coming.

It is a combination of Mugabe’s inability to see into the future or beyond himself and his deliberate abandonment of liberation struggle socialist democratic values as accompanied by neoliberal/free market economics that led Zimbabwe to its current parlous state. 

The end effect of this on our own society has been catastrophic.  Not only just in relation to our one time critical national consciousness as informed by the liberation struggle but also to our own individual perceptions of what should be a progressive society.

Mugabe’s long rule has the unenviable legacy of having created a highly individualized, materialistic and populist society.  One that perceives progress by the day and rarely considers collective posterity.  And with a default admiration of neoliberalism and ideological austerity.  Mugabe, via his ruling party Zanu Pf have taken us into the trap of ‘millennial capitalism’ where a combination of free market economics, superstition (religion), gambling and individualism have stymied the collective national consciousness.

There are many ways to regain a critical collective national consciousness.  The first step to doing so is to identify what caused its demise.  Historically and in the contemporary, that begins at identifying Mugabe’s real legacy and role in getting us to where we are as a country. Where we are saddled with a nasty/violent, materialist and populist individualism.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)  

A Dying (Public) Intellectualism in Zimbabwe.

By Takura Zhangazha*

The late Masipula Sithole taught me (and many others) how to perceive and think about our country, Zimbabwe’s, politics.  Not only formally via the university lecture room but also more significantly via informal engagements with him, long after we had graduated from the Political and Administrative Studies (POLAD) degree  that most of my own university peers (R97s) regarded with great derision.  And I promise you, we were never favourites in University of Zimbabwe (UZ) social and future scenes.

Another venerable lecturer at that time was A.M Kambudzi  now working for the African Union, who taught us, at a specific time in the late 1990s and in-between John Stuart Mill motivated lectures, that there was no need for a Chicago pie franchise in the heart of Harare, Zimbabwe.  Let alone that the packets had a Chicago City skyline emblazoned on them.  In Harare.

Or the late John Makumbe who because of his albinism and much to the humour of the UZ Students Union  ‘galas’ would always refer to himself as ‘the only white man from Buhera’.

And it would be he who was to teach us, in a very abrasive way, what local government, in its democratic sense should be. 

Then there was also Bertha Chiroro who took us through the motions of understanding ‘State, Politics and Society’ in what was then referred to as the ‘Third World’. And how she taught us that we should always think, intellectually at least, beyond our own borders.    

Or Solomon Nkiwane giving us a run down on ‘international relations’ and Zimbabwe’s difficult placement in the same.  Albeit briefly. 

In between the suspensions for engaging in student activism we learnt that there was always a greater cause and struggle as to how we perceived our and how we were perceived by our own society.  As learnt from the above and below cited public intellectuals of our ‘wannabe intellectual’ heyday.

By the time I met the legendary Morgan Tsvangirai (personally and subsequently in the company of Hopewell Gumbo, Nelson Chamisa, Phillip Pasirayi, Innocent Mupara, Ellam Gozho, Artwell Ruzivo under the aegis of the Zimbabwe National Students Union ((ZINASU)), I had already encountered the likes of Brian Raftopolous (whose surname we couldn’t quite pronounce), Lloyd Sachikonye both of whom were at the then reputable Institute of Development Studies which is now a computer centre.)

 And also Ibbo Mandaza , the late Prof Sam Moyo and believe it or not Joyce Kazembe (ZEC deputy chairperson as at present) as the key persons of what was then the Southern African Political Economic Series (SAPES) Trust. 

And the enlightening feminism of Prof Patricia McFadden,  Everjoice Win, Nancy Kachingwe and Prof Rudo Gaidzanwa. 

However we never understood what public intellectualism in the late 90s Zimbabwe meant to the future of the country. If anything at all. And in this it turned out to be phenomenal.

As student leaders of that time, we knew that our limited intellectualism was also associated with our proximity to opposition politics.  As led at that time by others who would prove to be legendary in their own right.  

The likes of Cde Munyaradzi Gwisai and Tafadzwa Choto (who taught us Marxism/Trotskyism), Brian Kagoro, Tawanda Hondora (who liberated us from student leadership suspensions at no legal cost), Tendai Biti (who dabbled in representing private capital and labour- an amazing feat if ever anyone asks you), Arthur Mutambara ( who addressed us at the University of Zimbabwe public transport rank prior to the 2000 elections and eventually joined the 2009 short lived government of national unity as deputy prime minister) and Prof Lovemore Madhuku (who initially had a people centered approach to human rights activism).  They may not have understood it at the time, but they were organic intellectuals. And as Castro says, “ History will absolve them.’

What we didn’t know, at that time as sons and daughters of lower class peasants and workers was that it would somehow and eventually become our turn to represent and protect the intellectualism of younger generations of activists that would come after us. Not only at the University of Zimbabwe but in the many other universities that would be spawned in the name Zanu Pf’s expanded access to education.  In the process we forgot about the lived reality that was the liberation struggle. By birth, by design and by default. 

Nor did we have (enough) access to the internet to understand our own African placement in contextual global history.

Where we consider public intellectuals of contemporary times we can list the likes in our time of  Prof Gatsheni- Ndhlovu (an ardent decoloniality intellectual, if he can at all be labelled as such), Hayes Mabweazara (with a firm understanding of media freedom in Southern Africa), Eldred Masunungure (who incidentally taught me an undergraduate course on Introduction to Political Science ), Tendai Murisa (a passionate proponent of the democratic developmental state), Nhamo Mhiripiri, Memory Chirere who pointed me toward literature in English)

The primary challenge however is how to move this commendable intellectualism out of the university lecture room to lived experience by young Zimbabweans.  Or to at least attempt at occupying social media and challenging ‘echo chambers’ of populist public opinion. 

Especially where it concerns the very necessary fact of Fanonian democratic national consciousness.  Pitfalls and all.  In all of its criticality.

And contending with the reality that we have arrived at a period in which being a public intellectual is less appreciated in Zimbabwe . Even in Hegelian terms where it is only done to pursue ‘recognition’. Or in what would personally be preferably Gramscian intellectualism. And we wont even mention the Cabralist assumption of ‘class suicide’ of the revolutionary intellectual. Despite formal academic qualifications or a lack thereof.

Takura Zhangazha writes here in his own personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blospot.com)

Amending Zim’s Constitution Again. The Necessity of 100% Proportional Representation

By Takura Zhangazha*

The Zimbabwean’s government recently announced that it is preparing to amend the national constitution.  This was announced via the Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Mr. Ziyambi who informed the Zimbabwean public that government in following up on the recommendations of the Monthlante Commission was seeking, as reported by the mainstream state-controlled print media, to ‘deepen democracy’ in an arguable Second Republic. 

All this, when taken into our contemporary political context, in the aftermath of post electoral violence that has had the end effect of creating a binary international perception of whether Zimbabwe has indeed moved on from Robert Mugabe’s repressive regime, makes one pause for clearer political thought.  Even if it further delays the full international  re-engagement intentions of Mnangagwa’s foreign policy.  A policy which the latter does not appear to be giving up on.  Just yet or as easily as the opposition would assume. 

The government, according to Ziyambi, is “really under pressure to make sure that all the legislation to do with the ease of doing business to support our TSP and Vision 2030 is in place much earlier.”

They therefore intend to amend the constitution to introduce new roles for chiefs, a more technical definition of ‘devolution’ (which will remove MPs from provincial councils) and also consider introducing the constitutional office of leader of the opposition in parliament.  All before year end 2019.

It is however important to crosscheck what appears to be the fundamental motivations to these proposed constitutional amendments.  The first and perhaps most obvious is that the Mnangagwa government is prioritising re-engagement with what it considers the ‘international’ (read as Western) community as was the case with the July 2018 general election.

It is seeking to rid itself of what it has referred to as an inherited ‘pariah status’ from Robert Mugabe’s leadership of the country. Both in Africa and the rest of the world. 

Essentially it would like to get rid of ‘politics’ (however it defines it) as an albatross around Zimbabwe’s economic neck.  So it will concede ‘democratic reforms’  for almost any form of international recognition or (financial) support. West or East, with the former valuing more the private capital side of things than any assumptions of revolution outside a neoliberal framework.  And the latter following suit with greater trepidation about the ‘liberal’ side of ‘neoliberal’. 

And that is what any current proposed amendments to the national constitution are about.  They are not about the people of Zimbabwe.  But about how the state (and state power) must be repositioned in order to meet the pre-requisites of a rapacious global private capital. And how it will not brook any challenges to its hegemonic dominance, including crosschecking whether incumbent regimes pay the utmost respect to private (land) property rights. As of colonial old.

Secondly, there is the issue that the Zimbabwean government has to grapple with domestically. This being its ability to harness a local/domestic performance legitimacy question as derived from its neoliberal economic trajectory.   Its ‘no pain-no gain’ economic policy mantra does not endear it to the Zimbabwean populace.  Instead it establishes breeding ground for very legitimate dialogue, debate and dissent.    Demonstrations included.  Even if it blames hidden hands or ulterior political motives on the part of those that would organize them. 

In order to handle this delicate political situation around questions of its political performance legitimacy, the government has decided to engage in what it calls a ‘national dialogue’.  With the help of some political party leaders and a sprinkling of churches, secular civil society organisations (including private capital /domestic business) and a newly appointed Presidential Advisory Council (PAC), it intends to bring everyone together regardless of political affiliation (bias) in order to move the country forward.  What it will not brook are questions of its legitimacy or any queries of the same around the national president. 

Even if one were to argue that the latter point is fair enough, the primary challenge is that it does not quite solve anything.  It instead perpetuates political polarization.  As of old or as a return to the highly personalized politics of the Mugabe and Tsvangirai.  Where political personalities matter more than political institutions.  Let alone political loyalties based on not just charismatic leaders (or a lack thereof) but ethnocentrism, mafia like political economies being more important than contextual or organic ideological considerations for a people centered democratic future of the country.

But then again we deal the hand we are dealt.  And we have to find solutions that are beyond the immediate.

We will, in the contemporary turn of events, never be fully able to comprehend the November 2017 ‘coup-not-a-coup’.  Especially the marches to oust Mugabe as permitted by Zanu Pf’s military political complex with the direct support of even our now nascent opposition political leaders.  Nor will we come to an immediate factual understanding of the role played (and continuing to be played) by disparate pro Mugabe Zanu Pf factions in assisting the opposition in a last gasp attempt at post coup-not-a- coup electoral power.  That is now for historians to explain with hindsight.  

What we do know, is that any talk of a raft of proposed amendments of the national constitution as proposed by Mnangagwa, are meaningless for whatever would remain of our country’s democratic future if they do not introduce a 100% proportional representation system to the executive, parliament and local government.  Not in order to mimic South Africa’s representative democracy electoral system but to ensure the diversity of our own.  Meaning, that our national contextual perceptions of what democracy should mean would be enhanced by a more representative and more diverse parliament and local government political system.  And with it, a more attendant, professional mainstream media .  As reflecting both the past, the present and a potentially even more democratic future.

The counter argument will easily be and become that we must accept what is considered to be incremental (slow but sure) change.

The changes to the constitution being planned by Mnangagwa’s government may appear to be somewhat progressive but regrettably they play more to an international gallery over which we have no control.  By way of how it perceives us, how it may manipulate us and how in the final analysis, we would be asking, ‘who dunnit?’

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Mapping Opportunities for Civil Society in Zimbabwe

A Return to an Organic, Critical National Consciousness. 

A presentation to the SAVIO Institute’s Conference on ‘First Year of the Second Republic: Continuing with the old or breaking with the past?’

28 February 2019, Sango Conference Center, Harare, Zimbabwe.

By Takura Zhangazha (15 mins)*

Thank you very much for the introductory statements.  And to also thank the great minds I am sharing ‘s this particular platform and panel with at the SIVIO Institute’s conference on the ‘First Year of the Second Republic, Breaking with the Past or Continuing with the Old.’ 

In making my brief remarks on Zimbabwean civil society and its future it would be remiss for me not to mention the fact that there are currently a number of civil society leaders that are being charged by the state of allegedly attempting to subvert a constitutionally elected government.  This following the January 2019 demonstrations against fuel price increases that eventually and tragically turned violent.   While the blame games do the rounds largely for the consumption of a real and imagined international concern, we can only offer solidarity for cdes who are facing either criminal or political charges, whichever way you prefer to view the same.

 There is a lot of scholarly and activist work on what would constitute any reasonable definition of what civil society in Zimbabwe can be.  I will avoid making reference to it directly and only focus on it by inference.  Within out context, one of the seminal works on civil society was done by  Sachikonye  titled ‘Democracy, Civil Society and the State: Social Movements inSouthern Africa.’ 

It is from this book that I learnt about how to refer to civil society basically as non-state actors that actively sought to influence the policy decisions of the state.  As well as their history.

And historical considerations as to the significance of ‘civil society’ in Zimbabwe are important.  Non state actors have always been key players in Zimbabwe’s history.  At least its critical and counter hegemonic consciousness.  All of our liberation movements that have now become governing parties stemmed from non state actors.  Whether it would be the phenomenal nascent African working class unions of the late 1920s led by Clement Kadalie through to those led by Benjamin Burombo in the late 1940s onwards.  Or the then non state actors such as the City Youth League that eventually led to enough pressure for then nationalists to initial and eventual formal liberation movements that were to become ZAPU and ZANU.  This also includes the Christian missionary churches that benovelently educated future nationalists. 

And it never ended only with our pre-independence period. After 1980, civil society once again was at the forefront of introducing a new critical consciousness to a repressive state of affairs as it negatively affected a majority of our people.  The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) or labour, the students unions largely as led from the University of Zimbabwe Students Union and shortly thereafter by the Zimbabwe National Students Union were all to be at the forefront of a counter hegemonic project against the one party state as preferred, at that time, by the ruling Zanu Pf party.   In the 1990s you would find the emergence of highly organic and social movement oriented CSOs such as Zimrights and the Association of Womens Clubs as revived by, among others,  Amai Sekai Holland. 

In our pre and post independence timelines what obtains was an organic civil society through which we have a clear pattern of genesis of counterhegemonic national consciousness.  

It is therefore arguably correct that there is no direct challenge to political power in Zimbabwe that has not emerged, originally, organically from non state actors or what we now commonly refer to as civil society. This is most certainly true of the ruling Zanu PF and the largest opposition political party, the MDC Alliance. 

I have been slightly elaborate about this history of civil society in Zimbabwe because we cannot understand the future without a composite knowledge of the past. 

And in both historical threads, there’s one key element that always indubitably stood out.  And that’s the question of an ideologically conscious civil society.  Before independence the ideological base was almost always going to be nationalism both in its moderate and radical forms. 

Post-independence the mobilizing ideology was largely socialism in the early years which was to give way for social democracy on the part of counterhegemonic civil society. 

More recently we are now saddled with a civil society that functions as though it lives in a post ideological world yet the reality of the matter is that the dominant and demobilizing ideology is now neo-liberalism. 

So in mapping out the future of civil society in Zimbabwe it would be prudent to keep in mind our neo-liberal ideological context and its impact on non- state actors.

It essentially means contemporary civil society players are no longer as counter-hegemonic as in the past.  They may be oppositional to government policies or even be genuinely lobbying the state and knowing the limits of their power, but they may no longer be as organic as in the past.

So where the Leninist question of ‘what is to be done?’ is asked, I would suggest at least four perspectives to take us forward.

The first being that civil society in Zimbabwe needs to return to a strategic re-positioning that is ideologically democratically socialist, conscious and organically people centered in its work.  I would even go further to prescribe that in its ideological consciousness civil society be clearly counter hegemonic to global neo-liberalism which is in retreat in the global north (its place of origin) yet ironically being expanded in the global south.  I suggest this largely because of the fact that our contextual national political-economic crisis will not find solutions in neoliberalism. 

Secondly in mapping out a new path for civil society, we must be aware of the fact of generational praxis.  Civil society organisations have changed significantly in form as well as in how they impact our national citizenry.  Younger Zimbabweans faced with the ravages of a repressive but weak state have taken to new forms of activism that attempts at being counter hegemonic.  Some of this activism has found new forms of expression not just in reality but also on social media.  Even though at times the activism is ephemeral it has however pointed us to a new approach that differs from what we would consider as traditional civil society. 

The key element of this generational praxis is how we must, to learn from Amilcar Cabral, understand the ‘weapon of theory’ and understanding the 'struggles against our own weaknesses'.  And our ideological and intellectual outlook must be passed on from one generation of activists to the next. And in this, to also be cognizant of the fact that it is always organically necessary to allow others to lead. 

In the third instance we need to come to terms with the expansion of new mediums of consciousness.  And by mediums here I refer to mobile telephony and the internet in its holistic form(s).  Social media and its attendant mediums are new arenas of not only activism but also purveying ideas, consciousness and even counter-hegemony.  Civil society in both its traditional and more contemporary form need to occupy these new spaces of disseminating progressive and counter hegemonic ideas against neoliberalism.  But also mindful of the theoretical assumption that the medium is also the message or to put it in simpler terms, the individualism that these new mediums such as the mobile phone brings, can serve more neoliberal hegemony than countering it.

Fourthly, in its interactions with the global north, civil society must always be fundamentally aware of its operational contexts and also seek out progressive relationships than benevolent or patronizing ones.  This includes steering clear as far as is pragmatically possible from mimicry.

  More importantly and this is very important, Zimbabwean civil society need to learn to strategically talk back to the global north on the basis of progressive principles and values.  And also not to merely follow the money but pursue an organic Pan Africanism and its global attendant solidarity from progressive civil society organisations in the global north. 

In conclusion, cde chairperson, I will not summarise all of the issues I have raised so far.  Instead I wish to set out a revolutionary task for Zimbabwean civil society for the year 2019. Because our politics has been a high stakes winner takes all game.  With tragic and unnecessary loss of lives or limb.  And keeping in mind a quote from Nyerere, 'the mechanisms of democracy are not always the meaning of democracy,' Zimbabwean civil society needs to re-examine/review our constitutional framework and begin the process of actively seeking the introduction of a complete (100%) proportional representation in our political system.  

In Parliament, which in turn will elect the President as an electoral college. And the same for local government.  I am aware that this is not as simple as it appears.  And that our largest political parties may quickly dismiss this opposition on the assumptions that it weakens their patronage systems.  My personal view is that it will make our society less politically polarized and our electoral politics to be less personalized.  It is a revolutionary task that requires an organic civil society that is not only people centered but also ideologically counter hegemonic.

*Takura Zhangazha spoke here in his personal capacity  (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

SADC and the EU’s Positions on Zimbabwe: Attempting an End of History

In the last week there were two very important statements issued on our country Zimbabwe by two very important inter-state political bodies.  The first of these statements,and closer to home was issued by the Southern African Development Community(SADC) current chairperson, Hage Geinjob who is also the current president of Namibia.

In the statement Geinjob condemned recent political violence in Zimbabwe without putting the blame on government or the opposition.  But more significantly, he called for the removal of sanctions on Zimbabwe wherein he said (to quote him at length), ‘The SADC Heads and State and Government further noted that the governments efforts to transform the economy and bring about prosperity to the people of Zimbabwe are negatively affected by the illegal sanctions that were imposed on the country since early 2000.  SADC expresses its solidarity with the Government and people of the Republic of Zimbabwe, and calls upon the international community to unconditionally lift all sanctions imposed on the country.’   

It was a statement that got an angry reaction from Zimbabwe’s opposition and some civil society organisations and activists.   With some unfortunately referring to the SADC acronym as standing for a ‘Southern African Dictators Club’. 

Not more than a week later the European Parliament(EP) made public its resolutions and recommendations to its executive arm, the European Commission (EC)  on Zimbabwe.  In it the EP condemned political violence, the internet shutdown  and to quote it at length, ‘Reminds the Government of Zimbabwe that the support of the European Union and its member states in the context of the Cotonou Agreement, and for trade, development and economic assistance, is conditional on its respecting the rule of law and the international convention and treaties to which it is party: Recalls that long term support hinges on comprehensive reforms rather than mere promises; calls for European engagement with Zimbabwe to be value driven and firm in its positioning towards the Zimbabwean authorities’. 

As indicated in the firm language used in the resolutions, the Zimbabweans government’s attempts at re-engagement for reprieve with the EU has suffered a severe setback.  And the reaction from pro-ruling party activists has been to quite literally blame the opposition for this firm stance by the EUP.

Both the state-controlled  and private mainstream media in what is now their expected partisan political output also reflected the views of their editorial and political preferences.

But as always critical context matters.  That the positions of SADC and the EP differ is very clear.  The motives for the same are however not so apparent.

SADC’s position appears to be predicated on a Pan Africanism that is wary of interference in the domestic affairs of a member state.  Not only by itself but also more significantly by international organisations that it has historically been suspicious of their intentions.  I mention history here because SADC is not just a latter day ‘treaty organization’.  It is a relatively historically organic one.   Largely etched from the anti-colonial and liberation struggle focused Frontline States (initially comprised of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana. Mozambique, Angola joined the group upon their attainment of independence to be followed by Zimbabwe in 1980). The FLS were to then establish the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) which also then spawned the now existent SADC.  

In light of this, whichever way one looks at it, the contemporary SADC and a majority of its member states are strongly informed by an anti-imperialist/colonialism ethos. A lot of us may consider the latter to be outdated and an excuse for protecting ‘dictators’, but regardless it remains an historical reality that cannot be wished away.  It is a reality that makes SADC one of the strongest regional political blocks in the world.  Minus the firepower of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 

The EU’s position is however predicated on an understanding of global universalism.  As well as the strength of its placement in global politics and the attendant economics/neoliberalism. And the historicity of it is again largely based on the fact that it is a union comprised of former colonial hegemons in Africa with vested interests beyond the political. It is an historical fact that we cannot run away from even if we wanted to. 

Where we juxtapose these two positions from the EU and SADC, we would do well to keep in mind how the two bodies potentially view each other.  Not that there is antipathy toward the global interaction and agreements on universal human values but more because of the specificities of regional histories and contexts.  Particularly in the case of Southern Africa. 

It is therefore imperative that lobby and advocacy activities on Zimbabwe always keeps this in mind.  As it did for example in 2007 when SADC intervened directly in Zimbabwe under the chairpersonship of Jakaya Kikwete (Tanzania) who then appointed Thabo Mbeki as the mediator on the Zimbabwean question(s). The inclusive government that stemmed therefrom should have moved the country forward but it didn’t.  Not least because of continued disputations over the land question that it failed to resolve. And that the current Zimbabwean government considers to be final.   

What then becomes interesting is the possibility that there is an evident desire on the part of SADC and the EU to move away from the past.  In respect of the former, it is to take Zimbabwe to a post Mugabe era while not negating or directly appearing to be compromising on issues to do with sovereignty and of course, land.  The latter however may have queries with the current government as to its failure to move away from Mugabe era not only in respect to human rights but also and probably more importantly to property (land) rights.

In both however, if we look closely, we see an attempt to move on or move back.  As informed by both immediate or long term history and perceptions of it. In any case, as has been now proven, history does not end.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Christianity’s Political Overreach in Zimbabwe?

By Takura Zhangazha*

At one time a Zambian comrade told me that their then new constitution had declared that theirs was officially a Christian country.  I did not panic but I was abstractly concerned.  I asked myself what it would all eventually come to mean.  And how would future generations of Zambians come to view it.  This was because it was and appeared to be final.  At least legally and with protections for the freedom of religion.  This was circa 1996 and to the best of my knowledge the constitution of Zambia has not been changed. At least in that regard.

Zimbabwe’s own political processes that led to a new constitution being signed into law by Robert Mugabe in 2013 avoided declaring the country a Christian one.

This despite some active campaigns by some church leaders that it is officially declared one.  That policy advocacy failure did not however stop its citizens from remaining exceedingly Christian.  And it was beyond the purview of the law.  What was guaranteed was the freedom of worship.  And that remains a good thing, unless of course you are a traditional spirit medium or what is then referred to in our statute books as ‘animist religions’. 

There the freedom of religion is a bit more limited and derided as being irrational.  Largely as a legacy of colonialism but also because it is how many Zimbabweans view it.  As exactly that if not borderline ‘evil’.

Hence a majority of our contemporary politicians have a strong Christian religious background.  Or if not, they will probably join one Christian church or the other for expedient or genuinely religious but in the end political purposes.  Regardless of how some of their own personal backgrounds are clearly to be found in  non-religious activities. 

This is important to mention primarily because the Zimbabwean Christian community has decided to weigh in on our national politics.  Both as arbiter and enabler.

Again, both historically and in the contemporary. The historical dimension being the ambiguous role played by the formal Christian church in our struggles for national liberation against colonialism (education and support to the liberation armies).

 In the contemporary and quite recently so, the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) recently held a ‘National Dialogue’ symposium with political parties.  Ostensibly to build a new national discourse on peace and tolerance.  And that’s the arbiter part.  The ZCC is persuaded that in the name of God in whom both the serving president and his arch nemesis in the opposition are firm believers, it can heal the nation.  Or at least bring the country back to a normalcy that it is yet to define.  And that is a good thing. Though it should not be beyond secular reproach.

The ZCC and its members or affiliates were reported in the media as having, at that meeting, ‘lashed out’ at the main political leaders in the country for not finding common ground for peace.

My personal persuasion is that it is always important to examine whether the ZCC is overreaching its mark and its mandate. Not least because it is becoming an important player in the realm of the secular.

 But then again we deal the hand we are dealt as a ‘Christian’ country.  The involvement of the Christian side of the church is based on the fact that a majority of Zimbabweans claim the same as their own religion.  And in any event, Christians remain the most organized (nationally and locally) of Zimbabweans.  Both in relations to their faith as well as their ability, once in agreement, to be mobilized to a specific political cause. 

In both cases, the Christian church is quite persuadable.  Not least because of its historical proximity to the colonial and post-independence state.  But also more conveniently because our contemporary political leaders are heavily reliant on its endorsement for some form of popular political legitimacy and more importantly, support. 

Quite significantly, the Christian missionary ethos of an ideological social justice cause in the colonial past and its post- independence narrative  is now somewhat lost. Mainly because the church appears less liberatory as it was in the past.  It is essentially a part of the establishment.  And where it tries to be somewhat different, it will eventually pick a side.  And that again, is most likely to be the establishment of the day.  But with relative caution that takes into account many things such as the protection of its material capital in the form of land, capital investments in institutions such as universities, banks, media, schools and hospitals. And possibly residential stands.

It all makes for a very awkward arrangement between what is assumed to be the secular state and the Christian church. An arrangement that suits both.  Those that would lead the state get political support. Those that lead the Christian church then get capital ( stands, educational stands and financial capital with tax exemptions).  A situation that may lead to a term of office perpetual ‘I owe You’ (IOU) with the ruling political party and by dint of the same, the state.

So why would the Christian Church not be politically influential in Zimbabwe’s context?  It is historically.  It can be in the contemporary.  It will be in the foreseeable future.

The only dilemma it faces is that it is already at the precipice of attempting that which it will eventually be unable to control.  Bibles in hand.  With its attempts at ‘national dialogue’ it is oblivious as to its own history under the aegis of Robert Mugabe and Ian Smith. Controversial as both historical narratives were.

And that’s its ambiguous side that is little talked about. Largely because the Christian church is perceived as liberatory. Church leaders that supported liberation and those that countered it were aplenty.  Both as redemptory to the then ‘natives’ as well as in order to keep them under control. 

A situation which changed with the increasing success of the liberation struggle.  The church for example under Catholic Bishop Lamont quickly learnt how to challenge a repressive state.  (Never mind the fact that Lamont was deported and the church carried on via the increasingly important Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace.)   Or the African Pentecostal churches of, for example, the Zion Christian Church and the Assemblies of the Family of God.

In the contemporary scheme of things however the Church will be unable to explain runaway political violence from those it either sought to bring together or in the final analysis, gave partisan and ‘spiritual’ support or guidance.  And it may eventually be unable to explain its role in a crass neoliberalism that will lead many Zimbabweans to poverty in the name of ‘austerity for prosperity’ as announced by government.   But then again, its all about faith. With a word of caution as to how that same said ‘faith’ can be partisan and convenient. All at the same time. Either to get state capital or (tax) reprieve. 

I am however of the personal view that  the attempt at some form of ‘national dialogue’ remains worth it in our Zimbabwean context. It is understandable given the fact that a majority of us Zimbabweans are Christian believers. And popularly so.  A key consideration however remains that the Christian Church should know the import of its impact and limits on what would be the ‘secular’.  After all, it remains colonial in its import to Zimbabwe. Together with its influence on the country’s perceptions of modernity/austerity or the current ruling party’s modernization/stabilisation  neoliberal programmes. It would be advisable, for now, that the majority Christian church proceeds with extreme caution.  Unless it is completely certain it can solve the problems it has interpreted. In the political/secular realm.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

An Imperial(ism) Re-creep? A Brief Zimbabwean Reflection on Venezuela.

By Takura Zhangazha*

A friend, in 2003 and much to my surprise remarked that he supported the United States of America (and its allies) invasion of Iraq.  I tried to caution him on believing what the global media was putting out for his consumption and preferences.  He remains unapologetic for his views and still avidly believes that almost all that comes from global Western superpower foreign policy toward the global south can only be good. Or in our best interests, even if we do not know it.     

In 2009, I was to watch the first black American president give a speech at Cairo University (Egypt) on what would ostensibly be the key features of his government’s Middle East policy .  Barrack Obama, true to form, spoke eloquently about the universality of human rights and how such a universalism would inform his governments policy.  It never actually turned out that way.  And for all his amazing speeches, Obama is partly responsible for the continuing break-up of Libya which in turn has contributed significantly (and arguably) to the deaths of thousands of African migrants in the Mediterranean Sea.  

We also now know (and see) the rise of radical white nationalism in the global north that was always going to counter assumptions of a global universalism for humanity.  Hence we now have 'fortress' global north and more stringent and in part discriminatory immigration policies.

But this was all rather distant from us here in Southern Africa or in particular in Zimbabwe.  Except for the time when a retired British military general mentioned, with hindsight,  the fact that former United Kingdom (UK) prime minister Tony Blair had made a case for military intervention in Zimbabwe.  And also as reflected upon by former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki’s advisor, Frank Chikane. 

Recalling the latter events with particular focus on Zimbabwe is not everyone’s cup of tea. Mainly because of a collective African historical amnesia as to the full import of colonialism and imperialism. Both as the past and a reinvented latter day ahistorical universalism.  As supported by an evidently pro-capital economic neo-liberalism and liberal interventionism from powerful governments in the global north.  And as they seek to compete for diminishing resources in the global south. 

I mention this in the wake of the neo-imperial foreign policy positions of the United States of America on a country that is now publicly its new arc Latin American nemesis, Venezuela (after Cuba of-course).  Donald Trump’s government has recognized the now main opposition leader Guardo as the president elect of Venezuela after the latter had declared himself the same over and above the actual president, Nicolas Maduro.  And at least four other governments in Southern America took the cue from Trump with the eventual support of some European governments.  

And this is where I return to the examples I cited above in relation to Zimbabwe.  And more significantly with its particular post 1997 struggles for further democratization which I have been a part of individually and with many of my elders, contemporaries and younger colleagues. 

We did not quite understand the mechanics of global politics and how they really work.  Especially in the aftermath of the cold war.  And understandably so.  

Faced with as dictatorial regime as Robert Mugabe’s which also created problems in order to pretend to solve them (economic structural adjustment was one of the most astounding), we would more often than not misread our placement in the global scheme of things.  This would occasionally mean our genuine struggles for democracy would be caught up in narratives that would limit our ability to negotiate better with either perceived or real allies.  

Or to at least measure what the interests of these same said global allies are. Together with a strategic reconsideration of what their support or allegiance would mean for our intrinsic democratic values and principles together with our right to national self-determination.  

A necessary exercise for all activists and as learnt from the insights of Pan-African revolutionaries of yore, not least, the inimitable Amilcar Cabral in his speech to the Tri-Continental Revolutionary conference, Havana, Cuba in 1966. 

Hence the situation in Venezuela, based on our own experiences in Africa during the drawn out Cold War of the 1960s-1980s, should clearly instruct us to be wary of a return of imperialism of old.  Not just by way of global superpower leaders bestowing presidents on us but in particular reducing our own national and pan African consciousness to being only important if they recognize it. Or assuming that theirs are acts that are intended only to serve our national interests. When the reality of the matter is that we are now faced with the serious threat, at least in the global South, of unmitigated ‘imperial re-creep’.  And we must be wary of that as our struggles continue.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)