By Takura Zhangazha*
The furtherance of the struggle for democracy in Zimbabwe is
getting a little bit more complicated now.
And as we end 2016, with the prospect of an elections pre-occupied 2017,
it is bound to become even more so. An immediate
question that one may ask is ‘what is this struggle’ that I am referring
to? There is no one answer to this
question. Neither is there still one
person (charismatic or otherwise) who is able to give an all embracing definition,
for now.
Understanding what it is to ‘struggle’ in present day
Zimbabwe now range from perspectives that vehemently want to topple/remove the
current government (not clear on how) to those that want to fight for their own
sectoral interests, to the many that
just want to survive every day and finally to a very few that struggle on ideological
pretexts.
The reasons for this ‘struggle fragmentation’ are also
many. The immediate ones are for example
the splitting of the main opposition MDC party on what are arguably personality
differences than principles (even after initial splits, the opposition continues
to split). Another reason is the fact of
sustainability challenges for mainstream human rights civil society from causes
that include donor fatigue, competition for resources and lapses in
transparency and accountability.
But these are pretty much straightforward reasons that
address more the symptoms than they deal with the actual illness.
The primary reason for ‘struggle fragmentation’ in the pro-democratic
forces in Zimbabwe relate to what I consider three fundamental causes.
The first is a direct result of the constitutional reform
process (COPAC) undertaken by the inclusive government from 2009-2013. COPAC culminated in a massive ‘yes' vote, a victory
which was initially presented as the ultimate embodiment of the struggles of
the people for democracy. A lot of its flaws were put aside for mainly partisan
reasons and the result we have, though few of us talk about it, is a constitution
that remains unknown and instrumentalised for political power games by the
ruling party.
But this isn’t really the problem. Instead it is the fact that we as activists
of one persuasion or the other, are stubbornly refusing to grasp the ‘incremental
change’ reality that the new constitution ushered in. Hence some of us continue to undertake our
activism in absolutist terms without taking into account that the supreme legal
document with its contrived popular mandate is the current centerpiece of how
the state is now being run. And conveniently
forgetting that a greater majority of us ushered it into existence, even if for
various and eventually problematic reasons. In
the process we have failed to make the best of this incremental phase that now characterizes
our national politics. Examples of this
include but are not limited to the surprising current calls for a national transitional
authority which essentially would abrogate the constitution.
Or why we are increasingly pre-occupied by factionalism within
the ruling party while forgetting that we neither control it, or that it is
also the ‘sunset clauses’ within the constitution that are partly perpetuating it.
The second fundamental reason why we are where we are is
that of ‘election cycle activism’. Not
that it is in any way wrong. In fact it
is quite necessary. But the challenge
has been to place within the context of a whole body of activism and not
over-emphasise it as though we are all in pursuit of power. Its downside became very clear in the post
2008 political context in which the MDC(s) as a natural political ally of
progressives became their nemesis. After
being helped and supported as part of a broad though poorly defined alliance,
it ignored the principles and values espoused in tandem with labour and human
rights organizations, for example as outlined in the Zimbabwe People’s Charter.
From the economy, through to the constitution and social
justice, the MDC(s) in the inclusive government forgot its founding values and
principles. Instead it embarked on an
aggressive muting and co-option of allies that were previously independently contributing
to the collective struggle (the controversial means it used to do this are well
known). This also explains why being
honest about the 2013 election potential and eventual defeat of the opposition was
generally derided. A majority of us had
simply begun to believe our own lies.
The third and final reason relates to our collective failure
to understand the ideological pretext of the Zimbabwean state and its political
economy. While initially we understood,
with the help of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, the imperative need for contextual social democracy as the ideological framework for change in our country, we got
too quickly co-opted into the neo-liberal global economic prescriptions of Bill
Clinton, Tony Blair and Thabo Mbeki (third way). With it of course came resource support and knowledge
production systems that did not truly fit our context. And
this was a narrative that the ruling party had already embraced with ESAP and
all of its subsequent economic reform programmes such as the current ZimAsset.
This also explains in part why the ‘No to Bond Notes’
protests have failed. Mainly because we
failed to understand the economic helplessness of a majority of our people, we
thought they would literally spill into the streets to support a currency they
do not always have but also one they do not really feel they have power over.
We failed to posit an organic economic argument around key issues of social
welfare to the extent that our default argument has now become a ‘wait and see’
attitude which suits neo-liberal arguments of how the market is king.
There are many counter-arguments to the reasons I have
presented here. But I am certain they will not be at complete contrast to the
same. What I would like to conclude with
is to return to our failure to understand the current ‘incremental’/small change context in which we are operating
in. We may not need to accept it in principle,
but we have to function within it, for now.
We need to address our historical trajectories and national political
economy with a new candidness, allow young leaders to learn a new organic
activism, think about but beyond the electoral cycle and establish organic
social movements that understand Zimbabwe’s realities while continually embracing
contextual social democratic values and principles.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity
(takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)
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