By Takura Zhangazha*
On 15 November 2017, Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s longest
serving ruler was confined to his private residence in the affluent suburb of
Borrowdale in Harare, Zimbabwe. This,
while armed soldiers took control of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation's (ZBC) headquarters major stations and patrolled the streets of the capital city.
In what was self-evidently a 'coup-de-tat' but
euphemistically referred to as a 'military assisted transition', the country had
entered into a period of potential serious political instability. All instigated by succession and factional
battles in the ruling Zanu Pf party at the end of which an emboldened Mnangagwa faction and
its military actors took a risk that Mugabe (and his wife) never thought possible. Also one that SADC probably
thought would never happen. At least not
in Zimbabwe.
By 18 November 2017 the military and ruling party members were
exhorting Zimbabweans to march on the streets.
And by 19-20 November 2017, march/gather in Harare, they did.
The ruling Zanu Pf party, for the first time
without Mugabe readily available to lead it, took advantage of the popular
support and called for a central committee meeting that resolved to remove him from power. And where he would
refuse they also undertook to use the constitutional option of an unprecedented Parliamentary impeachment.
In the meantime, the
military was negotiating with its would be commander in chief (at least legally) to resign.
Mugabe
refused.
And again Zanu Pf functionaries
aligned to Mnangagwa threatened mass action and impeachment. Mnangagwa himself also issued a statement
calling on the president to resign promising his now arch rival protection.
As it turns out, it was only when Parliament had started
impeachment proceedings at a local hotel that Mugabe’s resignation letter arrived. What were
rather contrived and real celebration were seen occurring on the streets of Harare with the military's permission.
But perhaps more significantly in what remained of the ruling party as seen
when Mnangagwa became president thereafter. Not only via his party but also a
very public swearing in ceremony attended not only by the then chair of SADC but more importantly by the main opposition leader
Morgan Tsvangirai.
Less than six months on from these events those behind the removal of
Mugabe’s ouster managed to perform another shocking political feat. They won a general election even as the
opposition decried the results as not being truly reflective of the will of the
people. Opposition marches were held and tragically lives were lost (the subject of former
South Africa president Kgalema Montlante’s Commission of Inquiry as
appointed by Mnangagwa.)
The international observers that were present noted
electoral discrepancies but the most important ones fell short of rejecting the
electoral outcome. The constitutional
court's judgement finalized the matter with a unanimous ruling in favour of
Mnangagwa thus paving the way for him to serve as president for the next five
years.
Many Zimbabweans, especially those sympathetic to the
opposition or with an intense dislike of the ruling party have refused to
accept this political reality. Those of
the other factions of the ruling party either known as the ‘Generation 40’
(Mugabe) or ‘weevil’ (former Vice
President Mujuru) factions have remained not only bitter on social media but
also actively supporting anyone who opposes the current ruling establishment.
Whatever their feelings, hindsight now favours those who are
in power. The future not so much
so. This is because the ruling Zanu Pf establishment
owes so much to so many global players.
The latter being those that are close to private capital in its local
and global economic and political parameters.
For local and relatively powerless ordinary Zimbabweans who
never really had a direct influence on not only the coup-not- a-coup events of
November 2017 but the complicated dynamics of the 2018 general election, there’s
a general tragedy of expectations.
Assumptions that the departure of Mugabe would lead to some sort of
better change, ill-defined as it was when people marched the streets in support
of the ‘coup-de-tat’ or the July 2018 elections, have come to naught. What has emerged and broadly spoken for, is a
sense of not only de-ja-vu but more significantly a return to an ephemeral
national consciousness that waits for elite driven political events to occur
first. All before intentions and questions are asked about those that would
seek political power are addressed or answered.
There are however four specific realities that Zimbabwe is
faced with going forward.
The first
being that the ruling Zanu Pf party is in power, for the umpteenth time and for another politically
controversial five years. And in its exercise of power, its primary target is
performance legitimacy. Not necessarily with
the people of Zimbabwe but more significantly with private global capital. All with the aim of being seen to return to international
legitimacy via the West, East and the Global South.
Secondly, the fact that there is a loose coalition of the opposition
which is never going to proffer an ideological let alone issue based
alternative to the ruling establishment leaves a lot to ponder.
Save for a shallow populism, again seeking endorsement, like Zanu Pf,
from global capital and its political backers in the global north. All in the
vainglorious hope that time (age), economic collapse and a
potentially distrusting global capital will spur them on to an electoral victory
in the next elections in 2023, the opposition remains hapless. And all
mixed with what can only be described as ephemeral religious political fervor akin
to ‘waiting for Godot’, to quote Samuel Beckett.
Thirdly and as a direct result of the above immediately mentioned two
factors, is the reality that the Mnangagwa government has no intention of being
people centered let alone behave in any way that would be harmful to business
(private capital). As long as the latter
forgets (and possibly forgives) their previous transgressions when they were under
the tutelage of a radically nationalist but unfocused Mugabe. Zanu Pf is intent on ensuring it courts back
big business. Therefore, its understanding
of what it calls a new dispensation is effectively neo-liberal.
So when people argue that this is in reality not a new dispensation,
they misconstrue the new to be more political than it is economic. Or they
misread the assumption of the new residing in the political as opposed to the
pro-business economic policies that will be announced next week in the projected
national budget for 2019. ‘Liberal
politics’ will be benevolently permitted but it is ‘liberal economics’ (free
market) that will be the supreme priority.
Being ‘open for business’ will not translate to being open to organic
challenges for state power. And with the
support of private global capital and its local offshoots, so long they both
get want they want. That is, profit or as politely put, ‘returns on investment’. Fourthly (and finally) is the
question that emerges from a 'between a rock and a hard place'. Is there an alternative? There always is. Given
the internal contradictions of neoliberalism and the emergence of a progressive
global and local left. With or without Zimbabwe’s faltered, faulty not so new dispensation.
If it ever was one. But alternatives will always remain in vogue. As Gill Scott Heron once sang, 'the revolution will not be televised.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his own personal capacity
(takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)
No comments:
Post a Comment