By Takura Zhangazha*
The Parliament of Zimbabwe is in the process of amending Zimbabwe’s national constitution a second time in as many years. At the time of writing the Constitutional Amendment Bill number 2 is headed for Senate after having been agreed to by way of a required two thirds majority vote in the National Assembly. The latter vote having been predictable given the fact that the ruling Zanu PF party commands the necessary numbers in both the National Assembly and also the Senate where the bill is likely to pass again before it is sent to the president for final approval.
The public debate around this second amendment has been
relatively muted. Even on social
media. That’s probably because this one
comes hard on the heels of the first one that was also recently passed by Parliament
after a constitutional court order that the voting be done again. Or also because of a general apathy on the matter by the public.
There however have been some comments either in defence or disparagement
of constitutional amendment bill number 2.
Those in defense of it as expected are ruling party
officials and Members of Parliament (MPs) or government functionaries.
The opposition MDC-T has also not vociferously opposed the bill and had
some of its own National Assembly members who voted in favour of the bill. The MDC Alliance MPs that remain in the National
Assembly have voted against it.
And while we await the final details of the final version of
this amendment after presidential assent, the legal
intentions are fairly clear. And also
for this blog to be more useful/utilitarian it is important to give a brief
summary of some of the major proposed amendments.
The most talked about proposed changes are for example that the
promotion of serving court judges will be done by the president from the
recommendations of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC). This also includes the removal of an age
limit for serving/sitting judges which had previously been set at the maximum age
of 70 years. The president will also be able to appoint and dismiss a Prosecutor
General on the recommendation of the JSC without public interviews. Another
proposed change is that there will no longer be a legal requirement that a presidential
candidate have running mates. And the
president will also have powers to appoint 7 ministers (as opposed to the
previous 5) who are not members of Parliament.
The less talked about amendments to the constitution in this
instance relate to the extension of the women's quota for another two terms of
office of Parliament. And the introduction
of a proportional representation youth quota listed by alternative gender.
Also there is the creation of the constitutional office of a
public protector who will have some similar functions of other commissions such
as the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission. Add to this the removal of MPs from Provincial
Councils and the election of members of the latter by way of party lists based
on proportional representation.
In summary these are most of the key amendments being
proposed barring any new changes from Senate or a return of the bill from the
president. (A full version of them can be found here)
There are however three key political aspects that need to
be considered on the implications of this second amendment.
The first aspect which is more a political-legal technicality is that the ruling party is amending the constitution because it is constitutionally
allowed to do so. Based on its
parliamentary two thirds majority. Or to
put it rather crudely, it is amending the constitution because the same constitution
allows it to do so. The political
inference of this is that the second amendment as with the first is a
reflection of the electoral results of 2018. Disputed as they were around the presidential
vote count and less around the parliamentary result that resulted in this two
thirds majority. In this, arguments around questions of legitimacy
have no immediate impact on what parliament can or cannot do. And while this is
difficult for many to fathom, the political reality is that the constitution is
operational both in relation to its technical aspects and also the political intentions
of the ruling party. All until 2023. And
the key word here is ‘incrementalism’ within the ambit of what the constitution
permits. Warts and all.
The second aspect relates to the introduction of a youth and
the extension of the women’s quota. As well as the introduction of a
proportional representation system to the election of provincial and
metropolitan councils. The political meaning of this is that it is
the most organized political party that will win the next harmonized general
election in 2023. Its like quite literally
asking aspiring politicians to do the math.
Those parties that can field candidates for both directly elected and proportional
representation seats are the ones that are likely to do well electorally. Including probably wining the most coveted
position of the executive presidency. And
it would appear the ruling party is well aware of the political factionalism
that comes with fewer posts and this strategy ensures fewer of its internal
leaders do not have elected posts.
Given what happened in 2018, I am not so sure our opposition parties
have as comparable an understanding of the same.
In the third and final instance, there has been some debate
about the consolidation of executive power by Mnangagwa. Especially because the amendment does away
with running mates. Or where it gives him great control of the promotion or
retirement of judges. This is an
understandable argument in not only anticipating assumptions of the
compromising of judicial independence by the executive but also assuming the
next election will again be disputed.
And that it will again require the intervention of the Constitutional
Court. This means it is as much about
democratic principle as it is about political assumptions and expectations.
In conclusion, what has become clear is that the new constitution
was not designed to either oversee a societal revolution or have a
fundamentally sacrosanct status in Zimbabwean society. It remains functional at the whim of the institutions
it created and those that are in charge of them by way of electorally arrived
at executive and parliamentary authority.
In the current context it remains a document that is intended to bring ambiguous
incremental change. At the whim of those
that are legally in charge of its implementation.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)
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