Mapping Opportunities for Civil Society in Zimbabwe

A Return to an Organic, Critical National Consciousness. 

A presentation to the SAVIO Institute’s Conference on ‘First Year of the Second Republic: Continuing with the old or breaking with the past?’

28 February 2019, Sango Conference Center, Harare, Zimbabwe.

By Takura Zhangazha (15 mins)*

Thank you very much for the introductory statements.  And to also thank the great minds I am sharing ‘s this particular platform and panel with at the SIVIO Institute’s conference on the ‘First Year of the Second Republic, Breaking with the Past or Continuing with the Old.’ 

In making my brief remarks on Zimbabwean civil society and its future it would be remiss for me not to mention the fact that there are currently a number of civil society leaders that are being charged by the state of allegedly attempting to subvert a constitutionally elected government.  This following the January 2019 demonstrations against fuel price increases that eventually and tragically turned violent.   While the blame games do the rounds largely for the consumption of a real and imagined international concern, we can only offer solidarity for cdes who are facing either criminal or political charges, whichever way you prefer to view the same.

 There is a lot of scholarly and activist work on what would constitute any reasonable definition of what civil society in Zimbabwe can be.  I will avoid making reference to it directly and only focus on it by inference.  Within out context, one of the seminal works on civil society was done by  Sachikonye  titled ‘Democracy, Civil Society and the State: Social Movements inSouthern Africa.’ 

It is from this book that I learnt about how to refer to civil society basically as non-state actors that actively sought to influence the policy decisions of the state.  As well as their history.

And historical considerations as to the significance of ‘civil society’ in Zimbabwe are important.  Non state actors have always been key players in Zimbabwe’s history.  At least its critical and counter hegemonic consciousness.  All of our liberation movements that have now become governing parties stemmed from non state actors.  Whether it would be the phenomenal nascent African working class unions of the late 1920s led by Clement Kadalie through to those led by Benjamin Burombo in the late 1940s onwards.  Or the then non state actors such as the City Youth League that eventually led to enough pressure for then nationalists to initial and eventual formal liberation movements that were to become ZAPU and ZANU.  This also includes the Christian missionary churches that benovelently educated future nationalists. 

And it never ended only with our pre-independence period. After 1980, civil society once again was at the forefront of introducing a new critical consciousness to a repressive state of affairs as it negatively affected a majority of our people.  The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) or labour, the students unions largely as led from the University of Zimbabwe Students Union and shortly thereafter by the Zimbabwe National Students Union were all to be at the forefront of a counter hegemonic project against the one party state as preferred, at that time, by the ruling Zanu Pf party.   In the 1990s you would find the emergence of highly organic and social movement oriented CSOs such as Zimrights and the Association of Womens Clubs as revived by, among others,  Amai Sekai Holland. 

In our pre and post independence timelines what obtains was an organic civil society through which we have a clear pattern of genesis of counterhegemonic national consciousness.  

It is therefore arguably correct that there is no direct challenge to political power in Zimbabwe that has not emerged, originally, organically from non state actors or what we now commonly refer to as civil society. This is most certainly true of the ruling Zanu PF and the largest opposition political party, the MDC Alliance. 

I have been slightly elaborate about this history of civil society in Zimbabwe because we cannot understand the future without a composite knowledge of the past. 

And in both historical threads, there’s one key element that always indubitably stood out.  And that’s the question of an ideologically conscious civil society.  Before independence the ideological base was almost always going to be nationalism both in its moderate and radical forms. 

Post-independence the mobilizing ideology was largely socialism in the early years which was to give way for social democracy on the part of counterhegemonic civil society. 

More recently we are now saddled with a civil society that functions as though it lives in a post ideological world yet the reality of the matter is that the dominant and demobilizing ideology is now neo-liberalism. 

So in mapping out the future of civil society in Zimbabwe it would be prudent to keep in mind our neo-liberal ideological context and its impact on non- state actors.

It essentially means contemporary civil society players are no longer as counter-hegemonic as in the past.  They may be oppositional to government policies or even be genuinely lobbying the state and knowing the limits of their power, but they may no longer be as organic as in the past.

So where the Leninist question of ‘what is to be done?’ is asked, I would suggest at least four perspectives to take us forward.

The first being that civil society in Zimbabwe needs to return to a strategic re-positioning that is ideologically democratically socialist, conscious and organically people centered in its work.  I would even go further to prescribe that in its ideological consciousness civil society be clearly counter hegemonic to global neo-liberalism which is in retreat in the global north (its place of origin) yet ironically being expanded in the global south.  I suggest this largely because of the fact that our contextual national political-economic crisis will not find solutions in neoliberalism. 

Secondly in mapping out a new path for civil society, we must be aware of the fact of generational praxis.  Civil society organisations have changed significantly in form as well as in how they impact our national citizenry.  Younger Zimbabweans faced with the ravages of a repressive but weak state have taken to new forms of activism that attempts at being counter hegemonic.  Some of this activism has found new forms of expression not just in reality but also on social media.  Even though at times the activism is ephemeral it has however pointed us to a new approach that differs from what we would consider as traditional civil society. 

The key element of this generational praxis is how we must, to learn from Amilcar Cabral, understand the ‘weapon of theory’ and understanding the 'struggles against our own weaknesses'.  And our ideological and intellectual outlook must be passed on from one generation of activists to the next. And in this, to also be cognizant of the fact that it is always organically necessary to allow others to lead. 

In the third instance we need to come to terms with the expansion of new mediums of consciousness.  And by mediums here I refer to mobile telephony and the internet in its holistic form(s).  Social media and its attendant mediums are new arenas of not only activism but also purveying ideas, consciousness and even counter-hegemony.  Civil society in both its traditional and more contemporary form need to occupy these new spaces of disseminating progressive and counter hegemonic ideas against neoliberalism.  But also mindful of the theoretical assumption that the medium is also the message or to put it in simpler terms, the individualism that these new mediums such as the mobile phone brings, can serve more neoliberal hegemony than countering it.

Fourthly, in its interactions with the global north, civil society must always be fundamentally aware of its operational contexts and also seek out progressive relationships than benevolent or patronizing ones.  This includes steering clear as far as is pragmatically possible from mimicry.

  More importantly and this is very important, Zimbabwean civil society need to learn to strategically talk back to the global north on the basis of progressive principles and values.  And also not to merely follow the money but pursue an organic Pan Africanism and its global attendant solidarity from progressive civil society organisations in the global north. 

In conclusion, cde chairperson, I will not summarise all of the issues I have raised so far.  Instead I wish to set out a revolutionary task for Zimbabwean civil society for the year 2019. Because our politics has been a high stakes winner takes all game.  With tragic and unnecessary loss of lives or limb.  And keeping in mind a quote from Nyerere, 'the mechanisms of democracy are not always the meaning of democracy,' Zimbabwean civil society needs to re-examine/review our constitutional framework and begin the process of actively seeking the introduction of a complete (100%) proportional representation in our political system.  

In Parliament, which in turn will elect the President as an electoral college. And the same for local government.  I am aware that this is not as simple as it appears.  And that our largest political parties may quickly dismiss this opposition on the assumptions that it weakens their patronage systems.  My personal view is that it will make our society less politically polarized and our electoral politics to be less personalized.  It is a revolutionary task that requires an organic civil society that is not only people centered but also ideologically counter hegemonic.

*Takura Zhangazha spoke here in his personal capacity  (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

SADC and the EU’s Positions on Zimbabwe: Attempting an End of History

In the last week there were two very important statements issued on our country Zimbabwe by two very important inter-state political bodies.  The first of these statements,and closer to home was issued by the Southern African Development Community(SADC) current chairperson, Hage Geinjob who is also the current president of Namibia.

In the statement Geinjob condemned recent political violence in Zimbabwe without putting the blame on government or the opposition.  But more significantly, he called for the removal of sanctions on Zimbabwe wherein he said (to quote him at length), ‘The SADC Heads and State and Government further noted that the governments efforts to transform the economy and bring about prosperity to the people of Zimbabwe are negatively affected by the illegal sanctions that were imposed on the country since early 2000.  SADC expresses its solidarity with the Government and people of the Republic of Zimbabwe, and calls upon the international community to unconditionally lift all sanctions imposed on the country.’   

It was a statement that got an angry reaction from Zimbabwe’s opposition and some civil society organisations and activists.   With some unfortunately referring to the SADC acronym as standing for a ‘Southern African Dictators Club’. 

Not more than a week later the European Parliament(EP) made public its resolutions and recommendations to its executive arm, the European Commission (EC)  on Zimbabwe.  In it the EP condemned political violence, the internet shutdown  and to quote it at length, ‘Reminds the Government of Zimbabwe that the support of the European Union and its member states in the context of the Cotonou Agreement, and for trade, development and economic assistance, is conditional on its respecting the rule of law and the international convention and treaties to which it is party: Recalls that long term support hinges on comprehensive reforms rather than mere promises; calls for European engagement with Zimbabwe to be value driven and firm in its positioning towards the Zimbabwean authorities’. 

As indicated in the firm language used in the resolutions, the Zimbabweans government’s attempts at re-engagement for reprieve with the EU has suffered a severe setback.  And the reaction from pro-ruling party activists has been to quite literally blame the opposition for this firm stance by the EUP.

Both the state-controlled  and private mainstream media in what is now their expected partisan political output also reflected the views of their editorial and political preferences.

But as always critical context matters.  That the positions of SADC and the EP differ is very clear.  The motives for the same are however not so apparent.

SADC’s position appears to be predicated on a Pan Africanism that is wary of interference in the domestic affairs of a member state.  Not only by itself but also more significantly by international organisations that it has historically been suspicious of their intentions.  I mention history here because SADC is not just a latter day ‘treaty organization’.  It is a relatively historically organic one.   Largely etched from the anti-colonial and liberation struggle focused Frontline States (initially comprised of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana. Mozambique, Angola joined the group upon their attainment of independence to be followed by Zimbabwe in 1980). The FLS were to then establish the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) which also then spawned the now existent SADC.  

In light of this, whichever way one looks at it, the contemporary SADC and a majority of its member states are strongly informed by an anti-imperialist/colonialism ethos. A lot of us may consider the latter to be outdated and an excuse for protecting ‘dictators’, but regardless it remains an historical reality that cannot be wished away.  It is a reality that makes SADC one of the strongest regional political blocks in the world.  Minus the firepower of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 

The EU’s position is however predicated on an understanding of global universalism.  As well as the strength of its placement in global politics and the attendant economics/neoliberalism. And the historicity of it is again largely based on the fact that it is a union comprised of former colonial hegemons in Africa with vested interests beyond the political. It is an historical fact that we cannot run away from even if we wanted to. 

Where we juxtapose these two positions from the EU and SADC, we would do well to keep in mind how the two bodies potentially view each other.  Not that there is antipathy toward the global interaction and agreements on universal human values but more because of the specificities of regional histories and contexts.  Particularly in the case of Southern Africa. 

It is therefore imperative that lobby and advocacy activities on Zimbabwe always keeps this in mind.  As it did for example in 2007 when SADC intervened directly in Zimbabwe under the chairpersonship of Jakaya Kikwete (Tanzania) who then appointed Thabo Mbeki as the mediator on the Zimbabwean question(s). The inclusive government that stemmed therefrom should have moved the country forward but it didn’t.  Not least because of continued disputations over the land question that it failed to resolve. And that the current Zimbabwean government considers to be final.   

What then becomes interesting is the possibility that there is an evident desire on the part of SADC and the EU to move away from the past.  In respect of the former, it is to take Zimbabwe to a post Mugabe era while not negating or directly appearing to be compromising on issues to do with sovereignty and of course, land.  The latter however may have queries with the current government as to its failure to move away from Mugabe era not only in respect to human rights but also and probably more importantly to property (land) rights.

In both however, if we look closely, we see an attempt to move on or move back.  As informed by both immediate or long term history and perceptions of it. In any case, as has been now proven, history does not end.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Christianity’s Political Overreach in Zimbabwe?

By Takura Zhangazha*

At one time a Zambian comrade told me that their then new constitution had declared that theirs was officially a Christian country.  I did not panic but I was abstractly concerned.  I asked myself what it would all eventually come to mean.  And how would future generations of Zambians come to view it.  This was because it was and appeared to be final.  At least legally and with protections for the freedom of religion.  This was circa 1996 and to the best of my knowledge the constitution of Zambia has not been changed. At least in that regard.

Zimbabwe’s own political processes that led to a new constitution being signed into law by Robert Mugabe in 2013 avoided declaring the country a Christian one.

This despite some active campaigns by some church leaders that it is officially declared one.  That policy advocacy failure did not however stop its citizens from remaining exceedingly Christian.  And it was beyond the purview of the law.  What was guaranteed was the freedom of worship.  And that remains a good thing, unless of course you are a traditional spirit medium or what is then referred to in our statute books as ‘animist religions’. 

There the freedom of religion is a bit more limited and derided as being irrational.  Largely as a legacy of colonialism but also because it is how many Zimbabweans view it.  As exactly that if not borderline ‘evil’.

Hence a majority of our contemporary politicians have a strong Christian religious background.  Or if not, they will probably join one Christian church or the other for expedient or genuinely religious but in the end political purposes.  Regardless of how some of their own personal backgrounds are clearly to be found in  non-religious activities. 

This is important to mention primarily because the Zimbabwean Christian community has decided to weigh in on our national politics.  Both as arbiter and enabler.

Again, both historically and in the contemporary. The historical dimension being the ambiguous role played by the formal Christian church in our struggles for national liberation against colonialism (education and support to the liberation armies).

 In the contemporary and quite recently so, the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) recently held a ‘National Dialogue’ symposium with political parties.  Ostensibly to build a new national discourse on peace and tolerance.  And that’s the arbiter part.  The ZCC is persuaded that in the name of God in whom both the serving president and his arch nemesis in the opposition are firm believers, it can heal the nation.  Or at least bring the country back to a normalcy that it is yet to define.  And that is a good thing. Though it should not be beyond secular reproach.

The ZCC and its members or affiliates were reported in the media as having, at that meeting, ‘lashed out’ at the main political leaders in the country for not finding common ground for peace.

My personal persuasion is that it is always important to examine whether the ZCC is overreaching its mark and its mandate. Not least because it is becoming an important player in the realm of the secular.

 But then again we deal the hand we are dealt as a ‘Christian’ country.  The involvement of the Christian side of the church is based on the fact that a majority of Zimbabweans claim the same as their own religion.  And in any event, Christians remain the most organized (nationally and locally) of Zimbabweans.  Both in relations to their faith as well as their ability, once in agreement, to be mobilized to a specific political cause. 

In both cases, the Christian church is quite persuadable.  Not least because of its historical proximity to the colonial and post-independence state.  But also more conveniently because our contemporary political leaders are heavily reliant on its endorsement for some form of popular political legitimacy and more importantly, support. 

Quite significantly, the Christian missionary ethos of an ideological social justice cause in the colonial past and its post- independence narrative  is now somewhat lost. Mainly because the church appears less liberatory as it was in the past.  It is essentially a part of the establishment.  And where it tries to be somewhat different, it will eventually pick a side.  And that again, is most likely to be the establishment of the day.  But with relative caution that takes into account many things such as the protection of its material capital in the form of land, capital investments in institutions such as universities, banks, media, schools and hospitals. And possibly residential stands.

It all makes for a very awkward arrangement between what is assumed to be the secular state and the Christian church. An arrangement that suits both.  Those that would lead the state get political support. Those that lead the Christian church then get capital ( stands, educational stands and financial capital with tax exemptions).  A situation that may lead to a term of office perpetual ‘I owe You’ (IOU) with the ruling political party and by dint of the same, the state.

So why would the Christian Church not be politically influential in Zimbabwe’s context?  It is historically.  It can be in the contemporary.  It will be in the foreseeable future.

The only dilemma it faces is that it is already at the precipice of attempting that which it will eventually be unable to control.  Bibles in hand.  With its attempts at ‘national dialogue’ it is oblivious as to its own history under the aegis of Robert Mugabe and Ian Smith. Controversial as both historical narratives were.

And that’s its ambiguous side that is little talked about. Largely because the Christian church is perceived as liberatory. Church leaders that supported liberation and those that countered it were aplenty.  Both as redemptory to the then ‘natives’ as well as in order to keep them under control. 

A situation which changed with the increasing success of the liberation struggle.  The church for example under Catholic Bishop Lamont quickly learnt how to challenge a repressive state.  (Never mind the fact that Lamont was deported and the church carried on via the increasingly important Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace.)   Or the African Pentecostal churches of, for example, the Zion Christian Church and the Assemblies of the Family of God.

In the contemporary scheme of things however the Church will be unable to explain runaway political violence from those it either sought to bring together or in the final analysis, gave partisan and ‘spiritual’ support or guidance.  And it may eventually be unable to explain its role in a crass neoliberalism that will lead many Zimbabweans to poverty in the name of ‘austerity for prosperity’ as announced by government.   But then again, its all about faith. With a word of caution as to how that same said ‘faith’ can be partisan and convenient. All at the same time. Either to get state capital or (tax) reprieve. 

I am however of the personal view that  the attempt at some form of ‘national dialogue’ remains worth it in our Zimbabwean context. It is understandable given the fact that a majority of us Zimbabweans are Christian believers. And popularly so.  A key consideration however remains that the Christian Church should know the import of its impact and limits on what would be the ‘secular’.  After all, it remains colonial in its import to Zimbabwe. Together with its influence on the country’s perceptions of modernity/austerity or the current ruling party’s modernization/stabilisation  neoliberal programmes. It would be advisable, for now, that the majority Christian church proceeds with extreme caution.  Unless it is completely certain it can solve the problems it has interpreted. In the political/secular realm.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

An Imperial(ism) Re-creep? A Brief Zimbabwean Reflection on Venezuela.

By Takura Zhangazha*

A friend, in 2003 and much to my surprise remarked that he supported the United States of America (and its allies) invasion of Iraq.  I tried to caution him on believing what the global media was putting out for his consumption and preferences.  He remains unapologetic for his views and still avidly believes that almost all that comes from global Western superpower foreign policy toward the global south can only be good. Or in our best interests, even if we do not know it.     

In 2009, I was to watch the first black American president give a speech at Cairo University (Egypt) on what would ostensibly be the key features of his government’s Middle East policy .  Barrack Obama, true to form, spoke eloquently about the universality of human rights and how such a universalism would inform his governments policy.  It never actually turned out that way.  And for all his amazing speeches, Obama is partly responsible for the continuing break-up of Libya which in turn has contributed significantly (and arguably) to the deaths of thousands of African migrants in the Mediterranean Sea.  

We also now know (and see) the rise of radical white nationalism in the global north that was always going to counter assumptions of a global universalism for humanity.  Hence we now have 'fortress' global north and more stringent and in part discriminatory immigration policies.

But this was all rather distant from us here in Southern Africa or in particular in Zimbabwe.  Except for the time when a retired British military general mentioned, with hindsight,  the fact that former United Kingdom (UK) prime minister Tony Blair had made a case for military intervention in Zimbabwe.  And also as reflected upon by former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki’s advisor, Frank Chikane. 

Recalling the latter events with particular focus on Zimbabwe is not everyone’s cup of tea. Mainly because of a collective African historical amnesia as to the full import of colonialism and imperialism. Both as the past and a reinvented latter day ahistorical universalism.  As supported by an evidently pro-capital economic neo-liberalism and liberal interventionism from powerful governments in the global north.  And as they seek to compete for diminishing resources in the global south. 

I mention this in the wake of the neo-imperial foreign policy positions of the United States of America on a country that is now publicly its new arc Latin American nemesis, Venezuela (after Cuba of-course).  Donald Trump’s government has recognized the now main opposition leader Guardo as the president elect of Venezuela after the latter had declared himself the same over and above the actual president, Nicolas Maduro.  And at least four other governments in Southern America took the cue from Trump with the eventual support of some European governments.  

And this is where I return to the examples I cited above in relation to Zimbabwe.  And more significantly with its particular post 1997 struggles for further democratization which I have been a part of individually and with many of my elders, contemporaries and younger colleagues. 

We did not quite understand the mechanics of global politics and how they really work.  Especially in the aftermath of the cold war.  And understandably so.  

Faced with as dictatorial regime as Robert Mugabe’s which also created problems in order to pretend to solve them (economic structural adjustment was one of the most astounding), we would more often than not misread our placement in the global scheme of things.  This would occasionally mean our genuine struggles for democracy would be caught up in narratives that would limit our ability to negotiate better with either perceived or real allies.  

Or to at least measure what the interests of these same said global allies are. Together with a strategic reconsideration of what their support or allegiance would mean for our intrinsic democratic values and principles together with our right to national self-determination.  

A necessary exercise for all activists and as learnt from the insights of Pan-African revolutionaries of yore, not least, the inimitable Amilcar Cabral in his speech to the Tri-Continental Revolutionary conference, Havana, Cuba in 1966. 

Hence the situation in Venezuela, based on our own experiences in Africa during the drawn out Cold War of the 1960s-1980s, should clearly instruct us to be wary of a return of imperialism of old.  Not just by way of global superpower leaders bestowing presidents on us but in particular reducing our own national and pan African consciousness to being only important if they recognize it. Or assuming that theirs are acts that are intended only to serve our national interests. When the reality of the matter is that we are now faced with the serious threat, at least in the global South, of unmitigated ‘imperial re-creep’.  And we must be wary of that as our struggles continue.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Zim’s ‘Medium as the Message 2.0’. Notes on a January 2019 Internet Shutdown.

By Takura Zhangazha*

I will begin with an anecdote.  A couple of weeks ago the royalty of Zimbabwean political Twitter had a decent enough rage against Econet Wireless Zimbabwe founder (and now also a multi-media mogul) Strive Masiyiwa over what appeared to be his own personal political persuasions.  He had decided to talk back, via social media, to those who were and still are criticizing his alleged role in assisting to prop up the global image of the Mnangagwa government vis-à-vis the sanctions on Zimbabwe debate. A friend noted the slight irony as the ‘twar’ (twitter war) ensued between those that supported Masiyiwa’s stance and those that derided it.  All for very political and business-centered reasons. 

The anecdotal point was when he highlighted with an ironic chuckle the probable fact that a majority of those that were either criticizing or supporting Masiyiwa were probably accessing social media via Econet Wireless, ZOL or Liquid fibre-optic company.  All of which are majority share-owned by Masiyiwa.  At least in Zimbabwe.  And this is where the anecdotal/ironic evidence ends.

There was to be a more serious event of urban protests and a mass work stay-away in mid January 2019, the effects of which we will still feel for a while yet as Zimbabweans. Ostensibly over abrupt fuel price increases, as personally announced by Mnangagwa.  The violence that ensued particularly and was popularly perceived as being the state against civilians led to what now appears to be a common habit of a number of global governments under some sort of political siege.

Zimbabwe’s government implemented an undemocratic internet (including social media) shutdown. 

Enabled by the minister in the president’s office for state security (Owen Ncube), confirmed by short message service (sms) by Masiyiwa’s most popularly used Econet mobile phone network and eventually to be successfully challenged in court by media freedom organization MISA Zimbabwe, this was information shock therapy for many an urban(e) Zimbabwean. 

As in 2016 when the nationally increasingly popular WhatsApp social media platform gained credence, Zimbabweans had come to rely on it for immediate information.  And more significantly a reliance that was mediated by their (increasing in number) smart(er) mobile phones.  Combined with access to social media. 

It was in this particular national instance that the ‘medium’ became the ‘message’.  

I know that this sounds somewhat sophisticated or convoluted.  But this is as learnt from Marshal Mcluhan. 

And this is what happened again from 14-21 January 2019 in Zimbabwe.  The medium quite literally became the message.  How Zimbabweans got information determined their behavior.  Hence the government sought to undemocratically cut off the internet link the country has with the global world.  And as controlled by corporate superpowers that control both the medium (technology) and mediate its message(ing).  Ditto WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, Econet, Huawei, Samsung and in our national context, a little bit of Apple.

 All in combination and to maximum possible effect.  

As long as the medium (your phone and its access to the internet) was able to land everyday political events into your palm.  Even if you were and are in what traditionally has been a private place. 

Mobile telephony has become a primary source of information for many Zimbabweans. Both politically and apolitically. 

I would hazard to add that it has become more than a monetary currency.  One that would be individualistic in ownership and associational in mutual benefit.  The more information you have, the more likely you are to share it and the greater the sharing the more likely you re to act on the information received or imparted.  Individually or collectively. 

The medium has therefore come to be the determinant of specific behavior.  It has replaced the usual church meeting with a virtual experience. The latter being a combination of both the medium and the message (have smart phone, do a prayer post).  So long it meets two specific requirements, personal gratification and by individuated default, collective catharsis. All as mediated by your mobile phone and its access to, specifically, social media.

The reasons why many of us in Zimbabwe have come to this space of perception of the combined fundamental importance of social media and mobile telephony is that we have been long deprived of balanced and accurate nodes of accessing of information that we have deemed to be publicly important. 

The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation has remained a state and nationally partisan broadcaster while simultaneously the private media has countered the former’s news narrative in default favour of the mainstream political opposition. 

We therefore want our own version of the truth. Or at least what we perceive it to be. Via the medium.

In such a news partisan media environment, social media (the message) and the mobile phone as it impacts the individual was always going to rise in political and national consciousness significance.

And in this, again, the medium as the message has significantly helped to put a light on the tragic circumstances in which lives were tragically lost and brought the same to global mainstream media attention.

But back to my initial and only anecdote in this blog.  The mobile telephony operators and owners of fibre optic cables (those that own the medium) that connect Zimbabwe to the rest of the world cannot claim a Pontius Pilate moment on Zimbabwe’s recent internet shutdown.  Be it as globally high up as with Huawei, Samsung, Apple (and others) or locally as with Telecel, Netone or Econet.   Nor should those that are in control of content and attendant algorithms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter do the same. 

We will always require a combination of the ‘real’ and the ‘virtual’ to come to a publicly-democratic accountable way forward to move Zimbabwe to a better social democratic space.  And we need to heed the warning that while the medium may be the message, the oxymoron is not enough to help us cross the flooded and tragic river. 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura.zhangazha-blogspot.com)

Zim’s Fuel Demos: Whose Class Consciousness/Contradiction is it Anyway?

(With Reference to Nyerere, Cabral, Fanon and Lenin.) 

By Takura Zhangazha.*

It ostensibly started in the poorer parts of  Harare and Bulawayo.  At least according to viral social media posts.  Both as representing events as they occurred as well as how they were/are generally preferred by those with smart phones. 

Fact, rumour and conjecture intermingled as the day wore on from mid-morning to midday Monday 14 January 2019 and its eventual deluge of late afternoon rainfall (at least in Harare).By the time the state shut down the internet and its off shoot, social media next day, Tuesday 15 January 2019, all of the major cities were eerily quiet.  People had decided to stay at home for probably two key reasons: the safety of their families and also the shock at how the government had decided to add proverbial fuel to the fire through now widely reported disproportionate use of the army against civilians. 

At the heart of it all was what is referred to as the ‘ghetto’.  Also representative of Zimbabwe’s urban ‘underbelly’ or urban poor working class (formerly/informally employed and unemployed).  Or where an urban majority who would be most affected by the Mnangagwa governments recent decision to double fuel prices at least in terms of the local unofficial currency (bond notes/RTGS/mobile-money).

The effect was almost immediate.  Local transport fares soared and public opprobrium was the national temperament.   For varying reasons that sociologists and political scientists will historically and eventually come to explain.

In the mainstream print media, the versions of what was to come and what has occurred almost had a religious tone.  For some private newspapers, the fuel price increase had all the makings of Zimbabwean version of ‘armageddon’.  Or a dystopian end to the Zimbabwean state as we (still) know it.  Even if ephemerally.

For state controlled media (print and electronic) the editorial lines of their stories sought more to defend the neoliberal policy decisions of Mnangagwa’s government.  With the added attempt at giving policy direction as to potential inquiries into how fuel imports were being distributed or corruptly repatriated across our national borders.  While all the time blaming the opposition for the violence. 

One thing that was apparent however in the midst of the demonstrations (and stayaway) was that they eventually had their epicenters being the ‘ghetto’.  And that where they were at their most violent, it all occurred in places with the highest urban proximity to poverty.  Both historically and in contemporary reality. 

Hence the jokes on social media about people in more affluent suburbs not knowing what’s happening in poorer parts of town. 

Sadly the minister of state for national security in the presidents office has already confirmed the needless and tragic loss of life.  And there are and will be many unconfirmed reports of injuries more as a direct result of the actions of the state or those of protesters.

The reality of the matter is that there are class dimensions to these events.  And the state with its violent apparatus (security services) is very much aware of this.  Not only in the moment but also in the long term.   Hence the evident political approach of the ruling party not viewing the urban working class as more important than the working/ farming peasant.  Let alone panicking about the former.  

To talk about class in our context however is no longer ‘fashionable’.  Nor is it preferable for many an opinion maker.  Mainly because the latter are largely schooled in viewing our national political economy from what is now referred to as an ‘entrepreneurial’ perspective.  One that prioritises ‘ease of doing business’ theoretical hand me down approaches from the global north. Or relatively abstract motivational books and bio-pics of the leaders of global private capital (Davos anyone?)

Hence the term the ‘people’ invariably refers to the lower economic strata/class of our society.  

It is important to point out that in our historical context, political perceptions of class, politics, the economy and progress have had clearly Marxist leanings. A trajectory that was long since abandoned in the late 1980s (ESAP) via the ruling party and in 2005 via the mainstream opposition MDC (still)  labour backed party. 

And in the case of the current public disaffection with the fuel price (with its knock on effect) this would have been a Leninist moment.  That is, an organized grouping of committed radical leftists taking advantage of the situation to announce and effect a much larger political programme of state takeover. On ideological grounds.  With the support of a disaffected and war/poverty ravaged proletariat.  In our specific case it did not and will not happen that way.  Even though no one seriously expected the equivalent of Lenin’s ‘ State and Revolution’ or ‘ What is To Be Done’ seminal essays prior to the contextual fuel price increases.

Where we take a Fanonian perspective to the recent urban mass action, there would be strands of similarities in the latter’s analysis.  Especially in relation to what he then referred to as the propensity of the post-colonial state for violence with equal but ill-equipped counter fervor and violence on the part of what he referred to as the  lumpen proletariat.  Coupled with the evident betrayal of what was an original nationalist liberation project by the post- independence elite which fails to deal with what Fanon referred to as a ‘racism of contempt’ with regards to how it deals with global capital or the global north.  

Our own local national political and comprador bourgeoisie has however not turned its back to what Fanon refers to as ‘the interior’.  It has survived at least politically by manipulating and subduing the interior's (rural Zimbabwe) historical consciousness to the extent that the same ‘interior’ appears to be acting of its own volition in support of the former. Even if the center (urban) is volatile as in our current situation. 

The current government for all its fawning to global capital will never get the investments it wants and as a result it will fail in its neoliberal economic model that it touts as a panacea.  The same goes for the opposition which is largely comprador bourgeoisie in nature but rides on a vague form of personalized but ideologically similar nationalism that Fanon abhors even as as he emphasizes the supremacy of the organic political party. 

In Nyerere’s instance, the clarity was always in the placement of African countries in the global scheme of things.  Both from a Marxist and Pan-African perspective.   He understood how global capital intermingled with globalized economics worked or at least was going to work.  And the clarity he perpetually sought was one that required context.  Hence his little cited phrase, ‘the mechanisms of democracy are not the meaning of democracy’ said at the twilight of his meaningful political career.  A point that is increasingly apparent as a result of the collusion of state actors and private capital who more or less do not expect elections and other democratic processes to change global neoliberal economic policy.  

Even if these electoral processes are held as regularly as they are in a majority of states across the world.  And this is where in part the irony of class consciousness or a lack of it emerges in our recent mass action local context.  The collusion between the state and private capital (local and global) has led to a class consciousness on the part of those that would be urban working people that sympathise with principles of the free market and access to the United States dollar.  There is little differentiation of class interests.  Instead there is a merger in consciousness- across the class divide- but in favour of the narratives of the global bourgeoisie and its local comprador counterpart. It is ironic beyond measure that the demands of a person in the affluent residential area are similar to those of someone in a dirt poor part of a city. Adn that the movers and shakers of demands for the US$ or even more neoliberalism  are generally not the ones that bear the brunt of state sanctioned violence.  

Where we examine Cabral’s approach to class, there is merit to his postulation that what he refers to as the ‘petit/petty’ bourgeoisie playing a prominent role in national liberation (ditto Zanu and Zapu).  He adds however (and I quote him extensively here)  that ‘no matter the degree of revolutionary consciousness of the sector of the petty bourgeoisie, called on to undertake this historical function, it cannot free itself from an objective reality: the petty bourgeoisie, as a service class (that is not directly involved in the process of production) does not have at its disposal the economic bases to guarantee the taking over of power for it….And it never could, since political power (the state) has its foundations in the economic capacity of the ruling class.  In the circumstances of colonial and neocolonial society, this capacity is retained in the hands of two entities: imperialist capital and the native classes of workers’

In our national context, Cabral’s assertions point to a petty bourgeoisie that seeks to give ‘free  rein to its natural tendencies to become bourgeoisie.. that is to deny the revolution and necessarily subject itself to imperialist capital.’

 This is why the Zimbabwean government insists in the midst of an economic crisis on attending the annual get together of the transnational neoliberal elite at Davos.  And even on the opposition side, despite its origins in labour or the classes of workers (urban and rural), is not prepared, for now, to commit the metaphorical ‘class suicide’ that Cabral refers to.  Or to demonstrate a capacity to ‘remain faithful to the principles and the fundamental cause of the struggle.’  In what Fanon refers to as a ‘liturgical sense’. 

So it is fair to ask ourselves the key question in the immediate aftermath of the recent urban mass action in Zimbabwe, whose 'class consciousness' and contradictions are we dealing with?  

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

An Emerging Political-Economic UnConsciousness in Zimbabwe

 By Takura Zhangazha*

I recently came across, via YouTube, a talk delivered in May 2018 by former Greece finance minister Yanis Varoufakis at the Cambridge Forum, Massachusetts, USA.  Its title was ‘Is Capitalism Devouring Democracy?’  Given his leftist credentials the main body of the talk was essentially pointing out valid criticisms of the current global economic system’s neoliberalism and perpetuation of inequality.  Whether via bailing out global banks or promoting a rampant financialised global economy or negating the economic regulatory responsibility of the state. He, at the end of the lecture proposes and international version of Roosevelt’s  New Deal and greater solidarity among the oppressed of the world (mainly in the global north). 

But that was not the most significant aspect of his talk.  Midway through it he mentions his first meeting as part of the Euro Group ( a meeting of finance ministers from countries that use the Euro as their main currency).  In the lecture Varoufakis says he told the meeting that he had the democratic mandate of the people of Greece (as a radical lefty) and therefore was intending on changing the country’s economic policy from what had already been obtaining.  Or that which had brought the country to where it is, i.e austerity. 

He recalls that the then German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble replied in one sentence, ‘Elections cannot be allowed to change economic policy.’  Varoufakis then says he replied with irony ( and I am paraphrasing here), ‘In that case, lets ban elections in bankrupt- or suspend elections for countries that are in the red.’  The key point that he was making here was the fact that the global economic system or as we generally refer to it these days ‘globalisation’ as currently constituted does not look upon elections or democratic processes to change economic systems from neoliberalism to being egalitarian or at least fairly distributive. 

I have made elaborate reference to this lecture (you can check it out on YouTube if you have enough bundles) because in our Zimbabwean context we are saddled with economic challenges that are a direct result of a re-energized neoliberal/free market/ ‘ease of doing business’ policy approach from our government.  An approach which is the preferred one for global private capital (global north and global east). And so soon after a general election in 2018, which for now, appears to have had little effect on the democratization of the national political economy. 

And the effects are all too apparent in the form of fuel queues, rising cost of living, high unemployment and the loss of savings. As begun by Mugabe and now being stubbornly attempted by Mnangagwa without his predecessor’s radical nationalism. 

It is also an approach that is, to my own personal disappointment, being pursued by the mainstream opposition political parties including those under the umbrella of the MDC Alliance.  Their argument is not one that represents an ideological counter narrative to neoliberalism.  But one that confirms by claiming that it is only them that can implement the same neoliberalism better.  As if there can ever be such a ‘progressive’ differentiation.  A change of implementers of neoliberalism does not mean the economic trajectory of the same changes.

But we live in relatively populist and angry times in Zimbabwe.  Where the immediate is more valued than the long term.  Where individualism and a high level of competitiveness coupled with deep pursuit of materialism means that to question the economic system outside of the neoliberal lens is viewed with derision. 

Hence a lot of those still in employment want to be paid in foreign currency.  Or big business/local private capital wants to be allowed to determine the character of the market (and pricing of goods and services).  But all at the same time screaming at a government that, at least at policy level is already saying in order for this to happen, there must be pain.  A pain that will be transferred to the poor majority while the well to do are, to use the government’s own phrase are ‘ring-fenced’.  Or have their monetary wealth protected.   

Or where ruling party and opposition leaders are still scrambling for recognition from global financialised capital or institutions as if they do not know that the latter do not serve the democratic public interest of the people of Zimbabwe. 

The economic formula government is trying to use to solve the country’s economic challenges is not made to fit the context.  Even if it has the support of global capital , the ruling and opposition parties or is being hailed as a success in a few neighboring or relatively more distant sister African countries. 

In our specific context we need to rediscover a more critical national consciousness that understands our challenges ideological and in relation to our placement in the global economy.  We need to be wary of the culture of consumerism/materialism and individualism that Mugabe and later on the 2009-13 inclusive government followed through by Mnangagwa are trying to cement in our polity.  

This means examining new alternatives to our national political economy that can only take the form of social democracy if we are to prevent putting up ourselves and our country for sale to global capital and its local rapacious representatives.  Be they in government, opposition and in business.  And we also need to take sharp lessons from the global north as to how not to proceed down the same path.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com