Zim’s ‘Medium as the Message 2.0’. Notes on a January 2019 Internet Shutdown.

By Takura Zhangazha*

I will begin with an anecdote.  A couple of weeks ago the royalty of Zimbabwean political Twitter had a decent enough rage against Econet Wireless Zimbabwe founder (and now also a multi-media mogul) Strive Masiyiwa over what appeared to be his own personal political persuasions.  He had decided to talk back, via social media, to those who were and still are criticizing his alleged role in assisting to prop up the global image of the Mnangagwa government vis-à-vis the sanctions on Zimbabwe debate. A friend noted the slight irony as the ‘twar’ (twitter war) ensued between those that supported Masiyiwa’s stance and those that derided it.  All for very political and business-centered reasons. 

The anecdotal point was when he highlighted with an ironic chuckle the probable fact that a majority of those that were either criticizing or supporting Masiyiwa were probably accessing social media via Econet Wireless, ZOL or Liquid fibre-optic company.  All of which are majority share-owned by Masiyiwa.  At least in Zimbabwe.  And this is where the anecdotal/ironic evidence ends.

There was to be a more serious event of urban protests and a mass work stay-away in mid January 2019, the effects of which we will still feel for a while yet as Zimbabweans. Ostensibly over abrupt fuel price increases, as personally announced by Mnangagwa.  The violence that ensued particularly and was popularly perceived as being the state against civilians led to what now appears to be a common habit of a number of global governments under some sort of political siege.

Zimbabwe’s government implemented an undemocratic internet (including social media) shutdown. 

Enabled by the minister in the president’s office for state security (Owen Ncube), confirmed by short message service (sms) by Masiyiwa’s most popularly used Econet mobile phone network and eventually to be successfully challenged in court by media freedom organization MISA Zimbabwe, this was information shock therapy for many an urban(e) Zimbabwean. 

As in 2016 when the nationally increasingly popular WhatsApp social media platform gained credence, Zimbabweans had come to rely on it for immediate information.  And more significantly a reliance that was mediated by their (increasing in number) smart(er) mobile phones.  Combined with access to social media. 

It was in this particular national instance that the ‘medium’ became the ‘message’.  

I know that this sounds somewhat sophisticated or convoluted.  But this is as learnt from Marshal Mcluhan. 

And this is what happened again from 14-21 January 2019 in Zimbabwe.  The medium quite literally became the message.  How Zimbabweans got information determined their behavior.  Hence the government sought to undemocratically cut off the internet link the country has with the global world.  And as controlled by corporate superpowers that control both the medium (technology) and mediate its message(ing).  Ditto WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, Econet, Huawei, Samsung and in our national context, a little bit of Apple.

 All in combination and to maximum possible effect.  

As long as the medium (your phone and its access to the internet) was able to land everyday political events into your palm.  Even if you were and are in what traditionally has been a private place. 

Mobile telephony has become a primary source of information for many Zimbabweans. Both politically and apolitically. 

I would hazard to add that it has become more than a monetary currency.  One that would be individualistic in ownership and associational in mutual benefit.  The more information you have, the more likely you are to share it and the greater the sharing the more likely you re to act on the information received or imparted.  Individually or collectively. 

The medium has therefore come to be the determinant of specific behavior.  It has replaced the usual church meeting with a virtual experience. The latter being a combination of both the medium and the message (have smart phone, do a prayer post).  So long it meets two specific requirements, personal gratification and by individuated default, collective catharsis. All as mediated by your mobile phone and its access to, specifically, social media.

The reasons why many of us in Zimbabwe have come to this space of perception of the combined fundamental importance of social media and mobile telephony is that we have been long deprived of balanced and accurate nodes of accessing of information that we have deemed to be publicly important. 

The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation has remained a state and nationally partisan broadcaster while simultaneously the private media has countered the former’s news narrative in default favour of the mainstream political opposition. 

We therefore want our own version of the truth. Or at least what we perceive it to be. Via the medium.

In such a news partisan media environment, social media (the message) and the mobile phone as it impacts the individual was always going to rise in political and national consciousness significance.

And in this, again, the medium as the message has significantly helped to put a light on the tragic circumstances in which lives were tragically lost and brought the same to global mainstream media attention.

But back to my initial and only anecdote in this blog.  The mobile telephony operators and owners of fibre optic cables (those that own the medium) that connect Zimbabwe to the rest of the world cannot claim a Pontius Pilate moment on Zimbabwe’s recent internet shutdown.  Be it as globally high up as with Huawei, Samsung, Apple (and others) or locally as with Telecel, Netone or Econet.   Nor should those that are in control of content and attendant algorithms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter do the same. 

We will always require a combination of the ‘real’ and the ‘virtual’ to come to a publicly-democratic accountable way forward to move Zimbabwe to a better social democratic space.  And we need to heed the warning that while the medium may be the message, the oxymoron is not enough to help us cross the flooded and tragic river. 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura.zhangazha-blogspot.com)

Zim’s Fuel Demos: Whose Class Consciousness/Contradiction is it Anyway?

(With Reference to Nyerere, Cabral, Fanon and Lenin.) 

By Takura Zhangazha.*

It ostensibly started in the poorer parts of  Harare and Bulawayo.  At least according to viral social media posts.  Both as representing events as they occurred as well as how they were/are generally preferred by those with smart phones. 

Fact, rumour and conjecture intermingled as the day wore on from mid-morning to midday Monday 14 January 2019 and its eventual deluge of late afternoon rainfall (at least in Harare).By the time the state shut down the internet and its off shoot, social media next day, Tuesday 15 January 2019, all of the major cities were eerily quiet.  People had decided to stay at home for probably two key reasons: the safety of their families and also the shock at how the government had decided to add proverbial fuel to the fire through now widely reported disproportionate use of the army against civilians. 

At the heart of it all was what is referred to as the ‘ghetto’.  Also representative of Zimbabwe’s urban ‘underbelly’ or urban poor working class (formerly/informally employed and unemployed).  Or where an urban majority who would be most affected by the Mnangagwa governments recent decision to double fuel prices at least in terms of the local unofficial currency (bond notes/RTGS/mobile-money).

The effect was almost immediate.  Local transport fares soared and public opprobrium was the national temperament.   For varying reasons that sociologists and political scientists will historically and eventually come to explain.

In the mainstream print media, the versions of what was to come and what has occurred almost had a religious tone.  For some private newspapers, the fuel price increase had all the makings of Zimbabwean version of ‘armageddon’.  Or a dystopian end to the Zimbabwean state as we (still) know it.  Even if ephemerally.

For state controlled media (print and electronic) the editorial lines of their stories sought more to defend the neoliberal policy decisions of Mnangagwa’s government.  With the added attempt at giving policy direction as to potential inquiries into how fuel imports were being distributed or corruptly repatriated across our national borders.  While all the time blaming the opposition for the violence. 

One thing that was apparent however in the midst of the demonstrations (and stayaway) was that they eventually had their epicenters being the ‘ghetto’.  And that where they were at their most violent, it all occurred in places with the highest urban proximity to poverty.  Both historically and in contemporary reality. 

Hence the jokes on social media about people in more affluent suburbs not knowing what’s happening in poorer parts of town. 

Sadly the minister of state for national security in the presidents office has already confirmed the needless and tragic loss of life.  And there are and will be many unconfirmed reports of injuries more as a direct result of the actions of the state or those of protesters.

The reality of the matter is that there are class dimensions to these events.  And the state with its violent apparatus (security services) is very much aware of this.  Not only in the moment but also in the long term.   Hence the evident political approach of the ruling party not viewing the urban working class as more important than the working/ farming peasant.  Let alone panicking about the former.  

To talk about class in our context however is no longer ‘fashionable’.  Nor is it preferable for many an opinion maker.  Mainly because the latter are largely schooled in viewing our national political economy from what is now referred to as an ‘entrepreneurial’ perspective.  One that prioritises ‘ease of doing business’ theoretical hand me down approaches from the global north. Or relatively abstract motivational books and bio-pics of the leaders of global private capital (Davos anyone?)

Hence the term the ‘people’ invariably refers to the lower economic strata/class of our society.  

It is important to point out that in our historical context, political perceptions of class, politics, the economy and progress have had clearly Marxist leanings. A trajectory that was long since abandoned in the late 1980s (ESAP) via the ruling party and in 2005 via the mainstream opposition MDC (still)  labour backed party. 

And in the case of the current public disaffection with the fuel price (with its knock on effect) this would have been a Leninist moment.  That is, an organized grouping of committed radical leftists taking advantage of the situation to announce and effect a much larger political programme of state takeover. On ideological grounds.  With the support of a disaffected and war/poverty ravaged proletariat.  In our specific case it did not and will not happen that way.  Even though no one seriously expected the equivalent of Lenin’s ‘ State and Revolution’ or ‘ What is To Be Done’ seminal essays prior to the contextual fuel price increases.

Where we take a Fanonian perspective to the recent urban mass action, there would be strands of similarities in the latter’s analysis.  Especially in relation to what he then referred to as the propensity of the post-colonial state for violence with equal but ill-equipped counter fervor and violence on the part of what he referred to as the  lumpen proletariat.  Coupled with the evident betrayal of what was an original nationalist liberation project by the post- independence elite which fails to deal with what Fanon referred to as a ‘racism of contempt’ with regards to how it deals with global capital or the global north.  

Our own local national political and comprador bourgeoisie has however not turned its back to what Fanon refers to as ‘the interior’.  It has survived at least politically by manipulating and subduing the interior's (rural Zimbabwe) historical consciousness to the extent that the same ‘interior’ appears to be acting of its own volition in support of the former. Even if the center (urban) is volatile as in our current situation. 

The current government for all its fawning to global capital will never get the investments it wants and as a result it will fail in its neoliberal economic model that it touts as a panacea.  The same goes for the opposition which is largely comprador bourgeoisie in nature but rides on a vague form of personalized but ideologically similar nationalism that Fanon abhors even as as he emphasizes the supremacy of the organic political party. 

In Nyerere’s instance, the clarity was always in the placement of African countries in the global scheme of things.  Both from a Marxist and Pan-African perspective.   He understood how global capital intermingled with globalized economics worked or at least was going to work.  And the clarity he perpetually sought was one that required context.  Hence his little cited phrase, ‘the mechanisms of democracy are not the meaning of democracy’ said at the twilight of his meaningful political career.  A point that is increasingly apparent as a result of the collusion of state actors and private capital who more or less do not expect elections and other democratic processes to change global neoliberal economic policy.  

Even if these electoral processes are held as regularly as they are in a majority of states across the world.  And this is where in part the irony of class consciousness or a lack of it emerges in our recent mass action local context.  The collusion between the state and private capital (local and global) has led to a class consciousness on the part of those that would be urban working people that sympathise with principles of the free market and access to the United States dollar.  There is little differentiation of class interests.  Instead there is a merger in consciousness- across the class divide- but in favour of the narratives of the global bourgeoisie and its local comprador counterpart. It is ironic beyond measure that the demands of a person in the affluent residential area are similar to those of someone in a dirt poor part of a city. Adn that the movers and shakers of demands for the US$ or even more neoliberalism  are generally not the ones that bear the brunt of state sanctioned violence.  

Where we examine Cabral’s approach to class, there is merit to his postulation that what he refers to as the ‘petit/petty’ bourgeoisie playing a prominent role in national liberation (ditto Zanu and Zapu).  He adds however (and I quote him extensively here)  that ‘no matter the degree of revolutionary consciousness of the sector of the petty bourgeoisie, called on to undertake this historical function, it cannot free itself from an objective reality: the petty bourgeoisie, as a service class (that is not directly involved in the process of production) does not have at its disposal the economic bases to guarantee the taking over of power for it….And it never could, since political power (the state) has its foundations in the economic capacity of the ruling class.  In the circumstances of colonial and neocolonial society, this capacity is retained in the hands of two entities: imperialist capital and the native classes of workers’

In our national context, Cabral’s assertions point to a petty bourgeoisie that seeks to give ‘free  rein to its natural tendencies to become bourgeoisie.. that is to deny the revolution and necessarily subject itself to imperialist capital.’

 This is why the Zimbabwean government insists in the midst of an economic crisis on attending the annual get together of the transnational neoliberal elite at Davos.  And even on the opposition side, despite its origins in labour or the classes of workers (urban and rural), is not prepared, for now, to commit the metaphorical ‘class suicide’ that Cabral refers to.  Or to demonstrate a capacity to ‘remain faithful to the principles and the fundamental cause of the struggle.’  In what Fanon refers to as a ‘liturgical sense’. 

So it is fair to ask ourselves the key question in the immediate aftermath of the recent urban mass action in Zimbabwe, whose 'class consciousness' and contradictions are we dealing with?  

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

An Emerging Political-Economic UnConsciousness in Zimbabwe

 By Takura Zhangazha*

I recently came across, via YouTube, a talk delivered in May 2018 by former Greece finance minister Yanis Varoufakis at the Cambridge Forum, Massachusetts, USA.  Its title was ‘Is Capitalism Devouring Democracy?’  Given his leftist credentials the main body of the talk was essentially pointing out valid criticisms of the current global economic system’s neoliberalism and perpetuation of inequality.  Whether via bailing out global banks or promoting a rampant financialised global economy or negating the economic regulatory responsibility of the state. He, at the end of the lecture proposes and international version of Roosevelt’s  New Deal and greater solidarity among the oppressed of the world (mainly in the global north). 

But that was not the most significant aspect of his talk.  Midway through it he mentions his first meeting as part of the Euro Group ( a meeting of finance ministers from countries that use the Euro as their main currency).  In the lecture Varoufakis says he told the meeting that he had the democratic mandate of the people of Greece (as a radical lefty) and therefore was intending on changing the country’s economic policy from what had already been obtaining.  Or that which had brought the country to where it is, i.e austerity. 

He recalls that the then German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble replied in one sentence, ‘Elections cannot be allowed to change economic policy.’  Varoufakis then says he replied with irony ( and I am paraphrasing here), ‘In that case, lets ban elections in bankrupt- or suspend elections for countries that are in the red.’  The key point that he was making here was the fact that the global economic system or as we generally refer to it these days ‘globalisation’ as currently constituted does not look upon elections or democratic processes to change economic systems from neoliberalism to being egalitarian or at least fairly distributive. 

I have made elaborate reference to this lecture (you can check it out on YouTube if you have enough bundles) because in our Zimbabwean context we are saddled with economic challenges that are a direct result of a re-energized neoliberal/free market/ ‘ease of doing business’ policy approach from our government.  An approach which is the preferred one for global private capital (global north and global east). And so soon after a general election in 2018, which for now, appears to have had little effect on the democratization of the national political economy. 

And the effects are all too apparent in the form of fuel queues, rising cost of living, high unemployment and the loss of savings. As begun by Mugabe and now being stubbornly attempted by Mnangagwa without his predecessor’s radical nationalism. 

It is also an approach that is, to my own personal disappointment, being pursued by the mainstream opposition political parties including those under the umbrella of the MDC Alliance.  Their argument is not one that represents an ideological counter narrative to neoliberalism.  But one that confirms by claiming that it is only them that can implement the same neoliberalism better.  As if there can ever be such a ‘progressive’ differentiation.  A change of implementers of neoliberalism does not mean the economic trajectory of the same changes.

But we live in relatively populist and angry times in Zimbabwe.  Where the immediate is more valued than the long term.  Where individualism and a high level of competitiveness coupled with deep pursuit of materialism means that to question the economic system outside of the neoliberal lens is viewed with derision. 

Hence a lot of those still in employment want to be paid in foreign currency.  Or big business/local private capital wants to be allowed to determine the character of the market (and pricing of goods and services).  But all at the same time screaming at a government that, at least at policy level is already saying in order for this to happen, there must be pain.  A pain that will be transferred to the poor majority while the well to do are, to use the government’s own phrase are ‘ring-fenced’.  Or have their monetary wealth protected.   

Or where ruling party and opposition leaders are still scrambling for recognition from global financialised capital or institutions as if they do not know that the latter do not serve the democratic public interest of the people of Zimbabwe. 

The economic formula government is trying to use to solve the country’s economic challenges is not made to fit the context.  Even if it has the support of global capital , the ruling and opposition parties or is being hailed as a success in a few neighboring or relatively more distant sister African countries. 

In our specific context we need to rediscover a more critical national consciousness that understands our challenges ideological and in relation to our placement in the global economy.  We need to be wary of the culture of consumerism/materialism and individualism that Mugabe and later on the 2009-13 inclusive government followed through by Mnangagwa are trying to cement in our polity.  

This means examining new alternatives to our national political economy that can only take the form of social democracy if we are to prevent putting up ourselves and our country for sale to global capital and its local rapacious representatives.  Be they in government, opposition and in business.  And we also need to take sharp lessons from the global north as to how not to proceed down the same path.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com

Delta Zimbabwe’s Defiance of Govt: The Tail Wagging the Dog?

*By Takura Zhangazha

The move by Delta Corporation Zimbabwe Limited (Delta) to announce that it would begin to sell its products in multiple currencies with a particular emphasis on the US$ was one of the most bold actions from a private corporation in recent years.  Mainly because in its statement announcing its decision, Delta made reference to the current government's monetary policy as being inadequate and went on to audaciously listed new prices in US$ for its commodities.

Government sort of panicked with the Minister of Industry, Nqobizitha Ndlovu issuing a press statement warning business against ‘dollarising the economy’ through unilateral decisions on commodity pricing by private business.

It went further and convened a meeting with Delta executives with the governor of the Reserve Bank which resulted in a joint press conference that announced a reversal of the US$ pricing of beverages for the domestic market. The Reserve Bank also promised to provide the requisite foreign currency (state subsidies) to Delta in order to maintain the status quo of pricing in bond notes.

 The minister of finance weighed in on the matter by stating that he did not expect private players to ‘rush to choose the currency they think the country should adopt.  They should just be patient, let us work together.’

This incident between government and Delta is interesting in a number of respects.

The most evident being that Delta is a powerful player in Zimbabwe’s political economy.  When it sneezes, it would appear government coughs.  This is probably due to the fact that it is almost a monopoly supplier of beverages and contributes significantly to the national purse via taxes and excise duty.  So government cannot afford to have an unhappy behemoth of a company that can decide unilaterally that its operations are no longer feasible (i.e profitable).

Secondly the government is increasingly a victim of its overall macro economic policy framework of the ‘ease of doing business’ or an unfettered ‘free market’ and its attendant neoliberal principles and rules.  Delta and a number of other large companies (Econet, Innscor, Makwiro Platinum etc) are probably all too aware of this.  Hence the ease with which Delta announced its decision as a private corporation.  Because government is pushing pro-private capital policies, the latter can easily decide that the former’s policy measures are inadequate.  As did Delta.  And they can with relative ‘ease’ threaten the government with arbitrary and profit motivated decisions to scale down their operations if their demands are not met. 

This is a vulnerability that government has brought on itself and local private capital knows that it has the protection of the gaze of global capital.  It then becomes a question of what does government actually control? Or what will it eventually be able to control when it comes to the interests of private business and companies as large as Delta?  So far it would appear that these large companies (private capital), given the example of Delta are potentially the proverbial tail wagging the dog.

And this latter point brings into focus the intrinsic/ longer term character of the emerging relationship between the state and private capital.  It’s a relationship that intends to become cemented by the shared principles of the free market/neoliberalism.  This to the extent of creating that hazardous ‘revolving door’ between state actors and private capital actors.  That is to say, at some point it will become difficult to tell the difference between a cabinet minister and a corporate executive.  Hence for now there is amicability, even after Delta’s unilateralism, between the state and private actors.  With the latter being keen to see government do its specific bidding in the name of the free market or as Mnangagwa puts it, ‘the ease of doing business’. 

It is however evident that this relationship between state and private capital actors is not democratic.  Or does not seek to deliberately work to serve the democratic public interest.  This is because the public interest tends to work at cross purposes to the profit motive of big business.  Hence for example the quicker solution to a potential crisis of beverages over and above that of the health services sector.

In order to counter this increasingly hegemonic relationship between private capital and state actors, we need to put up alternative understanding of what would a progressive national political economy.  We need to protect state capital (land, health, transport, water, education infrastructure) from the avaricious hands of private capital.

 And we need to put private capital in its place by telling a corporate citizen such as Delta that it is not a priority citizen because of this proximity to the state or claims at being too important to be allowed to fail (hence it and other private players are now guaranteed of state bailouts).

 And finally we need to come to unpopular terms with the fact that our continued use of the United State dollar (US$) as an official or publicly preferred currency in unsustainable.  However we try to rationalize it.  Instead we should work on introducing a credible local currency that will be available as a medium of exchange for all of us and not the politically and private capital connected few.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Commodity Fetishism/Politics: An (Dis)Honest Closure to Zimbabwe’s 2018.

By Takura Zhangazha*

Over the Christmas break, while travelling, I had to crosscheck the Marxian term ‘commodity fetishism’.  That is mainly in our Zimbabwean contextual ‘intrinsic’ valuation of specific goods/commodities –in their post-production and availability or a lack thereof to consumers. And in part how this contributes to defining our political, economic and social behavior.   

This was because mainstream and social media were agog with stories of how there were shortages of all things associated with a ‘happy Christmas’.  Or the lack of it.  These ‘things’ included fuel, Coca-Cola, local beer and the happiness associated with them.  And as is generally said in this part of the African continent, ‘the struggle is real’ in attempts to secure these commodities and the possessive personal satisfaction they can bring.  Even if we, as majority and mere consumers are not in control of their means of production.

If you have a personal vehicle, access to fuel was and still is a personal hassle.  Especially the fuel that you get at the local currency (bond note, mobile money or bank transfer) rates.  The queues at petrol stations were and still are a pain to experience especially if one is on a journey to a rural home or touristy holiday destination.  Where the fuel was available, albeit briefly, the likelihood of you getting to the pump after a long stint in a queue was limited.  Even if there were a few cars ahead.  This was mainly because there were the ‘special ones’ that could always get more than they need for their local or long journey use.  From touts to parallel market fuel dealers, the fuel was and is a profitable bargain.   They purchase it at what is clearly a locally discounted rate in large quantities, store it and wait for those desperate enough to be willing to pay for it in United States Dollars (US$).  Or at triple the pump price in local currency. 

For the other Christmas ‘happiness’ commodities such as Coca Cola and local beer, the prices fluctuated depending on the supply or supplier.  And it turns out if you had local currency as with fuel you may have had to pay double or triple the price to get your family’s drinks of choice. 

In all of this there are those that made a phenomenal profit.  Even in fuel queues the joke was that if you check out those who had the jerry-cans and drums, they would be be able to buy up market residential stands by the end of January 2019.  (It is now being reported that some of the fuel dealers are being arrested). 

But back to commodity fetishism.  The value of the Christmas happiness goods (fuel, drinks, clothes) was reflective of a national tradition about how the year should always end on a high note. Almost also as a carry over to how (black) labour and capital would define its relationship in terms of national happiness both in colonial and post-colonial/independent Zimbabwe.   With a possible summary statement being ‘If we don’t (nationally) get the happiness we always get at the end of the year, then things are not going well. Especially if government and private capital do not deliver or if the former does not enable the latter!’ 

I know that the public perception may not be as complex as the preceding statement.  The point however is that it helps explain the general public disappointment and pessimism.  Together with a curiosity of what underlies our culture of consumption as the equivalent of happiness. 

In abstract conversations with comrades, discussions on this particular matter have tended toward explaining our national social (political and economic) culture as increasingly self-centered or individualistic.  And also very much nostalgic of what would be perceived to have the ‘good times’ which regrettably do not exclude colonial Christmas time experiences.

 

The key emerging issue is that the Zimbabwean government’s approach to the national economy is failing to meet these expectations which are historically and popularly perceived or appreciated.  Not that it ever can, given the ‘policy’ fact that it has chosen a ‘free market’ approach to these matters, a market which for now is not (and will not be) delivering as popularly expected.  For some reason best known to itself the state assumes that with all this ‘pain’ there shall be ‘gain’.  Something that can only be qualified as an ahistorical truism.

But private capital also comes into the fray.  Despite US$ subsidization by government (queue to the Reserve Bank for US$ anyone?) big and informal business is failing to pay adequate homage to the ‘free’ market by profiteering and creating narratives that aver from the favours it is getting from the state.  All mainly based on the unofficial currency exchange rate and waiting upon the implementation of further fiscal reforms beginning January 2019.  As far as private capital is concerned, profit is profit and opportunity is exactly that, opportunity.  Never mind issues of business ethics as they do not relate to profiteering rackets. 

Again if the Leninist question of ‘what is to be done’ emerges as it should, the key issues are about countering an increasingly entrenched Zimbabwean individualism that looks at self-actualization as occurring in isolation as opposed to being part of the national collective.  Even if the year 2018 was one of national anger/high emotions, we will always need to take a step back and remember that worshiping commodities/ consumerism will not solve our national problems.  Neither will a neo-liberal government that pretends to be concerned about peoples’ welfare and yet focuses on the free market with abysmal failure, even by their own standards.   

What is required is a more contextual, structural approach to the national economy.  One that ensures that the role of the state is not subsumed by the vagaries of a rampant profiteering and an informal ‘free market’. 

And also that, in the final analysis, Zimbabwe requires its own solid national currency.  Even if popular perception and political mistrust gives greater value to the US$ as is the global norm.  Except that our problem is that we use it as if it’s our own. 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his own personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Zims' 2018: A Year in Which Anger was Never Going to be Enough.

By Takura Zhangazha*

At some point almost every adult Zimbabwean could easily be defined as being angry in the year 2018.  And all for different reasons. A majority of us were apoplectic about the state of the national political economy as accompanied by the promises of Mnangagwa’s ‘new dispensation’.  Not that expectations were that high.  It was more to do with promises made, and promises that were clearly going to be difficult to meet.  All accompanied by populist electioneering in the aftermath of the death of the main opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai.  And a very serious intention at retention of political power by the ruling Zanu Pf party despite having ousted its long serving leader Robert Mugabe.

So the anger remained fundamentally political in character.  There were those that were angry at the ruling establishment and its failure to work miracles with the economy or its financial component of the United States dollar (US$) versus the local bond note.  There were those that were angry with opposition leaders for not subsequently recognizing the electoral result. Others too were angry at Robert Mugabe for capitulating to the ‘coup-not-a-coup’ of November 2017 or for endorsing the main opposition’s presidential candidate. After the July elections there were to be those that were angry at the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) for allegedly ‘rigging’ the election, anger which also got transferred to the constitutional court for arriving at a judgement that kept Zanu Pf in complete power.

It should have ended there but it didn’t.  The anger continued  in the post electoral period with the Monthlante Commission of Inquiry into the August shootings in Harare becoming a central purveyor of such politicized frustration and a search for carthasis.  Not only by way of its public hearings but also its recent final report and recommendations. 

Even then the national political economy did not change for the better and the national anger escalated as a result of a new monetary policy as introduced by the ministry of finance.  The steep rise in prices and shortage of basic commodities caused by astronomical unofficial exchange rates with the US$ had a lot of people in national panic mood. The hoarding of basic commodities by those who could afford them and the withdrawal of regular production cycles by private manufacturers did not help matters.

Not surprisingly Mnangagwa’s government did not and has not shown signs reflective of the national panic, let alone anger.  Instead it has all the while kept insisting that if there is no ‘national’ pain, there will be no ‘national’ gain.  And they insist on ‘austerity’ i.e. the free market/neoliberalism as the only solution to the chronic challenges that the national political economy is faced with.  This means there is method to their proverbial ‘madness’.  

It is essentially the equivalent of ‘shock economic therapy/ shock doctrine ’ where government works closely with willing and in search for massive profit private capital to reinvent a national political economy in keeping with free market principles and values such as privatization and limiting the role of the state. And for this they have the support of local and more significantly components of global private capital. All with the intention of ensuring that Zimbabweans get used to this way and become individually more competitive with a national consciousness that no longer values the role of the state as the primary guarantor of citizens’ social and economic rights.

Given this determination by state and private capital to embrace elite motivated neoliberalism it is important to emphasise that anger or claims at youthfulness was/is never going to be enough. It may help in bringing people affected by similar emotions together but without a structured alternative to counter the neoliberalism the anger will only serve a cathartic role.  Or give the impression of momentum that with hindsight will be viewed as performance politics/activism.   Both of which tend to be more ephemeral than organically long term. Or where people become enamoured to increasingly superstitious and materialistic religiosity/livelihoods that is always on the lookout for the next messianic figure or big gamble paying off (crosscheck millennial capitalism)   

So the political year that was 2018 was a national emotional roller coaster.  No matter which side of the political divide one found themselves in.  And depending on political loyalties accompanied by an initial assumption that the governments ‘ease of doing business’ may temporarily pay off or fail, 2019 is likely to remain another highly emotional national year. Especially for a majority of poor Zimbabweans who will still be subjected to multi-tier commodity pricing, the emergence of a new ‘informal’ currency and the vagaries of privatizing social services.

Except that the anger may not just be with the state and private capital’s unholy partnership(s) but the entirety of the structure of the neoliberal and free market ideological framework being used as a solution to addressing the problems with the national political economy.  For this challenge to the under construction neoliberal hegemony (as orchestrated by the state and private capital) to have greater success new alternatives, not just as of the traditional conservatism versus socialism/social democracy but more people centered and contextual ones.  Or those that understand even more global dynamics at play but remain grounded in realities that place people at the centre of their proposed solutions.  Over and above a desire for recognition for challenging the ruling establishment(s) only to pursue the exact same regressive neoliberal economic policies.  Here’s to wishing cdes a happier 2019.  Optimism is key.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

US$8 million for Zanu Pf and MDC Alliance: An Annual Sharing of State Electoral Spoils.

By Takura Zhangazha*

Understanding the raw political ambitions of individual Zimbabweans is a complex exercise.  One that is full of familiar dictum's/accusations such as they want ‘power for power’s sake’ or ‘they are in it for the money’.  On the rare occasion comments about how certain political leaders ‘mean well’ in their pursuit of political power. Or that at least they are ‘one of our own’ and the now ominously familiar, ‘they have liberation war credentials’. 

These individuals invariably join/form political parties to better enable their intentions at some form of power.   The parties that they form or are a part of are also queried as to their intentions with power.  In the case of the ruling party the general accusation is that even if they may have been all about liberation, their long rule has made them appear to be all about self aggrandizement.  With the main opposition the occasional accusation is that they are also in it for the perks but also, luckily for them,  they would still be perceived to be the metaphorical ‘better devil’. 

The prevalent view it would appear is that politics and political ambition are linked to some sort of benefit(s) from the state.  And that whatever happens at the top of the political ladder, lower level leaders and supporters get some piece of the pie.  This would also be known as political patronage. 

What has been interesting has been the legal role that the state is obliged to play in support of those that would publicly be perceived as only motivated by milking from it. 

This week the ministry of finance and economic development announced that it has allocated a total of US$ 8 million (lets not argue about currency here as I am certain they all have ‘nostro’ accounts) to the ministry of justice for distribution to the political parties that are in parliament.  This is done periodically in terms of the Political Parties (Finance) Act.  In this act, each political party that got at least 5% of the total votes cast for its members in the last general election shall be entitled to an equivalent percentage of the total money allocated to political parties in each financial year.

So the ruling Zanu Pf party is going to get at least US$6million and the opposition MDC Alliance is certain to get US2 million.  At least according to the ministry of justice permanent secretary Virginia Mabhiza. 

The act does not advise political parties what the money is to be used for.  It is entirely at their discretion save for when the relevant minister issues out regulations as to how these monies are to be accounted for.  And as far as I recall, these regulations are yet to be publicized.  Nor has any minster of justice previously tried to make it an accountability issue beyond accusations of foreign funding which incidentally is not quite disallowed. 

The long and short this act is that apart from other motivations such as getting actual executive power (the presidency) in terms of current Zimbabwean law, there is definitely money to be made by running as a political party, for parliamentary office. All you have to do is to get at least 5 percent of the total vote count for candidates in the National Assembly (which also entails actually wining some first-past the post seats/ constituencies).  And as it turns out, it can be a lot of money just for your party (and as controlled by the party leadership). 

This would not always be a bad thing if it was clearer as to what the money was being used for.  Preferably this state funding  would be intended to help political parties strengthen their internal democratic processes and represent their constituencies better. Even if its not stipulated in the relevant act or in existent supporting regulations. 

In reality, experience shows us that these monies are largely unaccounted for and tend to be under the direct control of political party leadership. 

This would probably explain why the public may be skeptical of such state funding arrangements for political parties in a time when government is talking about ‘austerity’ (unpopular as it is).  Moreso given the amount the ruling party is being allocated.

This state funding of political parties has not promoted internal party democracy, a national democratic culture or seen a flourishing of issue based politics.   And that is why the Political Parties (Finance) Act must be amended to include in its parameters how state funding is intended to contribute to the enhancement of intra party democracy, public accountability and issue based political practices.  This should be done in tandem with removing/reforming the constitutional clauses that allow political party leaders to dismiss MPs without due procedure. 

Zanu Pf and MDC Alliance would probably not agree with the above proposition for a number of reasons.  The utmost being that it would limit their ability to practice political patronage over parliament.  It would also seek to make them more intra democratic and as a consequence contribute to a better national democratic consciousness that sees beyond just our five year electoral contests. 

Smaller opposition parties may also be wary of such reforms because they would feel that they would never have a chance of winning against parties that receive state funding.  A gentle reminder to them would be that at least in its beginning the MDC (as then called) did not receive such funding and gave Zanu Pf more than just ‘a run for the money’. 

Civil society organizations that work on elections, democracy, accountability and human rights would be advised to take this up more concertedly.  Because this might be an opportunity to help direct our national democratic consciousness into less personalized and more institutionalized understandings of a people centered polity.   

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot