Potential implications of a deteriorating media freedom climate in South Africa on Southern Africa.

Remarks made at the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) Public Discussion on Media Developments in South Africa and their potential impact in Southern Africa.

Wednesday, 12 July 2012: Rosebank Crowne Plaza Hotel, Rosebank, Johannesburg, South Africa

By Takura Zhangazha.* 

Mr Chairman,

Let me begin by expressing the gratitude of the Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwefor the invitation to attend this public discussion at the behest of our colleagues from the Media Institute of Southern Africa(MISA). The topic under discussion is an important one because it relates to the state of media freedom in the Southern African region with particular emphasis on recent media policy developments in South Africa.

It is an historically understood point  that in the aftermath of the anti-apartheid struggle and on the basis of its democratic constitution, the influence of South Africa on broad regional debates concerning democratization issues has been and continues to be  substantial.

This should also be taken to mean that it is generally perceived within the Southern African region and beyond that South Africa is a good example of a functional democratic state. Such comparisons are even more poignant where the Zimbabwean state is compared with the South African one either in direct relation to democratic practice or where it concerns issues of the perfomance legitimacy of former liberation movements that are in power in both of our countries.

In the last ten or so years, one of the key components of measuring and comparing the democratic perfomances of various SADC states has been whether or not the citizens of the same are enjoying their right to freedom of expression, and whether the freedom of the press is also guaranteed. South Africa has had the distinction of being singled out as having some of the most democratic clauses in its constitution and attendant enabling laws concerning freedom of expression, media freedom and media diversity. In fact, it has been cited by many Zimbabwean media stakeholders as an example of where lessons can be drawn from in order for the Zimbabwean media landscape to be fully democratised, particularly with regards to media self regulation, broadcasting diversity as well as media sustainability.

It has however come to pass that the South African government has decided that it must introduce the Protection of State Information Bill, a development that has had the unfortunate impact of making some governments in the rest of the SADC region claim that their laws are not so bad after all (even if they remain much worse, eg. Zapiro would probably have been a police cell in Zimbabwe charged with undermining the authority of the President).

Add to this, the now stalled Media Appeals Tribunal (MAT) which is currently a policy document of the ruling African National Congress, then indeed there is serious cause for concern about media freedom in South Africa. And given the regional ‘democratic example’ role that South Africa has been playing, it would also mean that if the MAT were to be made government policy, it would be a significant setback  for media freedom in the region by way of example.  

It would also appear as if the South African ruling party is getting lessons from some of its neighboring ruling parties in the region who insist on statutory regulation as well as criminalization of the media profession. From our own Zimbabwean experiences, such tendencies can only be those of  governments  that have  more to hide than share in the best democratic public interest.

Apart from the new undemocratic policy trends in South Africa as regards the mainstream media, again there is the new threat that is emerging from governments across the world against those that utilize social  media for citizen journalism or even just expressing their opinion on political matters. Given the global government panic over the impact of Wikileaks as well as the invoking of anti-terrorism laws by governments that have been at the forefront of promoting democracy globally are now preferring criminal charges against whistle blowers and investigative journalists. This is an unfortunate emerging trend that the Southern African region would do well to avoid.

With regards to the important issue of media self regulation in the region, it is imperative that we continue to emphasize the democratic symbiosis of the rights of media freedom with freedom of expression and access to information. None can exist without any of the other two.

Where governments both within our SADC region and across the oceans have started to talk about exercising either of the triumvirate rights separately, it must be viewed as being tantamount to seeking to make freedom of expression either a ‘qualified’ (depending on your political loyalties) franchise right or ‘privilege’ rights to be enjoyed solely by those in power.

This is why ‘co-regulation’ of the media by the state and the media itself, though being touted as a ‘compromise’, is patently inadequate in allowing the media to carry out its public interest mandate.

Governments, South Africa’s included, have adopted a ‘self righteous’ approach that seeks more to threaten the media than to engage in progressive dialogue with the media and allow media self regulation breathing space.

This is a habit that is now generally seen across the sub-region, and the new media policy direction being debated by the South African Parliament, unfortunately serves to strengthen the emergence of governments with predatory tendencies against the media.

It is therefore of utmost importance that we do not seek compromises that seek to protect those in power or those that claim and  wrongly seek to confer responsibilities that are undemocratic on the media while they skirt the democratic mandates that have been given to them by electorates.

Media self regulation is of the utmost importance in Southern Africa and indeed to our South African media colleagues because it has not yet been fully implemented. In effect it is work in progress. We therefore must not at this juncture permit democratic values to be compromised on the basis of the sole whim of governments that are more keen on control than they are on democratic media public accountability and serving the best public interest.

Where media self regulation has been faulted by governments in the region or elsewhere, these are accusations of those that either misunderstand the organic triumvirate of the right to freedom of expression, access to information and media freedom (which is inclusive of media self regulation).

It is however not only governments that must be reminded on these matters. Owners of the media products/houses must also commit themselves more and more to learning to balance their valid concerns on profit and sustainability with those of the public interest as well as media ethics. This would include ensuring that at least they collectively continue to agree on particular media ethics and commit to supporting media self regulatory mechanisms.  Journalists must also demonstrate commitment to the same said media ethics and media self regulatory mechanisms with the primary intention of proving that the profession is essentially there to work in the best public interest and with democratic media public accountability. 

To conclude, I must emphasize that the debate around media self regulation is a big debate about the triumvirate rights to freedom of expression, access to information and media freedom. Where we begin to see this clearly, we can argue on the basis of the democratic rights of the people of South Africa, Southern Africa and the world to enjoy these rights without undue interference. It would therefore be wrong for regional governments to seek to criminalise the three rights all at once via threatening journalists, whistleblowers and human rights activists for publishing information which in most circumstances is directly in the public interest. Where some of the technical arguments against media self regulation  relate to how ‘no one is above the law’, criminalizing the work of journalists will always, in the final analysis , be patently undemocratic.

Thank You.

*Takura Zhangazha is the Executive Director of the Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe (www.vmcz.co.zw)

Electoral End Games of Zimbabwe's Inclusive Government.

 Electoral End Games of Zimbabwe's Inclusive Government.
By Takura Zhangazha. *

The political parties in Zimbabwe's inclusive government have now begun playing out their electoral end games eleven months prior to the expiry of its constitutional term of office in June 2013. There have been varying public statements  from the three parties in government about the actual date of  elections  and which ever way one looks at it, election season is now firmly upon us again. Whereas Zanu Pf has been insisting on elections being held this year, that can now be considered a moot point given the hints by some of its newspaper columnists that it is well nigh impossible to have both a constitutional referendum and an election in terms of a new constitution in the next eleven months.

The MDCs, on the other hand, have been arguing for the full implementation of the SADC facilitated election road map. They however must most certainly know that again in the limited time period available , they will not get everything that they are requesting short of a constitutional amendment that extends the lifespan of this current government. And for this, they would require an almost impossible to get two thirds majority in Parliament. At best the MDCs will probably have to revert back (amidst Zanu Pf resistance) to the Electoral Amendment Bill (amongst other potential or existent laws) to try and integrate the provisions of the SADC facilitated road map into  domestic law.

Regardless of the outcome of all of these contestations, the issue of elections is no longer as distant as it was two years ago. In fact, it has become evidently more urgent for political parties within and without of the inclusive government and as such, the Zimbabwean public must brace themselves for highly politicized debates and an increasingly polarized political environment. In this, there will be the revival of the old rivalries of 2008 and mudslinging between leaders in the inclusive government about the performance of rivals in the last four years.

The images of friendly leadership handshakes will decrease and we will all be asked to demonstrate loyalty to one party over the other without really questioning issues of the policy substance that has been provided by the inclusive government in the period that it has existed. It is because of such a potential development that one can reasonably argue that we are now entering a political period in which we should no longer expect much by way of non-partisan or 'common ground' policy from the inclusive government. 

Each party will angle what it would call its own 'exclusive' policies in the inclusive government as evidence of its ability to govern and therefore its electability over the others. Zanu Pf will insist that it's indigenisation programme has been a success while MDC will argue that were it not for its control of broader economic policies, hyper-inflation would still be knocking on every citizens door. Blame games for the undemocratic and expensive constitutional reform process under COPAC will reach a particular partisan crescendo because it is the one thing that all parties in the inclusive government cannot skirt collective responsibility on.

The actual reality for the everyday citizens will however not be as frenetic or as emotive as that of those that will be seeking their votes. They will view and participate in the electoral processes either out of cultural and political coercion or even self aggrandizement than belief in any particular principles. This being a direct result of the fact that the inclusive government has had little to offer by way of inspiring its own people to believe in anything else but survival of the 'fittest' and the cliched  'kiya-kiya' political economy. Add to this, the clear distinction between the profligate lifestyles of those in government and the majority populace has already led to a cynical electorate which may seek more to gain materially in the immediate than to challenge political leaders on the country's future. So there will be the positioning of money, jobs and drought relief handouts in direct return for votes from a public that knows that without taking advantage of the elections, these material benefits would be few and far between.

So as Zimbabwe enters this protracted election season, it is of importance that civil society organisations take non-partisan stock of the inclusive government based on democratic values and principles. Where this is not done, it is the country that will be the worse off in the present and in the future. It is also imperative that  the inclusive government be brought to account not merely on the basis of the personalities that comprise it, but on its performance when measured by social democratic value and principles.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Review of Government and Business 'Relationship' Urgent

 Review of Government and Business 'Relationship' Urgent.
By Takura Zhangazha*

In the last fortnight there have been a number of media reports on the non-transparent tendencies of stakeholders in the banking and fuel procurement sectors of our national economy. These media reports indicate that due to a patent lack of transparency and accountability, the country is now faced with a new  crisis with some banks as well as a potential fuel procurement scam that if unattended to, will affect petrol and diesel supplies into the country. It would have been expected that government would have immediately announced an investigation at the highest level concerning to not only these two matters but even others that have been reported on in the media.

As it turns out, the government may not be taking these issues as seriously as one would expect. This even after the now embarrassing debacle that appears to be the Essar and Green Fuel investment projects that cabinet is said to be reviewing.  The reasons for such an ambivalent approach by the state to matters of serious national concern are generally given as the 'unworkable' and difficult relationships of the parties that comprise the inclusive government. But on the emerging scandals concerning the credibility of our banks as well as the procurement of fuel, this reason is thoroughly inadequate and democratically unacceptable.

The gravity of the economic challenges that are apparent for some people and businesses that are currently unable to access their savings due to the challenges of some of our banks and the serious hints at shady deals around fuel supplies did not emerge out of the blue. They are most likely the culmination of lack of serious government oversight into these sectors (and probably others) in the last four years.  Unfortunately it however appears as though this lack of serious oversight on the part of government is not merely due to a lack of capacity but may now increasingly be telltale evidence of a potentially unhealthy relationship between government and our own version of 'big' business.

The symptoms of this unfortunate state of affairs have been glaring. In the last year or so there have been many reported stories concerning various state related entities or crucial services and the dubious transactions that have taken place under the watch of government. These transactions have ranged from the controversial involvement of the National Social Security Agency (NSSA) with various banks and trusts, the 'prematurely' granted Essar-Ziscosteel deal, the  bio fuel project in Chisumbanje and of late the recent problems at Interfin and Genesis banks.  In all this one cannot avoid the rumours that some of the companies and concerns that are now under the spotlight are suspected  to be politically connected to one party or the other in the inclusive government. Moreover there are whispers that some senior government officials have or had direct business interests in some of these and other related commercial entities, a matter that can only leave a sour taste in the mouth.

Given the foregoing, it is necessary that there be an urgent but independent review of the relationship between various business interests and the state as well as individual political leaders in government. The necessity of such a review is premised on the democratic importance of ensuring that both business and the state are accountable to the people of Zimbabwe as well as to stem the rising 'mafia culture' that seems to be defining state-business relations.

Further to this, the review would enable our country's 'big' businesses to revisit their operational ethics and values in order not only to adhere to them but to improve on them urgently. The inclusive government must also revisit its approach on its interactions with local and international capital. As regards the former, government must insist on an understanding that a business concern is not just about personal aggrandizement. Its primarily about innovation in the supply of goods or services in the greatest public interest of the country.  This would assist in combating the murky culture of opulence amidst poverty that has been demonstrated by some of our prominent business persons and sad to say, most of the members of cabinet.

Finally, and in aide of emphasis, the collusion (if any) between government and prominent commercial concerns is undemocratic and prone to high levels of corruption.  It is also dangerous because when elites with political power and those with access to resources have fingers in both pies, it leads to the creation of a 'mafia' that may, with time, be impossible to bring to account.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity, takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com

Profit, Public Interest and Zimbabwean Business.

Profit, Public Interest and Zimbabwean Business.

By Takura Zhangazha*

A good friend of mine who is a business entrepreneur recently sent me an email to advise that he takes serious exception at my usage of the term 'comrade' in referring to him. The reason he gave for his umbrage with the title is that he finds the term archaic and reminiscent of what he calls the failed project that was socialism. He also added that, as a businessperson, he also felt that it does not reflect his own liberal  ideological persuasion and that in any event, its a term that is 'bad for business'. It was a brief conversation that brought a number of issues to my mind concerning the values and principles that drive what remains of Zimbabwean business. Particularly so when the corporate world interacts with the government's controversial policy of indigenisation, our virulent nationalism, contested elections and the uncritically celebrated policy frameworks of public-private partnerships. But in direct relation to the brief conversation I had with my colleague concerning 'comradeship' and business, I am persuaded that indeed the profit sector of our society has a key role to play in building a better economic and development paradigm for Zimbabwe. Both within the present and for posterity.

This is an argument that I premise on the fact that our commercial, trade and industrial corporations have an obligation to reflect on the role that they expect themselves to play in relation to acquiring profit while ensuring that it is in tandem with the broadest public interest. Such a combination of the pursuit of profit in a manner that is concomitant with Zimbabwe's best 'public interest' will not only lead to a much more symbiotic relationship between business, the state and society but one that will also benefit  all stakeholders.  It would however be necessary to explain how the relationship between business and the public interest would initially interact and perhaps in the process establish a new democratic 'comradeship' between the state, business and the Zimbabwean public.

The debate about the role of business, profit and the public interest is now a global one. It is generally characterized by prescriptive frameworks emanating from some of the worlds liberal think tanks as well as global institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary fund (IMF). It is also a debate that has been characterized by the failure of African governments together with African businesses by being poor  and weak negotiators as to the contextual relevance of some of the prescribed solutions to the development challenges of the continent.  Zimbabwe specifically has not been an exception. The economic crisis of the last 15 years has been a direct result of the combination of an undemocratic government system as well as an increasing one sided and 'extractive profit' motivated integration of our country's businesses/resources into the global economy.

 These developments were against the backdrop of the fact that we took to World Bank sponsored economic structural adjustment progammes  like ducks to water without checking the depth or width of the pond. And it appears we have never really sought to re-examine the same today. What we have had, on the part of both government and business, is the continued acceptance of macro-economic frameworks from the World Bank and IMF that short-change the national economy with the latest such initiative being an unexamined and haphazard outsourcing of state functions for profit via opaque and essentially symbolic public-private partnerships.

In such a context, the challenge of defining a progressive role for business in Zimbabwe is not so much an ideological one. Instead it is a challenge that is more to do with how business approaches its legitimate profit interests when juxtaposed with the public interest. While the primary function of business is to provide goods and services for a profit, in Zimbabwe's case it is also important that there be benchmarks on specific goods and services that are related to the right to life of all citizens. Examples of these  rights include those such as the right of all to education, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and the right to property. It is necessary that business and the state establish baselines as to how profit must not only be viewed in individual corporate monetary acquisition terms but in relation to the direct public benefit for broad Zimbabwean society.

This would mean that it would not be permissible for a health related business to seek to make super profits at the expense of the important right of all to access health services. The same can and should be argued in relation to the right to own property, wherein, no business should be permitted to acquire, for example, large tracts of land from communal areas at the expense of the communal farmer. To establish such a baseline, it would be advisable for the state and the corporate world to establish a Zimbabwe Business Charter, that would outline democratic principles and values of the profit making or seeking  sectors in the country as well as their interactions with foreign direct investment.

It would then be imperative that government and business frame their interaction with global capital on the basis of a combination of opportunity and mutual benefit to both the businesses concerned as well as the people of Zimbabwe.  Such a charter would therefore entail the specifications of how foreign direct investment must be handled in a manner that allows the development of our dilapidated public infrastructure, a deliberate transfer of knowledge to the people of Zimbabwe and the protection of our environment.

Finally, this new business charter would incorporate the basic understanding that while businesses are indeed about profit, they must also be about innovation and its relevance to the society in which they operate. This innovation would entail exploring new ideas and methods of doing business in a socially responsible and beneficial way. It would also relate to not merely seeking to mimic business practices in the north, but more of learning form the experiences of others, contextualization of the knowledge acquired and applying any new business ideas within the context of not only profit, but commitment to the improvement of the lives of the people of Zimbabwe.


*Takura Zhangazha writes in his personal capacity. (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Essar, Greenfuels Investment Deals and our Incompetent Inclusive Government.

Essar, Greenfuels Investment Deals and our Incompetent Inclusive Government.

By Takura Zhangazha*

There are currently two major investment deals that the government of Zimbabwe is surprisingly unsure about how to proceed with, even after initially approving of them. The first, which was launched amidst much fanfare was the Essar deal that was described as being intended to ensure the revival of ZiscoSteel in the Midlands Province. It is now being reported that cabinet has ordered some sort of review into the deal because apparently we sold the processing plant and the iron deposits for too little.

The other investment deal is the Chisumbanje/Greenfuels one where the Minister of Energy has publicly told the company involved to export its ethanol. Apparently the minister has not seen any cabinet minutes as to a directive that the ethanol from Greenfuels be compulsorily blended with all imported petrol in Zimbabwe. Deputy Prime Minister Mutambara has since told Parliament that cabinet has set up some committee or the other to look into the matter. There are other controversial government investment deals that are not as publicly disputed but these two above cited deals leave one perplexed as to what exactly is going on in cabinet and in the offices of various ministers.

The two deals in question, prior to being approved by the government, had been reported on for a while in the media. In some instances cabinet ministers travelled to various countries to see examples of where the relevant investor had a similar operation. In other instances, particularly as regards the Essar deal, there were further media reports about serious jockeying for the lucrative tender by not only the Indian company but South African companies that were alleged to have strong links to African National Congress (ANC) officials and allegedly the same party's former presidents.

After all the trips, lobbying, verification and other measures had been undertaken, the government, of its own volition, decided to award Essar and Greenfuels the relevant investment contracts. With both deals however, there now seems to be a turnaround by government without adequate reason or public explanation. The versions of these unclear reasons are many, but suffice to say, there can only be something fishy on the part of  cabinet in both cases. The lack of clarity on these two matters is not only appalling, but patently indicative of a government that does not take its work or its own people seriously. 

In fact, it appears that government is more preoccupied with grandstanding about private public partnerships when it does not in the end demonstrate the relevant knowledge of the intentions of the private partner and does not dot the 'i's or cross the 't's when putting pen to paper.  It is rather embarrassing to have a government that argues with itself about an investment that is already approved and already on the ground. Even if one is to assume that in the case of the Essar deal, all that government is seeking is to correct an anomaly, it would be irresponsible on our part as citizens to let cabinet off lightly.

A key question is how does the government not follow up with relevant mining departments as to the content and nature of  iron ore deposits before putting pen to paper? And if a minister is dealing with a multi-million dollar investment deal, to what extent is he/she assisted with the relevant expertise as regards the full implications of the deal? In the case of Essar, it appears that the government did not do its own homework and was quick to claim credit for an investment that invariably has turned out to be a sour one.

Where one reviews the limited public information that is there about the Greenfuels deal in Chisumbanje, one can be forgiven to think that the actual problem relates to community land rights. Instead the problem is that the government agreed to such a massive project, only to say it no longer wants to utilise the end product (ethanol) locally. The relevant minister then advises the investment company, via the media, to 'export' the ethanol. Now, there could be various reasons why the minster has done this, including, perhaps political reasons but what stands to fact is that if cabinet agreed to this deal, it must either cancel it altogether or else see it through.

Moreover, if there are serious differences in the fuel importation  industry, then the minister must openly seek to iron out these differences and explain cabinet decisions for the benefit of not only the fuel oligarchs but also the Zimbabwean public. Where government fails to do this, we would not be remiss to assume that perhaps cabinet is not functioning in the best interests of Zimbabweans.

In both deals, it remains imperative that the government cleans up its act quickly and functions on the basis of demonstrating that it is serious about running this country. Even where the arguments are that the inclusive government does not function fully well, it can only be counter-argued that all cabinets the world over have collective responsibility and as such, botched investment deals are the fault of all political parties that are in cabinet.

*Takura Zhangazha writes in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Harare City Council 'Bus Plan' needs re-think

 By Takura Zhangazha*

The Harare City Council (HCC), according to recent media reports, intends to expand the city's public transport services by introducing a fleet of 500 buses in partnership with a private company. On the face of it, it is a development that must be welcomed given the fact that the city's public transport system as it exists today remains characterized by 'stop gap' planning and without the necessary 'best practice' service and safety standards. The contemporary main players that are likely to be affected by this policy intention of HCC are private commuter omnibus operators who have  been the main providers of urban public service transport  in the city since the liberalization of urban transport services. How these stakeholders will respond to this potential competition is probably something that they can better argue via their relevant associations.

What is however  important about this particular policy intention and tender pronouncement by the city is how it came to be deemed either a solution or a necessary measure to take in the best interests of Harare residents and commuters. I am sure there are tender award protocols and accountability mechanisms that are currently being utilized in order to ascertain which of the five reported companies will win the award to provide the buses that council has deemed necessary to ease the traffic and congestion on the city's roads.

The more important point however is whether the plan is a holistic plan or, as with previous ones, is more to address symptoms without achieving the intended effect which would be a lasting cure for our transport ills.  A departure point in seeking to analyze this new policy initiative of council is to measure the reasons why HCC has not considered the railway network or linkages with the National Railways of Zimbabwe in its plan. If the council has indeed considered the urban railway network as an option then they must give a public explanation as to why it is no longer deemed part of the solution to our public transport challenges.

In its explanations, it would also be wise for HCC to consider  a number of issues that will emerge when it goes ahead with this plan in its reported form. The first issue being that given the general traffic congestion  particularly during our peak hours,  the additional 500 buses are not going to resolve the problem of time spent by commuters on the road to and from work.  A combination of the intended buses, smaller commuter omnibuses, private vehicles is a recipe for more congestion and not relief. 

When also considered with the fact that our roads are already strained since very few of them are either dualised  or fully upgraded to efficiently accommodate current levels of traffic, let alone an additional number of buses,  the HCC will then have to make  some controversial choices. These would possibly include either introducing  an extra charge ( e.g London's congestion charge)  to either private or smaller vehicles as a deterrent for them to come into the CBD. The other alternative will be to actively encourage commuters to  use council sanctioned buses while at the same time competing with the small commuter omnibuses in the CBD. Again, HCC will face tough challenges with proving their buses to be better and more efficient than the smaller commuter omnibuses that are currently the main mode of transport for many residents. This process will inevitably lead to clashes and differences between the city authorities and those that are currently in the public transport business wherein the latter will accuse the former of unfair protection of  the new bus company's operations.

Where the council undertakes a 'big picture' approach to the public transport challenges in Harare, they would have to consider including the railway network in their plans and thereby reduce the number of buses they intend to introduce. The national railway network, even though it has been described as technologically outdated and underfunded, provides an alternative solution that has been under-explored in relation to urban public transport in Zimbabwe. While it has been tried in controversial circumstances before (early-to mid 2000s) it was never further developed. The city council would do well to take an approach that links up more conveniently and efficiently the railway line network that circumnavigates the capital and lies adjacent to major residential areas to the west and east of Harare. The buses that would then be introduced would cover primarily shorter distances and possibly provide services that link up parts of the CBD or newly constructed railway stations in residential areas that the railway line passes through. This would invariably be a cheaper and more efficient  option for the commuters as it would mean less congestion on the roads, less accidents, less consumption of fuel as well as less environmental damage in the city.

While the leaders of the city may perceive this to be more expensive and more long term as an alternative to their 'bus plan', it is an alternative that will strengthen the full utilization of available infrastructure as well as enable an integrated public transport system for the city. It would therefore be imperative that the council undertakes a much more complete cost benefit analysis of its intended introduction of 500 buses onto the capitals strained transport system.

*Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity: takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com

The ‘Quiet’ Transformation of Zimbabwean Society.

The ‘quiet’ transformation of Zimbabwean Society.

By Takura Zhangazha*

The general discourse on the challenges that Zimbabwe has faced in the last ten years has been given as that which has its root causes in the political realm. In explanations as to why the country is where it is, and specifically in the aftermath of the advent of the global spread of liberal democratic values, academics and laypersons alike have referred to the root cause of the general crisis in Zimbabwe as a ‘crisis of governance’.  Such a description of the problems the country has faced has also been taken to mean that it is the manner in which Zimbabweans are governed that has been the source of the current and even previous unpalatable state of affairs in the country. 

This would be  'crisis of governance' causal effect has included identifying the ‘democratic deficit’ of  Zimbabwe's  political system as the primary reason as to why we no longer have either social welfare, decent levels of foreign  direct investment or even why our own citizens are leaving the country in droves at every turn and opportunity. 

Because in any event, the same said ‘crisis of governance’ still obtains, it is however important to point out that the country has however not stopped functioning in one way or the other. Whereas the late Professor Masipula Sithole referred the manner in which Zimbabwe started functioning after 1997 as an exercise in ‘normalizing the abnormal’, it remains true that however one may view it, we still have a state that is undergoing seen and unseen changes. 

The ‘seen’ changes (or lack thereof) are those that relate to what I have referred to earlier as  being determined by the cliche, ‘ a crisis of governance’ which is mainly defined by the lack of a number of democratic mechanisms such as free and fair elections, separation of powers, a democratic constitution amongst other matters that relate to various indices on democracy. 

The second and for the purposes of this article, more important change to Zimbabwean society has however been the 'unseen change' which has tended to evade or be evaded by political actors. This  'unseen' change is primarily experienced by the majority poor or ‘underbelly’ of Zimbabwean society and can be described as the comprising the ‘quiet change’ in the country. It is a change that has to deal with the new, stark and harsh realities that the everyday citizen has to face in Zimbabwe, no matter what the political leaders are saying at any given point in time. 

These realities are indicative of the transformation of the state from being 'benign' to being completely negligent to the livelihoods of the populace through inorganic planning and outsourcing of social welfare needs to either international NGOs or corporate (read as South African and Chinese) capital. The overall impact of such an approach by the state has led to literally ‘revolutionary’ change in how Zimbabweans survive on a regular basis as well as how this has negatively affected our social value systems. 

More Zimbabweans are now of the firm understanding that even where they had confidence in the state seeking to assist them out of poverty or humanitarian disasters, it is an unrealistic collective expectation. This, not because of big ideological battles on the role of the state but simply on the basis of the nonchalance of political leaders when it comes to matters that have no bearing on political power as an end in itself.

This has led to many citizens pursuing 'survival' tactics in activities that relate but are not limited to the informal economy (cross-border linked trading),  farming under the fast track land reform programme (even if their political party of choice is against it), resorting to crime (including  syndicates taking advantage of vulnerable young women for commercial sex work) , finding solace in religion and superstition or alternatively simply emigrating from the country and leaving behind disjointed families and communities. Even where some citizens are employed  formally, it is mainly to augment or finance the informal activities that are cited above.   

In undertaking these activities the attendant socioeconomic culture is one that is resigned to the ‘each man for himself and God for us all!’ mantra. This is tragically so  even where there should be collective concern over services that are intended to technically ensure basic human equality for all such as health, education, shelter and access to water. 

As a matter of consequence,  the sad thing to note about the above cited realities is that they have taken on a life of their own. That is to say, the negative state of affairs vis-a-vis the general lack of a social welfarist and responsible state has begun producing an increasingly societally  ‘acceptable’  knowledge and cultural system (increasingly via ICTs)  of its own for younger Zimbabweans who may no longer harbour idealistic notions of democracy for a society that seems to have neglected them.  

It therefore becomes this 'quiet change' that is most definitive of the future of Zimbabwe, after all the slogans have been shouted. It is a change that is easy to ignore given the Manichean  character of Zimbabwe's politics but it is the reality that a greater majority of Zimbabweans have to face every day.  Where political, civil and religious leaders do not address the ‘abnormalised normal’ in Zimbabwe’s ‘underbelly’, we have a real crisis on our hands. And it will not just be one of ‘governance’ but of a complete collapse of the legitimacy of the Zimbabwean state. 

 

 * Takura Zhangazha writes in his personal capacity. takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com.