The Struggle for a Social Democratic Zimbabwe Continues. It has to and it will.

By Takura Zhangazha.*

When the inclusive government came into existence, discourse over and about the ‘struggle’ shifted significantly. Whether this discourse was about narratives of ‘arrival’, or alternatively, ‘continuity’, the conversations that were had were always inconclusive. In the aftermath of the July 31 2013 harmonised elections, questions that are now coming back to haunt or even re-focus many comrades relate to fundamentals. What is the struggle? Where is it placed? Has it come full circle? How does it continue (if it still exists)? All of these questions can only be answered on the basis of self knowledge, organic values, and democratic principles.

In saying the above, I am aware of the ‘judgment calls’ that will be made on any assumed self righteous assessment of the state of affairs in the mainstream national political opposition .This is because the answers are in and of themselves judgment calls on those that were leading the struggle .A struggle which I remain persuaded exists and does not end with the 2013 electoral defeat of the MDCs (and components of civil society) by Zanu Pf. This is because the struggle for a social democratic Zimbabwe has always been much more holistic and more important than all of the parties that were part of the July 31 2013 electoral contest.

At this juncture, it becomes important that I define the ‘struggle’. Our post independence struggle has been a struggle for social democracy in Zimbabwe. It is a struggle that has its roots in the values of the liberation struggle wherein, social and economic justice was the key deliverable for a majority of the people of Zimbabwe (even if by default).

 It is a struggle that celebrated the achievement of national independence and a joyous desire to participate in the return of our people to the making of Zimbabwean democratic, people centered and self determining history .Where we welcomed our first majority rule government we remained cognizant of not only its challenges but also its primary mandate which was to fulfill the aspirations of the liberation struggle. This was and remains a mandate of all subsequent post independence governments.

 In our collective understanding of these matters, we measured Zanu Pf (as the ruling party) on the basis of its ability to address and achieve the aspirations of our nation’s founding values and principles.

 A decade after independence we were to find it necessary to challenge the political narrative of Zanu Pf and the fundamentals of the manner in which it was  governing the country. We were there both in spirit and form at the formation of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) and sought to challenge the ruling party’s hegemony. We sought to initiate a narrative that the country did not belong to one party or specifically that the collective understanding of our national liberation was not singular.

Interpretations of the values of the liberations struggle were always going to be varied but without undermining the revolutionary historicity of the same. Similarly, the fact of participation in the liberation struggle was not the singular prerogative of the right to govern as regularly argued by our former liberation movements. Contrary to this view we recognized the posterity component of the struggle.  One in which we knew and felt that the progenitors of the same said struggle knew and know that the ‘baton stick’ will be carried forward by subsequent generations. 

Unfortunately, this latter understanding of our national politics let alone of the significance of the liberation struggle did not find resonance in the ruling Zanu Pf party .This was where and when it had  disembarked from the revolutionary path and undertook elitist policies that negated the values of the liberation struggle.

Key among these elitist policies was the implementation of the World Bank initiated and sponsored Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs),which were to come to affect those of us born in the years preceding independence and those of us who are now collectively referred to as the ‘born free’ generation. Particularly in relation to employment, education, health, public transport and a democratic future.  

The issues that emerged in the decade after our independence were no longer about towing  any specific ‘party line’ but leading the country to social democratic prosperity. A challenge which the ruling Zanu Pf party was to prove incapable in tackling. 

We therefore, and correctly so, took to exercising our liberation struggle won rights of assembly, association and expression, to oppose the hegemony of Zanu Pf .  This was done through not only opposing ESAP via the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade unions (ZCTU), but also challenging the systematic narrative of political and human rights abuses stemming not only from our new found knowledge of the tragic events and state brutality  that occurred in the Matebeleland regions in the early 1980s but also the failure of the state to meet socio-economic performance legitimacy requirements.

 We correctly began to question the meaning of the liberation struggle for the majority. We remained aware of the ineptitude of government but were even more significantly aware of the challenges and responsibilities of alternative national leadership.

 That is why toward the 20^th anniversary of our national independence the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed.

The primary mission of the MDC was to embark on the historical path of fulfilling the remaining social democratic aspirations of the liberation struggle. Formed against the backdrop of a National Working People’s Convention, the MDC sought to re-engage Zimbabweans on the outstanding liberation struggle aims and objectives (including the outstanding matter of the land question).

True to its founding intentions, the MDC went to the people and began the process of reclaiming the country from the elite and back to the masses. This is why, in the elections of the new millennium, the MDC was to gain ground in both Parliament as well as eventually end up as part of the Executive branch of government with the assistance of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 2009, only ten years after its formation.  This ascension to national government office, controversial as it was, became evidence of how and why the MDC had gained national legitimacy in relation to being viewed by a majority of Zimbabweans as the movement to fulfill the remaining intentions of the liberation struggle.

In this, the MDC was not a creation of the West as Zanu Pf would want to allege. Instead, it was an evident demonstration of the people’s sentiment, one which was seeking political alternatives, hence the rise of the MDC to executive national office in a short space of ten years.

It was however not an easy road to effective and power acquiring counter-hegemony for the MDC. Mistakes were made, and most of these relate to the departure by the mainstream MDC leadership from a social democratic historical path and narrative of the people centered pursuit of political power and office. Both in terms of their internal genesis as well as the national understanding of the initial intention to fulfill the aspirations of the liberation struggle. The lack of historicity to their presence on the national political stage has been in part their undoing. And  this against better advice.

Where discussions about their agreeing to the SADC mediated Global Political Agreement (GPA) have tended to justify their electoral defeat, these can only be described as exercises in political dishonesty. The reality of the matter is that the latitude that the MDCs had during their tenure in the inclusive government was intended to allow them to demonstrate their ability to not only govern but to demonstrate greater commitment to the holistic aspirations of the liberation struggle. Both as envisioned in the past as well as in lived reality.

 The above is a key point to explain, because, whereas it was and has been claimed that the mainstream opposition did not have any ideology, the truth is that its genesis was premised on the basis of social democracy.  Both in relation to  its articles of constitution as well as in its political origins via the labour, womens’ and student movements. That the leaders of this counter-hegemonic project failed its own aspirations is an indictment of their ahistorical approach to it.

This point brings me to the particular issue of the struggle as I have defined above. It continues. It has to. Not because of individual egos or particular party aspirations. But more because this struggle for social democracy has and still belongs to the people of Zimbabwe. Therefore whether this generation of leaders genuinely and organically takes it up or not, it shall certainly be taken up by subsequent ones. Its new path however must be one that acknowledges past successes and failures, and one that specifically departs from celebrating cults and individuals instead of principles, values and objectives.

                 

The struggle therefore continues but only in the sense that it must renew itself both in relation to its recommitment to its founding values and principles as well as in relation to its leadership. And this should be taken to mean that no one, no matter how many scars or wounds they bear, is above the struggle. Even founders of the post independence struggle for social democracy cannot claim to be beyond criticism. This is why, in the aftermath of July 31 2013, those that were tasked to lead the social democratic movement(s) must demonstrate the necessary national contrition and step aside.

Those who take up the mantle of leadership of the renewed and organic social democratic movement must now think more in the long term and holistically about both the prospects of the struggle as well as those of the country. This entails taking into account the fact that the setback of 2013 is less about elections and more about the lack of articulation of an organic democratic alternative for the people of Zimbabwe. They must go back to the masses, engage them on the most basic of issues and restructure the struggle, less in the pursuit of international recognition, but in the interests of the majority who are the ultimate judges of what national and local changes they both need and want.

In leading this necessary next phase of the struggle for social democracy, the new leadership must pursue organic intellectualism and outright respect for the everyday citizen as opposed to the arrogant and inorganic leadership that was demonstrated before and particularly during the tenure of the inclusive government.

ENDS//

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity.

Money, not Mind Occupies our Universities.

By Takura Zhangazha

The pursuit of knowledge of the academic kind is generally viewed as a virtue/arete. By this the inference is not a just a moralistic one but one that also resides in Plato and Aristotle's understanding of the pursuit of knowledge. Therein knowledge is not knowledge for its own sake but for the good of society in a non-ambivalent search for truth. 

Zimbabwe’s tertiary institutions and to be particular, its universities have been traditionally viewed as institutions that should be doing just that, pursuing virtue. It is this impression that generally lends anyone who has acquired a doctorate in one academic field or the other everlasting reverence from adoring relatives, friends and work colleagues. In fact this admiration expresses itself in the truth that once one is referred to as a doctor or professor, it is a perpetual social title even in non-academic conversations and circles.

The assumption is that these qualifications have been acquired from institutions that are not only credible but ranked among the best and most competitive in terms of academic excellence and academic freedom. The reality is that our universities are no longer the harbingers of the unbridled and open pursuit of knowledge or virtue. This, for a number of reasons.

The foremost of these reasons being that none of our present (and even planned) tertiary institutions value the all important principle of academic freedom. It is a principle that is the sine qua non of any decent institution of higher learning and entails the unfettered pursuit of knowledge both for its own sake as well as with the intention of improving our understanding of the societies in which we live, for the common good. Where this principle is recognized and enforced, students, academics and non academics will be able to associate, assemble and express themselves freely. 

Unfortunately, not a single academic institution in the country, at the moment, has demonstrated the above cited characteristics that are key for the enjoyment of academic freedom.

Most campuses are literally like prison compounds with students and staff being monitored as to who they associate with, what ideas they peddle and who they invite from broader society to interact with the university. Student unionism, staff associations are either prohibited or severely restricted or only permitted where and when they parrot central university administration’s political and policy preferences. As a result of such an environment there has been no active pursuit of knowledge as a virtue in all of our universities. Instead what obtains is the pursuit of knowledge merely as a qualification to the extent that the oft repeated phrase by students is that ‘one is better off if they keep quiet and finish their degrees’ no matter the injustices they experience or witness.

The second and equally debilitating reason as to why our universities are no longer citadels of academic excellence or virtue is their unbridled pursuit of profit. This at the expense of most things academic. Ever since the government significantly reduced funding for universities, their new-found business models treat students and lecturers like commodities off a factory production line. Except that the commodities pay to be on the conveyor belt without a specific guarantee that they will be the full article after production. 

What this has led to is a culture of profiteering at the expense of knowledge production. This particularly so where and when it comes to what most universities refer to as the ‘parallel programmes’ for undergraduates. These, coupled with the now ubiquitous post graduate programmes in Business Administration and Development studies are the new university ‘cash cows’. This would not be a problem were these fundraising models being utilized for the promotion of academic freedom. Unfortunately however, they function in tandem with the repressive academic environment at the universities where the most visible and most critical element of university administrations remains the uniformed and punitive security guards.

Where arguments have been made about the right to education, this fundraising model remains one that limits the enjoyment of this right by citizens. It prioritizes the ability to pay over and above the right to an education to the extent that students more often than not fail to complete their studies due to financial constraints. Where they scrape through it is at great cost to not only their purse but also their academic aptitude and freedom (especially with the cadetship scheme).

In the final analysis, our universities perhaps are the default victims of state ineptitude and indifference toward higher education. But this does not absolve those in charge of them of complicity in the demise of academic freedom and the prioritization of inimical profit above all else. It would do well for vice chancellors to have that two line poem by Dambudzo Marechera posted on their doors, ‘Pub Conversation: My name is not money, but mind.’

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Zimbabwe’s Social Media, Elections and Mobilisation

Zimbabwe’s Social Media, Elections and Mobilisation.

By Takura Zhangazha*

Zimbabwe’s social media has had an ambiguous role in political events in the last twelve months and particularly with the yet to end July 31 2013 harmonized electoral period. Local ICT experts have lauded the expansion of mobile telephony and 3G internet as signifying definite improvements in citizens access to information and freedom of expression. Given the fact that the country faced a highly contested electoral period, the use of social media applications came to be dominated by matters related to politics and the targeting of voters. In other spheres such as in the mainstream media, social media was used to increase online readership and in part re-brand their titles into trendy multimedia publications. Civil society organizations also utilized the increasingly fashionable social media for voter education campaigns as well as to communicate variegated positions on the state of affairs in the country.

For those that were the end receivers of news received via Twitter, facebook or whatsup (among others), they took to it less to act on information received and more to express their own opinions on anything (from the religious to the political). In most instances it has become a platform more for information, entertainment, rumour-mongering and sensationalism that has transcended levels never seen before in Zimbabwe’s media and communications history. This ,to the extent that social media has left many a user upset, confused, seeking legal recourse or trying to contact the complaints email of one social media company or the other.

But perhaps what is of immediate concern are its political dimensions in Zimbabwe. Its arrival signified a major shift in how political news and events in the country are received and interpreted. Because it does not have a specific journalistic ethos as regards its content, the news that social media users put into the public domain were more for communication of opinion, personal matters than serving to professionally and ethically inform a somewhat unlimited number of persons.  This would then point to the fact that the arrival of social media led to the expansion of the right of Zimbabweans to receive and impart information in a manner that was more personally empowering and without direct censorship.  It is a right that in this electoral period Zimbabweans enjoyed all too well (if they could afford to get connected).

The overall impact of such usage of these media platforms on the overall election is something that pollsters and academics will take some months to give a verdict on, but it is important to place a few matters on the table.

The first of these is that social media usage and its evolution in Zimbabwean political matters was largely one of mimicry. Its political utilization was framed within the framework characterized by the Arab Spring, particularly the Tunisian version of it.  Except that here it was more for incremental change than any perceived or anticipated revolution. So the initial political usage of social media within the context of elections was more or less framed within the ambit of access to information and not action on information. This means that its usage in Zimbabwe was not in the aftermath of a specified injustice but in anticipation of a political event and therefore it had to be introduced and not enhanced.

This introduction of civic/political education and mobilization social media platforms literally unleashed a stream of what I would like to call ‘immediate/defensive consciousness’ related to various but specific political affiliations. And this is the second point to place on the table. More often than not, social media did not necessarily change the political viewpoints of users, it gave them a platform on which to reinforce or defend them against rival ones with greater urgency and immediacy. In the process it also served as a medium of rivalry even beyond political parties but also between differing civil society actors.

The penultimate issue relates to the emerging question of whether in Zimbabwe’s case, social media leads to action from the virtual and into reality. When one looks at the electoral period, beginning with the March 2013 Constitutional referendum, social media was important in generating public interest in various political issues but did not however significantly replace the direct need for either door to door lobbying, campaigning or political rallies. It was used more often than not after a major event and not as an event in and of itself. The campaigns to lure the youth to register to vote and eventually do so via social media could not be left merely to the internet by way of mobilizing. There had to be a prioritisation of physical mobilization and accepting the social media as ‘toppings’. Emphasis had to be placed on the real before turning to the virtual.

The final matter to be placed on the table is a rather controversial but necessary one to make. This being whether social media platforms have created new platforms for critical engagement or have merely extended the reach of propaganda. In the case of our country, for now, social media has reflected not only the mainstream views in our society but also the rival mainstream ideas about elections and/or their results.  This binary character to the ‘critical thought’ one encounters on these platforms means for now, whatever the hegemonic and counter hegemonic trends in real society, these will come to be represented in the new or alternative media.

So as it is, and during our electoral period (which has not yet ended) social media has been most useful as an alternative source of information for many citizens. It has also allowed greater participation by citizens  in debates that their opinions may have never seen it into any newspapers, radio or TV stations. It has not however, been as great an agent of direct change. For now, it remains direct and real mobilization that works.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

In praise of Thabo Mbeki.

By Takura Zhangazha.*

Former South African President Thabo Mbeki is rarely acknowledged for the positive role that he played over and about mediating the Zimbabwean political crisis from 2007 to 2009.  In making this assertion I am aware there are those who have controversially and without direct evidence accused President Mbeki of being sympathetic more to Zanu Pf during his tenure as the SADC appointed facilitator/mediator of our political crisis. I prefer to consider President Mbeki’s role in our country from a more objective standpoint.

The Global Political Agreement when it was eventually signed in September 2008 was not the sum-total of SADC mediation under Mbeki in Zimbabwe. The mediation process, for those with shorter memories, began in earnest in March 2007 when SADC after meeting in Tanzania and in the wake of the brutal assault of members of the opposition on March 11 of the same year, seconded President Mbeki to Zimbabwe.  

The secretive character of the mediation correctly raised eyebrows in civil society circles but to all intents and purposes, the responsibility for Constitutional Amendment number 18 which brought into being the holding of harmonized elections resided with the political parties. Mbeki merely provided an engagement framework.

By the time we held our first harmonsied elections in 2008 the impact of the SADC mediation was all too apparent, and where the Presidential election result was in dispute, it fell upon President Mbeki to assist in resolving the impasse. The different opinions over the eventual GPA that was signed after three months of negotiations are well recorded and known. 

What would however be unfair is to put the blame for the inadequacies of MDC-T’s placement in government on the shoulders of the mediator. Our national leaders had to etch out an agreement at some point given what they had all referred to as their non-negotiable matters. That Mbeki demonstrated the relevant patience with these same said leaders and kept ‘liberal interventionists’ at bay must be applauded.

The essence of Mbeki’s mediation was guided by what may appear as a dictum, but was of fundamental importance. The principle was that Zimbabweans and their leaders had the capacity to resolve their problems without direct intervention or by way of international dictat. 

That is why the responsibility to lead was not so much with the SADC facilitator but with the political leaders in Zimbabwe and their supporters. As the SADC facilitated inclusive government comes to an end, there are many questions that are left for historians and political scientists to answer or address. A key one would be whether or not the government worked. Because its primary mandate was initially never intended to last a full four years or even be in tandem with the constitutionally given five year time-frame for elections, the blame for its continuation resides at the doorsteps of its principals and not with President Mbeki.

 For added measure, its eventual long duration was to indicate that indeed the political parties in the inclusive government may have agreed to get along for longer than had been stipulated. The dragging and regular politicization of the constitutional reform process is the best possible indicator of this assertion.

Disputes that emerged within the context of the inclusive government were Zimbabwean ones and not engineered externally. 

This is a key point to make because while in its initial stages the inclusive government was an unpopular entity, the reality that it became over the years has vindicated Mbeki’s approach. This in the sense that there was need to ensure that the country remains stable and that reforms that were to be made were to be done collectively by the three political parties represented in our Parliament. That the reforms undertaken by the inclusive government have been inadequate and elitist in nature is not the fault of SADC let alone President Mbeki.

In my assessment the inclusive government failed to be organic in its leadership of the country and missed many an historical moment to change the course of the country toward less disputed elections and a democratic culture. The outgoing government undertook its tasks without the requisite seriousness that was necessary in order for its tenure to be more meaningful and less politicized.

It is however the framework that was provided by Thabo Mbeki’s mediation role as facilitator that must be praised as the inclusive government’s tenure comes to a close. It was a framework in which all parties could demonstrate their commitment to democracy as well as their specific ability to lead both as members of cabinet and as national leaders. How they have fared is not an indictment on SADC or on President Mbeki. The latter did what was pragmatically possible, given the circumstances. And for that, I salute Thabo Mbeki.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

The 2013 Watershed Elections: Will they Produce a Free, Fair and Indisputable Outcome?”

The 2013 Watershed Elections:  Will they Produce a Free, Fair and Indisputable Outcome?” 

A Presentation to a Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) Public Seminar

Thursday 25 July 2013

New Ambassador Hotel, Harare

By Takura Zhangazha*

Mr. Chairman, Ladies, Gentlemen, Comrades and Friends,

Let me begin by expressing my gratitude to MPOI for inviting me to share a few thoughts on the important national matter of our country’s harmonised elections scheduled for next week on Wednesday July 31 2013.  The primary question that the organisers of this meeting have asked me to address relates to the possibility that the  results of the elections after their occurrence next week will be undisputed, free, fair and credible.  It is a pertinent question that emerges from the precedence of June 2008 wherein, there was serious local and international disputation about the veracity of the both the results and the conditions in the run-up to the Presidential election run-off of June that year.

So the question being asked both in relation to the topic of the day as well as in speculative conversations in our country’s intellectual as well as social circles is a valid one. It stems from the lived political experiences of the immediate past as I allude to above as well as the general expectation by a majority of the people of Zimbabwe, particularly since the 1990s that elections/election results tend to be manipulated in one way or the other. These perceptions are perhaps the sum total of what our society has come to inadvertently express as political culture, just as much as the of given phrase, ‘kupinda muvanhu’ (to be with the people) is used for mobilization as well as legitimating of political candidates.

In the case of the elections that we are anticipating in the next few days there is a patent uniqueness to them in that they are being held with the context of an outgoing inclusive government which itself was the result of a disputed Presidential election and a hung parliament in 2008. This same said government was also a direct creation of external Southern African Development Community (SADC) mediation, a development which remains unprecedented in our post independence history as a nation.

As a result of the foregoing, where and when we consider the entirety of the issue of whether or not these pending harmonized elections will be free and fair, let alone undisputed we must not lose sight of the fact that the outgoing government is the result of a disputed election result and a closely hung parliament.  It was therefore a government that was formed not only in order to keep the country politically stable but also with the written and unwritten mandate to ensure that such a situation or circumstance as that which the country found itself in with the June 2008 presidential run-off must not be repeated again.

And this is the initial departure point where and when we wish to analyse the question that this important public debate wishes to address, though not with finality. The finality will eventually emerge from the electoral results and processes as announced and determined by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC).

The inclusive government had a specific mandate to democratize electoral laws particularly via the drafting of a new constitution amongst other less holistic reforms that were to occur in the interim. The first persons that should be brought to account on the basis of the subject matter at hand in this meeting are the leaders of the inclusive government. The criticism would be on the basis that they were the ones who were mandated at further democratizing the general political and particular electoral environment with the explicit intention of preventing any further disputes over and about either results or the credibility of a national electoral process.

From my own personal perspective, the inclusive government failed to satisfy the pre-requisites of ensuring a framework in which the people of Zimbabwe have confidence in the electoral system. And unfortunately a key evidence of this failure was the constitutional reform process which ended up in a referendum where people were instructed by the very same leaders to vote yes to a document that they had not read let alone integrated into their understanding of how electoral processes had been improved.  

This in turn, after the much celebrated passing of the new constitution in parliament by the very same parties that crafted it, was to shock a number of us when there were clear disputes about the date of holding elections as well as post-cabinet disagreements about amendments to the electoral act to suit the new constitution. The constitutional court challenges together with the SADC extra-ordinary summit can therefore be viewed as the initial laying of the ground for the disputation of the electoral results as well as trying to frame the electoral process as not being credible enough. All of the latter issues were raised largely by the MDCs and may need no further elaboration as these were extensively covered both in the local and international media.

A second issue to consider when analyzing the possibility of elections being considered free and fair, and it’s a key one, is the perception and role of the international community through its international observers. Broadly spoken for, the Western side of the international community have already indicated that they are willing to recognize the victor of a credible election process. There is no heavy insistence on the term ‘free and fair’ for reasons that are still yet to be publicly announced but be that as it may, it essentially points to the fact that should the election be viewed as somewhat fair, somewhat free, they will accept the result. 

Our own African brothers and sisters are however the most significant determining factor in assisting the world to come to a determination on whether to dispute whatever results are announced by ZEC. And this is a key departure point from the June 2008 presidential vote count. The AU and SADC have come here in large numbers not just because they have been invited to do so, but also because they intend to ensure they avoid pre-emptive allegations of not having monitored the process well enough. Their intention is to send a message to the main contenders that they are here and they are watching. This will most likely contribute to the minimalising of disputes around election results let alone processes themselves. Their presence in the country at the moment contributes significantly to a free and fair electoral environment for the elections as well as a the acceptance of the final results.

Having said all of the above and  in fulfillment of what I would assume are some of the main issues that the organizers would have wanted addressed, I now turn to the most important measurement of legitimacy of the elections next week. This measurement was, is and will always remain the people of Zimbabwe. There is a lot of ambivalence on their part as regards the freeness and fairness of the election. There is also a lot of confusion. For example, given the fact that only a few of them have read and understood the new constitution, there are going to be many challenges over and about their knowledge of how exactly they are meant to vote. I say this with particular reference to the proportional representation system that will inform a quarter of the National Assembly seats and majority of the Senate.

So in the announcement of results there shall be a significant amount of confusion and in part a mathematical usage of mobile telephone calculators to try and found out what exactly the outcome is in relation to vote counts, averages and percentages. This will however not compromise the integrity let alone acceptance of results but will inevitably demonstrate what some activists have referred to as a ‘ democratic deficit’ where it comes to popular and informed participation in important national processes.

It is these doubts that will lead to questions being raised also about the fairness of the Presidential vote count by varying party supporters and depending on which candidate wins.  These disputes however will not necessarily lead to particular instability depending on how well ZEC transparently announces results and allows for review of the same.

My penultimate point in this presentation relates to the whispered issue of whether or not the security services will accept a result that favours the mainstream opposition. This against the backdrop of previous announcements from commanders of the armed services before the inclusive government was formed that they will not accept a person who has not gone to the liberation struggle as their commander in chief.  The political reality of present day points to a somewhat different circumstance. Given the reforms made with the consent of all parties under the aegis of SADC, any serious commander of the security services knows that they will have little or limited moral and political ground to reject the results.

In any event SADC will not accept it, not even if it happens against the backdrop of massive demonstrations by one party or the other. Whatever their misgivings, whichever party they individually support, members of our national defence forces will have to take the electoral result on the chin and act professionally. They would also do well to remember the lessons taught by Political Commissars, that in the struggle, the gun must always follow the politics and not vice versa.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate a number of points I have mentioned above. All elections are generally characterized by disputes over and about results and processes. Our elections are already minimally disputed both by the mainstream opposition and components of civil society organizations. Evidence of these disputes have spilled over into our courts of law.

These disputes however are short lived given the presence of SADC and AU observers, including the visit by the Chairperson of the AU Commission. The ability of ZEC will be key in determining the perceptions around these elections and unlike with the special voting system, the disputes will invariably be minimal. It is the contestants to the elections that are more likely to raise the tempo and seek disputes. The people of Zimbabwe will indeed vote, wait and anticipate that their will be respected, even if in part they do not know the electoral system as well as they democratically should.

Ends//

*Takura Zhangazha talks/writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

A non- politicized take on Chombo’s Debt Relief for Residents and Ratepayers.

By Takura Zhangazha

The outgoing Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, Ignatius Chombo two days ago issued what amounted to a controversial edict. In it he instructed all local authorities to essentially write off all the service provision debt that has been accrued by residents and ratepayers since the introduction of the United States dollar to council billing systems. 

The instruction from central to local government is controversial mainly because it was issued a week before the holding of harmonized elections and also after Minister Chombo  had dissolved all elected councilors and replaced them with appointed commissioners. In some circles it has been described as an 'electoral' debt relief. 

In announcing his decision, the minister cited sections of both the Urban Councils Act and the Rural District Councils Act. The legality of this is perhaps something that some residents and ratepayers may take up with our courts of law, but the long and short of it is that in this case, it’s the politics that count. Moreso given the fact that the edict is probably seen from a Zanu Pf perspective as being a vote acquisition strategic move for most urban areas. (I am however sure that they know that it won’t ultimately win them seats but may marginally increase their vote count in MDC strongholds.)

The MDC-T has in turn politically defined the move as a vote buying gimmick that betrays what it calls ‘desperation’ on the part of Zanu Pf.  The Newsday editorial also defined the move as ‘populism at its worst’ while the Daily News one called the move catastrophic. The Herald was the only paper to have a front page headline story on the issue thought it is yet to write an editorial on the same.

There is however a socio-economic mechanics to the announcement, particularly if effected. Ever since the ‘dollarisation’ of the Zimbabwean economy, major parastatals and government departments converted what was owed them by users of their services into US dollars. This was before the full formal expansion, availability and integration of foreign currency for  ordinary citizens.  As a result payment of utility bills, be they for electricity, council rates/rentals or even medical aid was and remains erratic nationally. This is why in most instances every other quarter one parastatal or local government authority would either announce or re-emphasize what they referred to as ‘payment plans’ for end users of their services.

Such a  development indicated an inability of the said government related organizations to re-coup their revenue and not for lack of trying. Closure of water and electricity has been fairly commonplace even with the effecting of ‘payment plans’ which a good number of citizens can still not meet or strictly adhere to. The end effect has been that either way, even if a bill states an amount owed, it would still not be paid either in full or in terms of the payment plan. Either way therefore the councils or parastatals even with payment plans have been unable to recover a greater percentage of what they are owed.

The big factor in all of this, apart from the inability and not intransigence of a majority of ratepayers, has been the changeover from the Zimbabwe dollar to the US dollar billing system. This left many residents with debts that they cannot pay in the immediate or the long term.  The blame for such a state of affairs lies with those who, in central government were in charge at the time of the economic collapse of 2007. It also however lies with those that joined government in the aftermath of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and who have since failed to resolve the matter. And this pronouncement by Minister Chombo will essentially relate to a bit of mathematical assumptions. 

It is generally agreed that most of our urban and rural district councils are living from hand to mouth particularly where it comes to paying salaries of employees and immediate running costs for water treatment as well as refuse collection. Now the jury may be out on the direct impact of  not having revenue for July 2013 will have on councils but the bigger issue is about the debt owed prior to this month (and for many years). The onus of proving this however resides with both the relevant ministry and the local authorities in question.

What is however forgotten is that the debts are cumulative. Whatever one owes does not mean one is not charged for services utilized for the month in question. This also means that the councils do not stop charging residents and ratepayers in the next month for services rendered. What is lost therefore is essentially one month of revenue which was in any event not going to be paid in full. Therefore either way, whatever payments were being made prior to the announcement local councils have revenue in their coffers.

It is the continual large debts that are owed by residents over the years that will not be reflected on the bills come next month. And that can only be a good thing for social and economic justice. No matter who propositions it.  The government, which made this pronouncement, has an obligation to meet the shortfall that will emerge as a result of its directive. It will have to foot, among other costs, the wage bill of council workers for this month.

In the final analysis, this is a matter that remains controversial but talks to the challenges residents and ratepayers have been facing. That it has been politicized by an outgoing Zanu Pf minister is cause for concern, but that does not take away its resonance with a majority of economically disadvantaged citizens in various urban and rural district councils. It should have been done well before the elections by elected councilors and not by way of edict by a minister.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Zimbabwe's 1st TV as an Indictment of Government's Failed Media Policy

By Takura Zhangazha.*

The launch of a new free to air satellite televison station 1^st TV at least 12 days preceding Zimbabwe’s harmonized election on 31 July 2013 sent a lot of tongues wagging. This particularly so after the scrambling of SABC channels broadcasting into the country via Wiztech. The owners of this new (satellite) television station cannot be faulted at seizing an opportunity, be it for business or as insinuated by the Ministry of Media, Information and Publicity, for political reasons. 

Essentially the owners of 1^st Tv saw an opportunity that they were and are within their right to take. Both in relation to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) regulations as well as within the context of the law of whatever host country their relay transmitters are to be found.

The statement issued by the proprietors of 1^st Tv  also states that their station has not been launched not only in order to broadcast during elections but more as a long term alternative to the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC). Even though they are not physically broadcasting from Zimbabwean soil, this is an issue that the Ministry of Media, Information and Publicity together with the national transmission company, Transmedia have raised opprobrium about.  

Whether the latter company can actually stop the 1^st Tv signal from entering Zimbabwean airspace has thus far been proven to be an exercise in futility given the fact that it can be viewed on channels to be found via DSTV decoders.

The broadcasting of 1^st Tv into Zimbabwe is however not the main issue to be considered in this article. What is more important are the reasons as to why this new channel, owned as it claims, by Zimbabweans  (based both here and in the Diaspora), had to take the route of broadcasting via Wiztech. The immediate answer to that question is that regardless of  whatever successes one accords the outgoing inclusive government, the broadcast media, particularly television, have not been democratized. Both with reference to transmission as well as in relation to broadcasting diversification of stations or even their content.  

This lack of progress in the broadcasting industry is something that many would correctly want to put on the doorstep of Zanu Pf as a sole governing party before the formation of the inclusive government, but where one is more honest, it is an indictment on all the parties in the same four years after its formation in 2009.

Throughout its tenure and against better advice the inclusive government remained muted on the important issue of broadcasting diversification and reform. The fact that it licensed two private national free to air radio stations is not only inadequate but evidence of how wrong an ‘incremental’ approach to media reform was and will always be in Zimbabwe’s context.

The ‘privilege’ premise accorded the media in Zimbabwe by all political parties that signed and approved the new constitution is unfortunate and betrays a patent misunderstanding of media freedom by those that are in the outgoing government. And this is across the board.  Media freedom remains a right that should be inviolable, but the new national charter while recognizing the same in section 61, takes it away not only through establishment of a constitutional media commission to licence and supervise journalists (within the ambit of potential criminal punishment) but in similar fashion to the Lancaster house constitution by providing for media freedom to be curtailed by not listing it on rights that have no limitations in Section 86.

This is also the same political culture of control and propagandizing of information that characterizes the structure and editorial policy of our state broadcaster, much to the denial of alternative views to the mainstream or ruling party and its associated organizations in the country.

It is this culture of controlling the media that has left the democratic media reform agenda not only shortchanged but to be viewed as an abstract matter by all of the major political parties both in this election and those that may emerge thereafter.

This has been the reason why in effect broadcast media environment remains undemocratic and lauded only on the basis of incrementalism as opposed to substantive democratic progress.

Even where the MDCs have decried the conduct of the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ), they have only done so on  the basis of personalities and not on key principles such as those that are to be found in the African Charter on Broadcasting. To argue against the chairperson-ship of Dr Mahoso at BAZ is fair politics but is unfortunately a far cry from addressing the fundamental challenges of the archaic broadcasting and technological frameworks that bedevil the media in Zimbabwe. 

It is futile to discuss personalities and not policies over and about the media at a time when media technology is changing rapidly both in terms of its convergence and its global reach. International diplomacy may stall the ability of externally based television and radio stations from broadcasting into a country, but this is always a temporary measure if the country in question has neither the technology nor the democratisation of its own media environment.

In effect therefore, the launch of 1^st TV, more out of the frustration at the lack of opportunities to broadcast from Zimbabwe by its proprietors, is a direct result of an undemocratic media environment in Zimbabwe. That the station was launched less than two weeks before the holding of harmonized elections may raise some eyebrows but it cannot be faulted both in terms of the ITU and neither can the government absolve itself of the sin of incompetence.

Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)