Five Awkward Incidents of Zim’s November 2019 Political Economy

By Takura Zhangazha*

I have recently skipped a week before posting my personal blog. And for that I apologize most sincerely to those that either fully read or crosscheck my blog.

There are five specific incidents in November 2019 that I wish to point out in recent political, economic and social developments in Zimbabwe that would merit a decent enough return to writing on the same said developments in the country of my birth. 

The first being that it has been a full two years since Robert Mugabe was forcibly ousted from power by his own liberation war allies in the ruling Zanu Pf party as defined by remnants of its own guerrilla army, nationalists and their offspring.  A development that has not been lost on many a pundit.  Some of whom have written extensively on the matter since its own occurrence.  Or its significance.  The difference of the latter would however remain the same.  Robert Mugabe is not only no longer in power but he also in the intervening period passed away.  All as accompanied by what we now know to be one of the most controversial and probably longest burials of African liberation struggle leaders in history.

Secondly, Mugabe’s successor, Emerson Mnangagwa in full but disputed flight of a five year presidential term, also announced via his appointed minister of finance and economic development Mthuli Ncube, the projected national/state budget of 2020 in the month of November.  Maintaining a very neo-liberal stance to his macro-economic policy, Mnangagwa demonstrated what can only be now a familiar embrace of global capital’s interests in the increasingly and evidently post-colonial state that is Zimbabwe.  All with the caveat of a ‘carrot and stick’  method to anyone who seeks to contradict, at least ideologically the full import of his intentions.  A development that is so far, judging on the basis of the performance legitimacy challenges of the mainstream opposition MDC Alliance, is least likely to happen. 

This was immediately against the backdrop of a further incident of the related slightly earlier release of  additional currency into the monetary system by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. A development that for some inexplicable reason somewhat coincided with a highly unpopular ‘system upgrade’ of Zimbabwe’s largest mobile money supplier, EcoCash.  With the latter serving to undermine, by default, the actual supply of liquid currency into the Zimbabwean retail/consumerist economy. 

It should have ended there in relation to reminiscent political events of November 2017.  But it did not. 

In a third incident the minister of International Relations of Zimbabwe’s hegemonic neighbor, South Africa decided to hold a conference on what she considered Zimbabwe’s pressing issues.  Naledi Pandor, went on to comment on what she considers a ‘path’ in which South African economic support to Zimbabwe should be determined by a shared vision from all stakeholders.   

While mentioning international sanctions on Zimbabwe, it was clear that she was at pains to couch her statement in the language of the resolutions of SADC against the same said sanctions on Zimbabwe. In doing so, our regional hegemon, South Africa, knew it was playing the diplomatic devil’s advocate to the SADC resolutions by claiming to take the lead on resolving what she invariably referred to as a Zimbabwean crisis.  All the while with Zimbabwe’s president serving as the chairperson of the SADC Organ on Politics, Security and Defence. Zimbabwe’s government is least likely to respond to the provocation.  At least not publicly for the moment.

In a fourth incident, the Chinese government also then decided, in this same month of November 2019, to dispute it’s geographically strategic Southern African ally’s figures on its development aid contribution as juxtaposed with that of the United States of America and others.  All as announced by Mthuli Mcube in his projected 2020 state budget statement to the Parliament of Zimbabwe. In a statement through its local embassy Xi Jinping’s government advised that its Zimbabwean counterparts and its  “relevant departments…make comprehensive assessments on the statistics of bilateral supports and accurately reflect its actual situation when formulating budget statement…”

By implication and as far as China is probably concerned, the Zimbabwean minister of finance is not being honest.  Which is also diplomatic double speak for outright lying. 

China claims to have put out far more than what Mnangagwa’s government claims in aid to Zimbabwe. It argues its total figures are in stark contrast to the equivalent of US$ 3,6 million outlined by finance minister Mthuli Ncube’s presentation to parliament.  China states that this statement “is very different from the situation on the ground.”  Instead direct aid to Zimbabwe according to the Chinese embassy topped the equivalent of US$136 million excluding donations to other non-state actors.

I am more that certain that the Zimbabwean government will issue an apology regardless of the disclosing the facts or lack thereof of what Mthuli Ncube presented in his 2020 budgetary statement to our Parliament.

In local mythology, November is a month in which there shall be no marriages.  In our shared political history, November is also a month in which assumedly tumultuous political events occur.  Coup anniversaries, neoliberal budget statements, shocking aftermaths of delayed, controversial political burials and attempts by regional hegemons to prove unclear points about their influence in Zimbabwean politics all pointing to a country and government not certain of itself. Or with many others uncertain of what its intentions are.

Perhaps all I can say is that the country should not be for sale.  Is not for sale. By way of money or by way of pursuit of vainglorious but in the final but emerging analysis, futile recognition.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)