Zim's 2017: A Political Year that Will Not End Soon (Not for Democratic Reasons)

By Takura Zhangazha*

There are many ways to review Zimbabwe’s  political year that became 2017. Whichever way one tries to look at it, it’s a given that it was seismic and borderline catastrophic.   The military intervention/ coup or as officially described ‘Operation Restore Legacy’  was the most significant event that never had to happen.  At least politically speaking. 

It put the nation at high risk of direct intervention (militarily so) by SADC and as a result thereof, greater political instability and uncertainty. 

But so far, they pulled it off to what turned out initially to be popular support which has now become more or less popular acceptance.  

With hindsight it never had to happen.  And the military would never have had to leave their barracks in order to solve what was an internal and political ruling Zanu Pf party succession battle.  But it happened under former president Mugabe’s ‘confined’ watch and with some self confessed orchestration by his former deputy and now president Mnangagwa (he claimed he was in perpetual contact with the ZDF commanders during his exile). 

In the run-up to this major and unprecedented military intervention/coup, Zimbabweans had been subjected to rallies and the playing out of Zanu pf’s succession politics on state television and the mainstream media.

There had also been widespread public outcry against the state of the national economy though protests as driven by social media motivated movements had declined.  The extractive role of the state (via the pernicious actions of the Zimbabwe Republic Police), allegations of massive corruption  and the precarious nature of social service provision however remained a sore spot.  

These issues dominated social media conversations alongside Zanu Pf succession politics satire and derogation.

The official opposition was hamstrung by its own internal succession dilemmas’  and the self -inflicted but complex challenges of building a coalition to oppose Mugabe or what they considered a would be ‘weaker’ successor  in the scheduled 2018 elections. They, as with everyone else save for those in the Zanu Pf elite loop, did not anticipate a direct intervention by the ZDF on behalf of Zanu PF. 

What is clear as the year 2017 is considered  in retrospect is that the events of November did not occur in strict isolation.  Even if they were motivated by immediate causes such as the firing of then vice president Mnangagwa and the reported targeting of then commander of the ZDF, General Chiwenga.   A combination of the lack of popularity of the then Zanu Pf leader, Mugabe and his wife together with a national economy that was/is bleak, an ever ambiguous and undemocratic constitution  together with a lackadaisical political opposition and a politically hamstrung media created the optimum conditions for what we now know as ‘Operation Restore Legacy’.

But the effects of the latter are not going to disappear with the turn of the year.  They are here to stay for the long term.  These being the  militarization of our national politics in a more direct manner  in the name of the ‘legacy’ of the liberation struggle hence we now have those that are senior war veterans (in the literal sense) occupying top echelons of government.  And also why there are statements by presidential advisor and war veterans leader Chris Mutsvangwa that Zanu Pf will also use the ZDF in the 2018 electoral campaign, a statement that he later denied.   But the import to the same subtly betrays the intent of the ruling party at winning the election by all means at its disposal. At the moment the strongest of these is the overtly military-political complex that it has become. 

The only rider here is that there is a public perception that ‘any change’ from Mugabe (as president of the country) is good.  So a lot of Zimbabweans may not see the undemocratic  undercurrents of this 'new' regime.  Or they may not be allowed to.  It has no major democratic reforms on its cards.  Its claim to legitimacy apart from the post ‘Operation Restore Legacy’  constitutional provisions it utilized to get Mnangagwa into power is that of promising a better performing national economy.  

They are going to pull out all stops to appear to make this work, including rejuvenating the propaganda around any of their economic policies but also more significantly giving the impression of a ‘progressive’  neo-liberal economic outlook to court foreign direct investment.  It may work in the short term for electoral politics but austerity always has serious political ramifications for small economies like Zimbabwe’s.  And we have the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) of the late 1980s and 1990s as history’s instructive lesson to draw from. 

But they are going to try it anyway and ensure that there is limited national opposition to their policies in a number of ways.   First and perhaps most important to the new’ establishment is to dominate the national political narrative through what they hope will be an internationally accepted (at least by SADC and the African Union) 2018 election.  In the process their envisaged electoral victory will make any question of their legitimacy significantly undisputed and as a raison d’etre for continuing with a neo-liberal Zimbabwean national economy. 

But that also requires that the ruling establishment ‘manufactures consent’ hence the media and its offshoots are going to be key.  State and private media will be under severe pressure to carry the narrative of ‘progressive change’, never mind the de-unionisation of workers, the benevolent (as opposed to actual observance)  attitude toward human rights and seeking long duree Zanu Pf leadership of the country’s government(s). 

This means they will also keep the opposition in safe check, including the possibility of co-option into their neo-liberal project.  In this they warmly welcomed the initial support of the opposition for their ‘Operation Restore Legacy’ and will work to ensure that the opposition continues to support it as a fundamental point of political departure that can only be attributed to themselves or where its denigrated, they will remind the same opposition of having initially supported it.  Both in its occurrence but more significantly in its meaning (‘give the new government a chance’).

So 2017 is a year that is going to stay with us for a while.  Even to the point of making 2018 of limited significance without thinking of its ‘predecessor’ year.  And also 2023 as its probable most significant political future year.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

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Countering a Stalling of Media Freedom in a Post-Mugabe Era

By Takura Zhangazha*

Where it concerns freedom of expression in Zimbabwe’s ‘new era’, there are a number of urgent matters that need to be placed on the table.  Not only by government officials (even though there is a current political vacancy in the relevant ministry).   At the same time, the ministry exists and has its current permanent secretary and spokesperson for President Mnangagwa, Mr. George Charamba. 

In an interview with the Zimbabwe Independent, Charamba, as presidential spokesperson explained his perspective(s) on media stories concerning the new cabinet and wait for it, toward the end, his evidently strong views on any immediate calls for (democratic) media reform.  His key reaction to calls for the same was as follows (to quote at length),

“The only problem that I have is that the agitation for media reforms is prompted by transient calculations of elections due in six or seven months. I am not an elected officer, I am a bureaucrat and my reflex is to build a law that endures, a law that competently encompasses a sector...

“I cannot proceed on the basis of transient calculations. The state of Zimbabwe subsists ad infinitum and the state is much more than institutions that make it. There are seismic changes happening in the media sector. It is futile hurrying to write a law which will prove perishable only the morning after.”

It is not difficult to discern a number of issues that emerge from these statements.

The first being that the permanent secretary in the Orwellian  ministry of Media, Information and Broadcasting Services is not keen on any quick or far reaching media reforms before the 2018 harmonised elections.  Even if he is only a bureaucrat who, it turns out was the author of a discontinued controversial but far reaching weekly column in The Herald daily newspaper, ‘The Other Side with Nathaniel Manheru ( remember that ominous statement ‘chine vene vacho chinhu ichi’), and therefore probably has a great deal of political influence in what has been referred to as Zimbabwe’s ‘new era’. 

So his statements as  the senior civil servant in the ministry responsible for the media should be taken very seriously.  Not in order to massage his ‘policy making’ ego or gate-keeping role for Mnangagwa’s government (he is also the official presidential spokesperson). 

Instead it should be in order to advance media freedom, diversity and the cornerstone democratic rights of every Zimbabwean to freedom of expression, conscience and access to information. All in sections 60, 61 and 62 of the constitution respectively. 

But in the aftermath of the ‘military/war veteran intervention on behalf of Zanu Pf ’ and the intention to control the mediums of access to information as announced by now minister of foreign affairs and more recently retired Lieutenant General Sibusiso Moyo when he 'asked' all journalists and media houses to ‘report responsibly’ there is an urgency to re-position the media and media freedom as a fundamental public concern of the Mnangagwa's political era.

This is despite the fact that it was an instruction issued at the height of ‘Operation Restore Legacy’ which was recently announced as having ended.  It is an instruction that probably and with great trepidation remains at the back of the mind of many a journalist and media owner including those at the helm of state owned/controlled entities such as the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) or the Zimbabwe Newspapers Group (Zimpapers). 

In this sense it would appear that the media and what it puts out must be kept in stasis as directed by those at the helm of the ‘new era’. Or be allowed to function in the regulation of old that has always been underpinned by an approach of 'benevolence' toward the media.

That means that an attempt at wholesale democratic media reform would be anathema to the current ruling military-political establishment.  There is still an unfortunate need, on their part, of a retention of controlling the national conversation or narrative via the media and its social media offshoots.  (They polished up on their Gramsci).

Such a control includes stalling any anticipated media reform(s) and ensuring that a dominant popular 'any change is good' or 'give the new leaders a chance' narrative is placed in the public domain.  The latter would include ensuring that the broader public is persuaded that the ‘military intervention’ is not viewed in a negative light and that it presents the changes that occurred in the ruling party as not only a change for the better, but the only change that was and is currently a better, if not a ‘best’ option. 

That is why where the mainstream media will not play ball, there has been (and will be) the pursuit of popular alternative avenues such as social media influencers. And also the creation of platforms that will rise to hegemonic popularity such as the military-political ‘change of consciousness’ artistes as exemplified via music bands/songs  that place the military at the centre of not only popular musical entertainment but also public acceptance of the establishment's version of  ‘political change’. 

In this the probable intention of Mnangagwa’s government, complicated as it is by its own military political complex, is to give the impression of a liberal media environment without changing the same’s  repressive legal frameworks.  Not at least until after it has retained power via what will inevitably be a highly disputed but not as contested election in 2018. And if it does retain power, it is least likely to be persuaded to urgently review its media policies. 

Hence the significance of Mr. Charamba’s perspective (as a powerful bureaucrat) on the limited possibilities of media reforms prior to the elections.  On the face of it, government is keen to allow international media players to be in the country to report on its political/electoral processes.  But structurally it has no intention to do so holistically in relation to local media.   

So there will be no new era of free expression in and of itself.  Except when one is talking about the economy and reflecting what would be a ‘national will/acceptance’ of the status quo as led by the military-political complex that is Zanu Pf. 

What Charamba does in his interview statements is to throw down the gauntlet on stalling media reform and thus presenting a direct challenge to Zimbabwe’s media stakeholders.  Be they media  freedom activists, non-governmental organisations, state or private media companies. And he also does this at the general public in relation to the extent that media freedom is a popular issue or one that Zimbabweans may not be as concerned about as they should.   

If they are going to contradict his opinion and policy making influence, they had better do so with strong democratic values, principles, technical knowledge and policy alternatives of/for a democratic, de-criminalised media in Zimbabwe.  And its not going to be easy.   

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Budget, Congress, Election: Zanu Pf's Firm Intention on Perpetual Power/Hegemony

By Takura Zhangazha*

When newly re-appointed Finance minister Patrick Chinamasa presented the projected Zimbabwe government budget for 2018 he did not mince his words.  Paramount in the intentions of government is the embrace of (neo) liberal economics of the free market with a  dash of state capitalism also known as 'command economy'(intervention).

It was a budget statement that was received with cautious optimism by those in ‘big business’ and skepticism by those in small ones.  For the rest of the public the sentiment is either one of give them a chance to do what they want and see if things improve. Or just downright nonchalance until something actually changes.  Either way, the ruling Zanu Pf party is well aware of the key challenge of meeting the standard requirement of ‘performance legitimacy’.  Both for its supporters and in part in order to win a scheduled harmonised election in 2018.    

When the military coup/ intervention  occurred on Wednesday 15 November 2017, there was a clear message from its progenitors.  It was an act of the guerrilla wing of a former liberation movement (though they may still think it still is).  A wing that strongly believes it has a stake in a post independence political arrangement as long as it is alive.  And for as long as it could pass on what it has since referred to as 'Operation Restore Legacy' to a subsequent generation of young Zimbabweans who would value the same, it is in this for the long haul.

Not only via pushing an appreciation of our national liberation war history and understanding of this military-political complex but also by way of political patronage, a strategy that had been tried by former president Mugabe's acolytes who had called themselves Generation 40.

The political processes that immediately followed the coup or military intervention no doubt made it a ruling party problem to resolve as it occurred.  The Sunday 19 November 2017 Zanu Pf central committee meeting that ushered in a new party leader and set the course for his 'interim presidency' put paid to any calls for a transitional or unity  government in the short term.

The complexity that has however emerged is that of retention of power in the long term.  On this the ruling party is going for broke in the wake of its momentous, even popular but evidently undemocratic change of leadership (events/actions).

But the ruling party has a plan. And its a pretty intricate if not disarming one.  It has announced a (neo-liberal economic development plan (never mind its insistence on a Robert Mugabe's ZimAsset economic blueprint).  Its promise is to implement the latter better and with a full throttle of macro-economic reforms that are palatable to investor interests.  And these include former Rhodesian capital's interests (if the statements from the special advisor of the 'new' president, Christopher Mutsvangwa are anything to go by.

The strategy is probably three pronged.  First is to get the  economy rejuvenated via a (neo) liberal approach the national economy.  That would mean promising to get the government's game up to scratch with global trends vis-a-vis the free market through pursuing privatization of the state and in order to maintain performance legitimacy through outsourcing the role of the state in keeping with IMF intentions of a not only reduced civil service but also a redundant one.

The second is ensuring a return to political legitimacy and validation of domestic political processes via the long (worn)  tradition of the party extraordinary congresses and confirming a presidential candidate in the year preceding elections.  All in order that the party and its leadership must demonstrate a popular claim to power.  At least internally to the party faithful and significantly to a  SADC dominated by former liberation movement governments.

However to effect such an electoral victory in what are tricky and probably ephemeral popular circumstances following the 'military intervention' there shall be a (literally) national blitz of  'command agriculture'  as a means of retaining populist support via patronage and attempts at popular legitimacy. 

The third and perhaps most 'dangerous to democracy' element is what will occur after securing an electoral 'victory' in the 2018 harmonized elections.  A new five year term will no doubt give Emerson Mnangagwa the time and opportunity to consolidate what would be a political hold on power as supported by the military-political complex that is the ruling party.

In this there shall be concerted attempts to drown/crowd out opposition voices through dominating the national narrative with economic plans set in neo-liberal frameworks.

Adherence to democratic values such as human rights, public accountability and social service delivery shall be done through the prism of retention of power via performance legitimacy.  All with the intention of limiting opportunities for the mainstream or new opposition to regain a national popularity similar to that of the 1990s and the first decade of the millennium .  And for this I am certain Zanu Pf apparatchiks have closely studied and drawn lessons from their Russian Chinese and probably Angolan, Egyptian and Ethiopian political-military counterparts.

As for the opposition, they are well advised to crosscheck the thoughts of Antonio Gramsci (Selections from the Prison Notebooks) and Amilcar Cabral (Collected Speeches and Writings) even before they dust off Fanon's 'Wretched of the Earth'.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Echoes from Goree: Resisting a Contemporary African Slave Trade

By Takura Zhangazha*

Visiting Goree Island in Senegal did not turn out to be as eerie as I had initially anticipated.  And I wasn’t going to have an Obama picturesque moment of looking austerely toward the open Atlantic ocean.  Or trying to find the deepest of meaning from it.  But approaching the island on the hourly ferry from the coastal city of Dakar, past the ocean freight tankers, and in the midst of relaxed Goree island residents, there was always going to be a significant pause for thought, pained emotion and a sense of liberation.  

Thought in the realization that you were approaching a symbol of global inhumanity and injustice as led by the capitalism of human flesh in the 16th through to the 19^th century.

Pain at what the island now means in contemporary African historical and political consciousness. Liberation in the sense that for you to even be able to visit this island, emblematic as it is of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade in which millions of African lives were lost or forcibly displaced, it means that as Africans we conquered the evil that it was. 

Not just by way of the religious Abolitionist Movement but by way of our struggles against mercantile capitalism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. 

In this regard, a visit to Goree Island, at least a first one for me, is a rite of African passage. Especially as one recalls the haemorrhagic human and economic effect of the Atlantic slave trade on the African west coast.  (The same is true for the Arab Slave trade on the  East African coast though to lesser recorded impact). 

Meeting with African bloggers and thinkers on the island was without doubt a reclamation of the spirit of liberation.  Amid serious discourse as to the state of freedom of expression on the continent, the tour of the island was always going to be a grim reminder of Africa’s peripheral placement in global economics and the commodification of the human body.  Both historically and in the contemporary.

I mention contemporary because during the week of our visit to the island, the BBC broke a story about a ‘new’ slave trade in Libya.  It is a story that outlines the auctioning of black African migrants from countries in or close to the Sahel region such as Ethiopia, Gambia, Sudan, Mali and Nigeria.  And the debate has been raging as to who is to blame for this contemporary trade in African bodies. A recent Al Jazeera programme ‘The Stream’ showed the glaring differences of opinion on the matter.  

Commentary has ranged from blaming African governments for not creating economic environments where their citizens chose to stay as opposed to attempting the dangerous journey to Europe via Libya.  Other opinion points to the fact of the liberal intervention in Libya by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) that has led to porous borders and political instability in the Sahel. 

All of these arguments validated as they may be by their propagators, do not take away the tragic fact of the dehumanisation of the African body. Not only by way of its commodification but also the clear historical inference of what can be done to it via the memory of the slave trade.

And its not just the memory of us Africans as former victims but also the memory of those that would be the perpetrators.  

The latter seeking to reinforce what should be a perception of the past, that is the wrong assumption that black Africans can be traded like animals.  Such a throwback represents the worst of contemporary race relations between Africans in the north and those south of the Sahara. At the same time, given the fact that those that are being subjected to this inhuman and degrading treatment are intending to travel to where they are not wanted, the Global North cannot escape complicity in the current state of affairs. 

The new found anti-immigrant groups and parties of the industrialised world perpetuate not only inherently racist attitudes toward people of colour but even more significantly cloud over the global injustice that was the slave trade.  A trade that in part led their countries to arrive at the state of development that they so jealously guard.

Leaving Goree Island was equally a moment of reflection as had been arriving.  Knowing that this was not the only slave outpost island on the west or even the east coasts of the continent but also that here has been a muted but ever existent sentiment and call for reparations gives one hope of redress for an historical injustice.  Knowing too that there are still contemporary actors that want to pursue this trade in Libya (and elsewhere) means the struggle against slavery is not over. Both by way of its real occurrence as well as racist perceptions of black bodies and black people. 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)