The Bulawayo Rally Explosion: Reflecting, Remaining True to a National Democratic Course

 By Takura Zhangazha*

The tragic bomb blast in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe  on the weekend of 23 July 2018 at a Zanu Pf rally made one pause for deep reflection on the state of our national (Zimbabwean) politics.  While expressing deep shock and sadness at the lives that were lost and those that were injured by the terrible incident, we can only hope that this or anything similar to it will never happen again. Either during this electoral period or anytime afterward.  In any circumstances. 

We do not yet know the motivation for what Vice President Chiwenga referred to as a ‘terrorist act’.  And correctly so, all opposition political parties worth their national salt have condemned this terrible act.  While the security services are still investigating it and without any remit to make further comment on this tragic incident, all Zimbabweans must seek to rise above it. 

There will be and already are many stories that point to various conspiracies about what could have been the motivation for such an attack. 

And Zimbabwean social media (domestic and Diaspora controlled) has fuelled these conspiracies further.  Either by way of genuine speculation or attempts at conspiratorial attention seeking or clickbaiting.

This to the extent of political party leaders (at varying levels) beginning to mix up official perspectives on the tragedy with personal opinion on social media.  And in some cases doing the same in the mainstream media.  

But I am persuaded that all Zimbabweans, especially those that are voters and even those that would want to be elected political leaders from various political persuasions, for all their faults and views on this matter, would want the country to proceed to never veer from its, faults and all, electoral culture. Even if their interests and reasons for doing so are entirely personal.   Or about their own political ambitions. 

There is always however a need for all of us to pause and reflect on our national political culture, the motivation(s) of our political leaders, parties and activists in their pursuit of political power.    

In this, we must move forward beyond loyalties to political individuals and a loyalty to political values that connote more democratic meaning and a pursuit of national democratic posterity. By the latter I mean that we must undertake our political activism less for the moment and more for a true democratic meaning beyond our own lives, lifestyles and personal experiences. 

While the events of November 2017 with the 'military intervention'/ 'coup-not-a-coup'  that spawned them remain an eyesore of our politics, (it never had to happen but it did), we have to chart a new national democratic culture and course.  And this is one that must rise above the long standing  succession dynamics of the ruling party that got regrettably played out onto the national political stage. 

But we deal the hand we are dealt with.  Both by default and by way of our own popular misunderstanding of what happened or, now, in the aftermath of the Bulawayo incident, what we remain on tenterhooks about what should by now be a straight forward electoral process. 

In avoiding the conspiracies, one has to discuss what would be the country’s political future.  That future should be underpinned by an immediate and direct abhorrence of politically motivated violence.  In whatever form.  And it must value the lives of every Zimbabwean regardless of their political hue beyond political slogans, persuasions and loyalties. 

But our levels of national and democratic political consciousness are worrying.  Especially in the aftermath of the Bulawayo national tragedy. 

At the risk of sounding repetitive, we need to rise above such terrible acts and continue to create a deeper democratic meaning to our national politics.  From those that would claim ownership of ‘Operation Restore Legacy’ through to those that would talk of ‘Generation 40' and others still of 'Generational Consensus’ and others whose ‘mantra’s or dictums’ are not yet clear, the issue that they must be reminded of is that they do not lead for themselves.   They lead for others and they set precedents of the nature of our future democratic politics as led by younger comrades who may not have as much patience as they would have.  Either based on experience or on long term political ambitions.  Individual or organisational. 

So it’s a good thing that the Zimbabwean government has committed itself to ensuring that elections are held as scheduled on Monday 30 July 2018.   But not only for the purposes of assumptions of personal electoral victories. But more for the purposes of proving that our nascent functional democracy begins to work beyond individual political ambition, pursuits of power for its own sake but more for constructing a new democratic culture that shuns altogether political violence in whatever form and respects the sanctity of human life.  No matter the differences of political opinion and political grudges of the past. 

As the legendary Zimbabwean musician Thomas Mapfumo once sang, ‘Hondo isu takairamba kare’( we refused acts of war a long time ago.)  We should  look to the future and while acknowledging the past, seek better democratic solutions to the latter’s after effects.   With better people centered democratic ideas, contexts and a better politics that has nothing to do with politically motivated violence.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Zim Elections 2018: A Complicit Attempt at Ending Opposition Politics

 By Takura Zhangazha*

Zimbabwe’s ruling establishment or military political complex are consistently referring to how they intend to stop focusing on ‘politics’. Instead, as claimed by President Mnangagwa, they want to put all their energy into what they have called ‘the economy’. 

Some ruling party pundits have gone so far as to equate that the ruling establishment’s slogan of ‘Zimbabwe is open for business’ also applies to politics.  

And here they essentially are arguing that there is no longer any need to make politics as polarised as before, but more significantly, to remove any assumptions of high stakes end games as was the case with their predecessor leader Robert Mugabe (arguments which can only be made by those that anticipate an electoral victory.)

The more significant intention however appears to make the opposition appear somewhat agenda-less or even in some instances, irrelevant.

This is one of the arguments that Herald columnist Igomombe recently put into the public domain.  Referring to the ‘death of party politics’ he writes, ‘Looking in the crystal ball, Zimbabwe after July 30 will pass for a highly de-politicized Nation. There is likely to be a net swing to wealth-creation and the founding of a technocratic ethos which it needs to underpin that swing.’

The fortification of the ‘ease of doing business’ mantra, together with the ruling military political complex anticipation of a July 2018 electoral victory means that they do not want an opposition.  Or that they will work effectively to undermine it by giving it a rope long enough to hang itself.  This in the form of speaking the language of global capital, neoliberalism accompanied with strands of state capitalism. 

The assumption is that once they take away the economic agenda from the opposition by courting global capital on the basis of incumbency before and after the 2018 election, it will cease to be taken as seriously as it was at its peak.  Add to this the internal structural weaknesses of the opposition would also make the intention/task easier.

And all under the guise of a ‘new dispensation’.

The ruling establishment’s functionaries are therefore keen on constructing a new domestic ‘hegemony’ that is in tandem with the hegemony of neoliberalism. And to reduce opposition politics to nothing but a mere aberration that would never get into power.  Or having the political arrogance to assist what remains of it to ‘democratically’ exist. 

Regrettably these evident political intentions of the ruling military political complex for the 2018 elections will only be popularly realised after the event.  The opposition may have an idea of these ruling establishment intentions, but has become to enamoured to electoral movement squabbling and campaigning as to be unable to think beyond their individual political careers. 

To create an initial form of counter-hegemony Zimbabweans need to challenge the ruling establishment’s neoliberal narrative on the basis of clear alternative social democratic values that embrace more the people than they do capital.  The opposition political parties need to learn to seek to distinguish themselves from the ruling party on the basis of values as opposed to personalities and age. 

Once the ruling military political complex’s narrative is challenged, it is important that there be the use of relevant public platforms (online and offline) to increase the public debate on a different understanding of what would be a more people-centered national political economy. 

This would also mean that the value proposition of elections should also change.  That is, we would still need to change the political culture that considers elections, electoral processes only as national events. I know that this is a hard ask, but it is entirely possible. 

While I cannot suggest who should do this, I know that the primary responsibility to do so is with those that would want to be elected, the political parties.  And in particular, those that are in the opposition, who the ruling establishment is only too happy to see in their weak state. 

But even more so, for pro-democracy activists, who while not co-opted into ‘incremental change’ frameworks, understand the undemocratic intentions of the ruling establishment.  Knowing full well that incremental change leads to an political elite permanence in power, pro-democracy activists need to be ideologically clear in how they intend to put out counter-narratives as well as how they raise the democratic accountability of political parties.   Internally and externally.   

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com) 

Keyboards Drawn, Perceptions Ready: Social Media and Zimbabwe's 2018 Election

By Takura Zhangazha*

As is increasingly the case across the world, social media is now a permanent fixture of Zimbabwe’s political battleground.  And again as is the case in every country that lays claim  to being democratic, its use for political mobilisation proposes escalates during election campaigns.

Given the fact that Zimbabweans shall be voting on Monday 30 July 2018, social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and Whatsapp apart from being sources of information have become purveyors of a great deal more political opinion, innuendo, bias and activism. 

Because of this it is important to think through the current and contextual placement of social media may mean for Zimbabwe’s scheduled elections.

One thing that is almost certain is that there will be no role for global political consultants such as was the now ‘non-existent’ Cambridge Analytica that could allegedly invade what little privacy rights remain on social media and use algorithms to sway voters to a particular side.

But as is now already the case, there are organised groups of social media specialists and party supporters, sympathisers that are actively tweeting, ‘whatsapping’ and ‘facebooking’ for their side.  

And all the main political parties that are in this election appear to be expecting their supporters to harness social media to demonstrate either their popularity or effectiveness of their campaigns.

And its all fair game. For now. Though I anticipate that social media content on the elections and between parties will get more rabid as the Election Day nears and as the results start to be officially announced.

The striking characteristics of the electoral campaign related social media content is that it appears to be serving the primary function of fortifying political positions or functioning almost strictly as ‘echo chambers’ of already held perspectives/views.

At least for those that are online or have some sort of intermittent access to the internet.  This means that the initial primary target of the political social media content is to those that are ‘converted’ by way of which party they support.  So their party, its leaders and supporters must be actively seen to be on social media for the purposes of giving each other confidence and demonstrating the amount of (sometimes contrived) public support that they have.  These campaigns are therefore designed for instilling greater confidence and ‘pride’ for party members and supporters. 

In the second instance, these now confident online party supporters then try and expand their party’s reach to a broader audience. And in most cases this is the urban and Diaspora based Zimbabwean voter who has greater access to the internet and social media.  Here the content is as with the first primary target audience, highly politicised and intended to demonstrate an already existent political strength (through numbers shown by pictures of rally attendances and embellished negative stories of rival political parties.)

In turn the targeted voter also accepts, likes, receives, shares information that suits their preferences.  Especially on the whatsapp platform. Bringing to the fore, again, the fact that electoral content on social media for the 2018 election is mainly about confirming, strengthening already established preferences.  This is largely because of the highly personalised, materialist and loyalist nature of our country’s electoral-political culture. 

The middle ground of this social media content is hard to find.  It’s largely comprised of election related support organisations that will either urge people to crosscheck their names on the voters roll or put out analysis on the law and other requirements for a free and fair election.  All juxtaposed against what obtains.  Such social media content is largely ‘instrumentalised’ by one political contestant or the other depending on what the issue is. If it is critiquing the current electoral system, it will be used to malign the ruling party.  If it is commending the electoral system it is used to malign the mainstream opposition.

Then there is the personal dimension to political content around the elections that is increasingly coming to the fore.  Prominent activists and celebrities on Zimbabwean Facebook, Twitter and Whatsapp have also taken to putting out content that clearly indicates which side their rooting for.  And in some cases there have been some twitter spats between them, again, based on their preferences. One can only hope that these spats stay online and remain no more than political banter.  

Though in most instances it does seem that these will spill over from the online to the physical. 

And where we discuss the relationship between the online world that social media represents with the real world, we also have to be wary about how electoral content may also affect the emotional and psychological state of those that are putting it out or consuming it.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com) 

Re-Reading Tsvangirai's Bio 'At the Deep End': Reflecting on Legacy, Leadership, Ideology

By Takura Zhangazha*

I recently re-read Zimbabwe’s late former Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai’s biography or memoir, ‘At the Deep End.’  Written in collaboration with the late journalist William Bango, the book is essentially about  Tsvangirai’s reflections on his own life.  Both the personal and more significantly (for me at least)  the political aspects of the same. 

And its purpose was probably to emphasise the political more than the personal.  Either way it tells the life story of a man who conscientiously worked to improve the lives of workers as a unionist and the those of the people of Zimbabwe as a political leader. 

I was re-reading the biography more out of nostalgia of the activist days I first encountered Morgan and also in order to reflect on his immense contribution to the struggle for the democratisation of Zimbabwe.    

This is despite the controversy that has now come to surround the process(es) of selecting his successors in the mainstream opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) political party that he led until his passing on. 

I was more interested in what Morgan in his own book felt he had come to represent in relation to political values and principles.  And what both portended for his leadership legacy.   

Like most people born in the 1950’s, Morgan’s initial political consciousness was based on encounters with nationalist parties and the violence of the colonial settler state.  He however does not make any claims to having been an active member of the then liberation movement at an early age.

His more significant political consciousness stemmed largely from the work he began doing as a trade unionist of the Associated Mine Workers Union at Trojan Nickel mine in Bindura.  And unionism is generally couched in the politics of direct representation of workers (and their interests or else you lose the representative post.)

In the euphoria that was national independence, and through the urging of the new government, that was to see Tsvangirai become a member of the ruling Zanu PF party.  All trade unions were now required to join the new Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) led by Albert Mugabe (brother to then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe). 

In rising up the trade union ranks to become national vice president of the AMWUZ (and subsequently moving to Harare to take up the post) Tsvangirai maintains a specific focus on unionism and does not demonstrate any intention at ascending the ruling Zanu PF’s party leadership ladder.  This is a key point to make because his commitment to labour unionism would define his leadership of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.

In the position of secretary general that he took up in 1988, his primary concern was the welfare of workers.  But events such as that of the demonstrations at the University of Zimbabwe in the following year would escalate his political collision course with the establishment.  In fact he was detained without trial for at least 90 daysweeks after the ZCTU issued a statement in solidarity with the university’s students union.

His clearer ideological leanings emerged when the impact of government neo-liberal economic policy the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) started negatively affecting workers.  Though he does not claim it in his book, the documents that the ZCTU authored at that time such as one referred to as ‘Beyond ESAP’ had clear left leaning ideological nuances. 

The acts of solidarity with striking civil servants and the leadership of the ZCTU to help from and lead the National Constitutional Assembly, did not however cement any leftist ideological leanings.  But they expanded an attempt at a holistic approach to leadership that Tsvangirai would come to use a that at the formation of the labour party backed Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). 

And this meant that Tsvangirai was not an ideologue despite his evident strong belief in the rights of workers.  Hence he abhorred the liberalisation of the economy which led to job losses for many workers and insisted on a form of economic protectionism of local business and industry. 

It also turns out that Tsvangirai was a strong believer in people-centered consultative processes.  Before the formation of the party, and he makes regular reference to this, ZCTU undertook a study to figure out what the people wanted.  One of his colleagues, who gets commendable mention, Timothy Kondo, undertook a nationwide research on issues affecting the people on behalf of ZCTU. 

Combined with a multi-stakeholder approach that led to what was the National Working People’s Convention (NWPC) in early 1999 which tasked labour to form what was then called a ‘working people’s party’.

Tsvangirai then fully embraces ‘social democracy’ but in a manner that I hazard to add is more to the centre than to the left.  This was probably in keeping with what the ‘third way’ politics that was trending politically via the then 'global' leadership of Bill Clinton,, Gerhard Schroeder and Tony Blair at the turn of the century. 

To quote him on this ideological matter, Tsvangirai says, ' Our policies and ideals had been set out at the NWPC and the general policy thrust was for democratic change, in the real sense of the word.  We had said that we were social democrats: we believed in a clearly defined but limited role of the state in governance and in the economy'.   

I am sure that the latter line may have been said with the benefit of hindsight on his part.   And it does sound less genuine than the slightly more radical and protectionist argument against ESAP motivated economic liberalisation.

In this regard it is always useful to keep in mind that Tsvangirai's memoirs were written at a time when he was already in the inclusive government and decidedly less radical for what in my view at that time were expedient reasons.  And assumptions at a globally acceptable statesmanship.

That is where the rub in recalling Tsvangirai's leadership is.   Both as a lesson to those that would seek to lead or be led.  It is always imperative to remain true to the values and principles that brought one to leadership.  Even in the most difficult of circumstances.  Contrasting the genesis of his leadership with the time when he passed on there appears to be a coherent pattern of commitment to the working people of Zimbabwe.  Even if mistakes were made, Tsvangirai could never shake off his original understanding of politics. That is the people always come first.  No matter that the methods he used were sometimes out rightly populist and borderline messianic. Or that in the age of the inclusive government they became more neo-liberal in approach and intent.    But above all else he was probably a believer in direct representation (unionism) of an affected majority even if he would come to control its immediate outcome or popular meaning. Ideology or no ideology.

What I personally learnt and now observe with the benefit of hindsight is that however ones political fortunes change, it is always important to remember what got you to where you are and remain as organic as possible with that base.  It helps. Despite new pressures, opportunities or very personal preferences.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personality (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

The Democratic Importance of Zimbabwe Political Party Primary Elections in 2018

“Primary Elections: Strengthening or Undermining Internal Party Democracy?” in Zimbabwe’s 2018 General Election

A presentation to a Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) Public Meeting

Thursday 31 May 2018

New Ambassador Hotel, Harare, Zimbabwe.

By Takura Zhangazha*

Cde Chairperson,

As always, I am grateful at having been invited to come and share some of my thoughts on the official topic of this public discussion today concerning what is now a certain general (harmonised) election on 30 July 2018 in Zimbabwe.

The issue that I had been advised to share thoughts on, “Primary Elections for 2018: Strengthening or Undermining Internal Party Democracy” may initially appear to have been overtaken by recent events such as the signing into law of the Electoral Amendment Act as well as the proclamation of three key electoral dates namely the holding the election itself on 30 July 2018 preceded by nomination court on 14 June 2018 and just in case presidential candidates final to garner the 50%+1 vote count, a presidential run-off vote scheduled for Saturday 8 September 2018. 

To begin by stating the obvious, for what would be considered the biggest prizes (presidential office and parliamentary majorities) of electoral contestations since national independence, the political party is key. 

This latter and initial point of my brief discussion may sound abstract but is, in my view, a fairly pragmatic assessment of our political realities. 

Even the title of the topic under discussion suggests I am correct in my assertion. 

If we are to discuss, as advised by MPOI, the ‘(political party) primary elections of 2018; strengthening or undermining internal party democracy’ we, as would contemporary Christian theologists and their understanding of the religious functionality of the ‘family’as the primary unit of society,  look for a primary organizational unit that underlies our understanding of what would be national politics.

In post independent Zimbabwe’s case the primary unit for political mobilization in pursuit of political power has historically been the political party.  This unit, in its ability to organize and mobilise the proverbial ‘masses’ to a specific cause has remained supreme over and above all other political considerations.  In the case of the ruling party Zanu Pf, this understanding of the pre-eminence of the organization (party) led to the ouster of its long standing leader, Robert Mugabe, undemocratic as it may have been (in the final analysis the party ‘triumphed’). 

The same with the largest opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC in its perpetually varying formations) the passing away of its again longstanding leader, Morgan Tsvangirai has left remaining leaders with a claim to internal party legitimacy fighting over control of, you guessed it, the party or what remains of it. 

So the question of ‘internal primary elections’ and their meaning for democracy in Zimbabwe’s context, can only be answered from the perspective of understanding the supremacy of the party as the foundational unit of political activism/action and belonging in our body politic. 

And it is important to also point out that internal party processes have a direct bearing on national political culture and actions. That is to say, the more democratic a ruling or main opposition party is internally, the more likely the nation state or country will be also democratically governed.  
This is because democratic internal party party processes such as primary elections allow a culture of transparency, democracy and direct leadership accountability.  It also allows ordinary members of the party leadership eligibility and as a result thereof performance assessment in relation to principles and objectives of the party.  

This is currently not happening in the ruling or opposition parties that straddle our national political landscape.  And I will come to an assessment of each shortly.  . 

Where we are faced with a general election the key questions that emerge are whether this primary political organization is up to the task of seeking and acquiring electoral victory.  Because the topic at hand is time specific vis-a-vis the 2018 elections, it is important to outline the reality that the internal status of the party is a key determinant to its prospects for electoral victory.

I will begin with the ruling party Zanu Pf.  Following its coup-not-a-coup internal party transition of removing Mugabe from power, it appears to have re-coagulated around its intention to retain state power via a re-legitimisation process that would be the 2018 general election.  It has however faced internal challenges over retaining those that had previously stood with its former leader and those that embraced (and stuck their necks out) for what it now refers to as the new dispensation. 

It has attempted to balance both for expedient electoral reasons.  Hence its primary elections were a hotchpotch of accusations and counter accusations of local leaders having never supported the ‘new dispensation’ and therefore undeserving of elected positions in the 2018 elections.  What is has however done is sought to reinvent itself in intra party democratic tradition.  It has allowed its members to contest in its primary elections on what would on the face of it be regarded as a ‘fair’ electoral field. Even if you were alleged to be part of the now infamous ‘G-40’ that sought to retain Mugabe you were allowed to contests as a candidate (so long you were not part of the direct ‘criminals’ around the former leader).  And some of these alleged candidates won resoundingly in the ruling party’s primary elections. Others who were at the front of ‘Operation Restore Legacy’ of November 2017 had to be restored to internal party primary election ‘victories’. 

The fact that there have been various meetings including one ironically dubbed a ‘reconciliation meeting’ between winning and losing candidates points to the fact that these primary elections in Zanu Pf still have untold stories about their effect on its actual electoral performance come polling day.  But as Zanu Pf leader Mnangagwa has publicly stated, they have a strong expectation of victory despite the challenges they have faced in their own internal party leadership transition.  The primary elections in the ruling party are therefore assumed as a routine process.  Not only by way of its own internal undemocratic tradition but also by way of seeking a new intra-party legitimacy for its controversial ‘new’ leadership.

Where we consider the opposition MDC-T and its loosely put together MDC Alliance, the differences far outweigh assumed similarities.  The former relate to the fact that the opposition has still not only not completed primary elections but more significantly is still squabbling over sharing pre-election spoils with its ‘alliance’ partners.  Assuming that these pre-election spoils survive to become post-election ones, again there are challenges as to whose candidates in the alliance won and who gets to control them. 

Where the (united) MDC-T had chosen to go it alone, their primary elections would have been simpler and pointed to an internal democratic processes.  But because of the ‘sharing’ of safe seats in the context of the alliance and a transposed ‘consensus’ candidate selection system in the MDC-T, the intra party process has served more to divide than unite their party(ies).Alliance or no alliance.  This means that the primary elections in the opposition, whatever format they have taken and will take, are no longer supportive mechanisms to an electoral victory. At least not via the party(ies).

Cde Chairperson,

Because the topic is so broad I cannot capture all of the key points I wanted to raise, I will restrict my remaining time to only two key further points.

The first being that the 2018 elections, in so far as it concerns the ruling party is a foreign policy election.  Their newfound attempts at 'internal democracy' via their recent their primary elections are not just for their party but also to try and show face with the broader world that they are a changed party after Mugabe's rule. 

It is more of a public relations exercise but they do not intend to lose the general election in its presidential, parliamentary or local government aspects.  In their assumptions of electoral victory they intend to re-establish themselves as a ruling establishment in the neo-liberal mould of the 1990s.  This is when the seeds of free market capitalism or the  ‘ease of doing business’ was key to linking up those in political power and those with capital to combine to create an assumedly unassailable power pact of a rent seeking elite ruling class.  

All in keeping with what global capital (east or west is rapaciously seeking across our African continent, especially South of the Sahara).

The second key point that is necessary to make is that the mainstream opposition as led by the MDC-T in failing to demonstrate a different intra-party political trajectory/culture from the ruling Zanu Pf party is falling into a tragic trap of mimicking that which it may not be able to dislodge from political power.  The ‘consensus’ candidate lists of the alliance and the divisions that they have caused in the larger MDC-T together with a consistent lack of intra-party political and financial accountability has left all opposition forces politically hamstrung.  Regrettably this has meant that they have generally followed Zanu Pf lead in how to either dissipate their internal disputes by trying, vaingloriously, to resolve them by laying claim to either ‘chine vene vacho (the party has owners)’ or ‘generational consensus’. 

The third and final point I am concluding by Cde Chairperson is almost a reiteration of the point I made at the beginning of our discussion.  The political party, in Zimbabwe’s context is the basic unit of political mobilization/organization for elections in relation to the topic.  But more significantly, the political party is a purveyor of political values and practices. Where a party is internally undemocratic and either in power or close to power, its tendencies negatively affect national political culture and practice. Where the opposite is true, that means internal party democratic practice means a democratic national political culture.   Not only in the heated moment of primary elections but for posterity.  At the moment neither of the two main political parties vying for state power have demonstrated that they are thinking beyond their historical liberation war legacies, celebrity statuses, age or a globally failing consumerist/neo-liberal/free market culture. 

Thank you cdes. 

#Takura Zhangazha spoke here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)