Emerging Politics of Zim's Latest Constitutional Amendment

 By Takura Zhangazha*

The Parliament of Zimbabwe is in the process of amending Zimbabwe’s national constitution a second time in as many years.  At the time of writing the Constitutional Amendment Bill number 2 is headed for Senate after having been agreed to by way of a required two thirds majority vote in the National Assembly.  The latter vote having been predictable given the fact that the ruling Zanu PF party commands the necessary numbers in both the National Assembly and also the Senate where the bill is likely to pass again before it is sent to the president for final approval. 

The public debate around this second amendment has been relatively muted.  Even on social media.  That’s probably because this one comes hard on the heels of the first one that was also recently passed by Parliament after a constitutional court order that the voting be done again. Or also because of a general apathy on the matter by the public.  

There however have been some comments either in defence or disparagement of constitutional amendment bill number 2.  Those in defense of it as expected are ruling party officials and Members of Parliament (MPs) or government  functionaries.  The opposition MDC-T has also not vociferously opposed the bill and had some of its own National Assembly members who voted in favour of the bill.  The MDC Alliance MPs that remain in the National Assembly have voted against it.

And while we await the final details of the final version of this amendment after presidential assent, the legal intentions are fairly clear.  And also for this blog to be more useful/utilitarian it is important to give a brief summary of some of the major proposed amendments.

The most talked about proposed changes are for example that the promotion of serving court judges will be done by the president from the recommendations of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC).  This also includes the removal of an age limit for serving/sitting judges which had previously been set at the maximum age of 70 years. The president will also be able to appoint and dismiss a Prosecutor General on the recommendation of the JSC without public interviews.   Another proposed change is that there will no longer be a legal requirement that a presidential candidate have running mates.  And the president will also have powers to appoint 7 ministers (as opposed to the previous 5) who are not members of Parliament. 

The less talked about amendments to the constitution in this instance relate to the extension of the women's quota for another two terms of office of Parliament.  And the introduction of a proportional representation youth quota listed by alternative gender.

Also there is the creation of the constitutional office of a public protector who will have some similar functions of other commissions such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission. Add to this the removal of MPs from Provincial Councils and the election of members of the latter by way of party lists based on proportional representation.    

In summary these are most of the key amendments being proposed barring any new changes from Senate or a return of the bill from the president. (A full version of them can be found here) 

There are however three key political aspects that need to be considered on the implications of this second amendment. 

The first aspect which is more a political-legal technicality  is that the ruling party is amending the constitution because it is constitutionally allowed to do so.  Based on its parliamentary two thirds majority.  Or to put it rather crudely, it is amending the constitution because the same constitution allows it to do so.  The political inference of this is that the second amendment as with the first is a reflection of the electoral results of 2018. Disputed as they were around the presidential vote count and less around the parliamentary result that resulted in this two thirds majority.   In this, arguments around questions of legitimacy have no immediate impact on what parliament can or cannot do. And while this is difficult for many to fathom, the political reality is that the constitution is operational both in relation to its technical aspects and also the political intentions of the ruling party.  All until 2023. And the key word here is ‘incrementalism’ within the ambit of what the constitution permits. Warts and all.

The second aspect relates to the introduction of a youth and the extension of the women’s quota. As well as the introduction of a proportional representation system to the election of provincial and metropolitan councils.   The political meaning of this is that it is the most organized political party that will win the next harmonized general election in 2023.  Its like quite literally asking aspiring politicians to do the math.  Those parties that can field candidates for both directly elected and proportional representation seats are the ones that are likely to do well electorally.  Including probably wining the most coveted position of the executive presidency.  And it would appear the ruling party is well aware of the political factionalism that comes with fewer posts and this strategy ensures fewer of its internal leaders do not have elected posts.   Given what happened in 2018, I am not so sure our opposition parties have as comparable an understanding of the same. 

In the third and final instance, there has been some debate about the consolidation of executive power by Mnangagwa.  Especially because the amendment does away with running mates. Or where it gives him great control of the promotion or retirement of judges.   This is an understandable argument in not only anticipating assumptions of the compromising of judicial independence by the executive but also assuming the next election will again be disputed.  And that it will again require the intervention of the Constitutional Court.  This means it is as much about democratic principle as it is about political assumptions and expectations.

In conclusion, what has become clear is that the new constitution was not designed to either oversee a societal revolution or have a fundamentally sacrosanct status in Zimbabwean society.  It remains functional at the whim of the institutions it created and those that are in charge of them by way of electorally arrived at executive and parliamentary authority.  In the current context it remains a document that is intended to bring ambiguous incremental change.  At the whim of those that are legally in charge of its implementation.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com) 

Querying the Inevitability of Neoliberalism in Zimbabwe.

By Takura Zhangazha*

One the most enduring elements of contemporary global capitalism/ neoliberalism has been its ability to re-invent itself. Even as it goes through what many academics, writers and activists have referred to as ‘major crises’.  Or even as it changes form to more financialised forms that include those that led to the global financial crisis of 2008.  Or even now as we are faced with the Covid19 pandemic and the still profit motivated role of global pharmaceutical companies. Not only about vaccines but also a ‘push back’ against a global acceptance of the necessity of public health services for all. 

In explaining this ability of capitalism to re-invent itself, again academics, writers and activists point to at least two things.  The first and perhaps more important one is its ability to create a hegemonic presence over society (ditto Gramsci).  And the second being its ability to within the context of hegemony it gives the impression of being ‘incrementally progressive’ with an assumed trickle-down effect.  Including by way of creating nodes of mimicry, consumerism and what eventually turn out to be unrealistic aspirations of working class people.

In Zimbabwe’s context, which is the primary focus of this blog, we have not yet dealt with this neoliberal turn of the current government as extensively as we should.  Especially where it comes to our own understanding of our political economy and our almost ever present wishes to be assumed to be, in the implied words of the current government, ‘returning to normalcy’.

In analyzing this national context and capitalism/neoliberalism I will also examine the two points of hegemony as well as incrementalism in tandem with the contradictory approaches to how we understand Zimbabwe’s political economy. 

Where we consider the hegemonic element of the neo-liberal thrust of the current government, it is as historical as it relates to assumptions of what is progress within our political economy. The history behind it is that neo-liberalism/capitalism is directly inherited from the former Rhodesian colonial state.  By way of the ideological outlook of long-duree colonial capital (which is still with us in many forms today).  While it was a minority settler state whose capital and profit was derived directly from the exploitation of the black majority for labour and also via the latter’s violent economic and physical displacement, it remained true to its global ideological outlook and acceptance by its peers. Not only in Africa but internationally. 

While we fought a war of liberation struggle against this settler colonialism/capitalism it also sowed seeds of its continuity that we inherited in post-independence Zimbabwe.  From urban settlements and racially differentiated urban culture through to the denigration of African religious practices in favour of Christian ones.  Or colonial education as preferable, the inherited colonial capital’s hegemonic presence was always going to be with us for a long time. 

Even where we embarked upon attainment of independence on what was assumedly a different ideological trajectory in the form of what came to be a mixed democratic socialism, the inherent hegemonic envy created by not only our aspirations to replace those at the top of the previous colonial capital pyramid eventually let us down.  I remember some conversations with war veterans who worried that their comrades were now living the good life in the suburbs while they were left behind in the ghettoes as though they had not all gone to war.  Or arguments around their proximity to white capital owners as being a key determinant to their own individual material success. 

And even later on in the late 1990s and at the height of the fast track land reform programme some cdes widely decrying any attempts at dismantling the structural elements of colonial capital.  Add to this rural-urban migration and the lifestyle/cultural hegemony is complete.  Not just by way of the removal of restrictions of movement but more significantly by way of desire.  Or a false nostalgia where some peers of mine ridiculously and to my personal dismay argue that the then Rhodesia was better.  Yet they never experienced it’s harsher exploitative realities.

Where we look at our immediate circumstances, even at the height of the Covid19 pandemic, arguments over and about the economy largely revolve around aspirational lifestyles/desires and also a government that faces challenges in being trusted/accepted by global private capital. Including an opposition that works assiduously to try and prevent that recognition from happening until it wins an election. 

What it means is that political and economic leaders across political divides accept the hegemonic framework proffered by neoliberalism.  Not necessarily because they understand it. But more because they want to recognized or seen to be the ones that understand how it works.   And also with the possibility of simply wanting the easier option of cozying up to the money for political survival or in some cases pursuit of personal aggrandizement.

In this, the creation of patronage networks that follow their lead then make for a situation in which their popularly, culturally and materially received wisdom assumes an air of ‘inevitabilism’ with the majority of their supporters.  One in which these same said supporters no longer see any other alternatives except what their leaders say. And the recognition from private capital that the same leaders receive are celebrated beyond their realities or exploitative contexts. 

This leads me to the second key point embedded in what is clearly an expanding historically hegemonic capitalism in Zimbabwe. That of incrementalist approaches to change. These can be collective but couched in revolutionary language without querying the ideological basis of the placement of the country’s political economy.  Or they can be highly individualist with a focus on materialism and consumerism that also relies on religion, superstition and staying ahead of the pack by many means necessary. 

If activists, writers or academics don’t question the fundamental structural causes of inequality in Zimbabwean society, then it is this false incrementalist approach that prevails. That does not mean that the alternative is revolution as almost occurred with the liberation struggle.  Instead it means that the contest is one for a counter-hegemonic, progressive national consciousness of the people of Zimbabwe.  And that is no easy task.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)