Zimbabwe has SADC (and Mbeki) to Thank. Ditto Afghanistan.

By Takura Zhangazha*

There has been relatively limited discussion about a longstanding narrative that at some point the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK once considered a military intervention in Zimbabwe. This was allegedly under the leadership of former Prime Minister, Tony Blair.  It is a narrative that was put forward by former South African president Thabo Mbeki in an interview with AlJazeera in 2013.  This was also after he had been the Southern African Development Community (SADC) appointed mediator in the Zimbabwean political impasse. 

I have raised this issue particularly  in the wake of the collapse of the American occupation of Afghanistan. Mainly because it reflects what could have become a Zimbabwean reality but more significantly because at that time, the idea of liberal interventionism was a fad across many global and local activist circles.  Including what the United Nations office on Genocide Prevention defined as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P). 

To argue that there were strong inclinations toward either liberal interventionism and R2P in Zimbabwe’s context would probably be an understatement.   This is mainly because the narrative of Zimbabwe’s political challenges were couched in failed and pariah state languages.  At a global scale.  And as the actions of the then Mugabe government had riled equally global capital and its assumed universal private property rights.  

Add to this base a mix of a lack of domestic popularity of the incumbent government and leader, together with serious cases of political violence, salvation from outside the country was never out of the popular or some intellectual imaginations.   More so in the wake of what the United States of America (USA) and the UK together with their allies had already been doing in either Iraq, Afghanistan or Sierra Leone and eventually Libya. 

What also emerged was a hostility toward regional mediation by the Southern African Development Community (SADC).  Or even that of the continental body, the African Union (AU).  With some of the main reasons being it was either too accommodating of Mugabe or it was not yielding the populist result of his resignation/removal from office. 

And these were fair concerns depending on which political side of the fence one sat.   Personally I was never a supporter of liberal interventionism.  Especially the kind that anticipates the arrival of a foreign army to liberate a people.  But my opinion then and even now are beside the point.

What is important is that we look at the dynamics that then informed SADC and the AU to insist on a more contextual and non-military intervention in the Zimbabwean political situation.  And why SADC, including its appointed mediator Thabo Mbeki eventually prevailed. 

Zimbabwe’s placement in international relations particularly after the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) had (and probably still has) essentially two strands to it. 

The first being that it was a state that had gone rogue by violating private property rights and also limiting other freedoms.  But with the former being the motivator for the observance of the latter.   What Mugabe had done for whatever reasons he gave was probably considered ‘unforgiveable’ not only by private global capital but also neo-colonial mentalities of global political establishments.  It probably still remains ‘unforgivable’ that Mugabe undertook the FTLRP.  And his successor appears to understand this hence his courting of private capital and former white commercial farmers. 

The second strand to the narrative is largely found on the continent and its remembrance of anticolonial struggles.  Particularly as it relates to land restitution and redistribution.  And this is significantly within the Southern African context.  Hence SADC’s ambivalence at the idea of liberal interventionism in Zimbabwe.  This is also compounded by the strong historical ties between Southern African states based on the Frontline states and former liberation movements that are still in power in a majority of countries in the region.  As well as the legacy of the Organization of African Unity now the AU together with the principles that guided the former’s African Liberation Committee.   

But these narratives alone were never going to be enough.  It was the juxtaposition of one against the other  and the insistence by SADC that saw and thought beyond what a military intervention would mean for Zimbabwean society. As well as for the stability of the region. 

While the AU eventually made some huge misjudgments in the case of Libya later on, in Zimbabwe’s instance we were helped by SADC to avoid a similar catastrophe. 

As is now evident with the case of Afghanistan and the departure of the Americans, interventionist wars generally do not end well.   They cause untold suffering to ordinary people and in most cases the latter never remember fully why the wars were started in the first place. And these wars often times bring back those that were assumed to have been ousted into the political milieu in one form or the other. 

You may ask, was Zimbabwe really that close to a possible external military intervention?  I do not have a technical answer to that question.  The point however is that where it was thought of, it was rejected.  And for this we have SADC and its appointed mediator Thabo Mbeki to thank.  Whatever we have, however we differ in viewing it, it is far better than being a country under either direct military occupation or at war with itself. 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

 

Explaining Zimbabwe’s Re-Established Fifth Estate

By Takura Zhangazha*

Those who have studied in one form or the other law, journalism and social sciences are likely to be familiar with the political use of the term ‘estate’.  It would normally refer to at least three arms of the state.  Namely the executive (Government), the legislature (Parliament) and the Judiciary (courts of law).  This triumvirate is generally deemed to be in charge of what is referred to as ‘checks and balances’ in the exercise of state power.  Especially in a society that is considered to be democratic.   And they are usually formally recognized by law through written constitutions or Acts of Parliament and traditions.

In Zimbabwe’s case whereas arguments can be made about the extent or reach of our democracy, we also have these three legalised ‘estates’.  They are also referred to as the three arms of the state. But in the case of this particular blog we will stick with ‘estate’ as it connotes not only territoriality but also assumptions of ownership beyond just control. 

There is also another ‘estate’.  This is generally referred to as the ‘fourth estate’.  This is comprised of the mainstream media owners and journalists.  It is not as formal as the aforementioned three because it is predicated on the right of all people to freedom of expression.  The assumption being that it will then remain free from legal formalities that inform its counterparts and therefore give the general public some sort of say about how society is run.  It is however perennially under threat from either the executive or legislature where it digresses from hegemonic intentions of the day or era.   This is because it can neither issue executive orders (government), pass laws (Parliament) or give final judgments (courts). 

Though it is in a parlous state.  Our mainstream media has suffered years of attack particularly from the executive and the legislature.  It has also suffered at the hands of its private or state proprietors who either prioritized profits over the public interest or deemed it fit to take partisan approaches above media professionalism.   It therefore is not as influential as it was either in the past or as would be preferable in a democratic society.  Even where it has now seen itself taking a multi-media route with the advent and influence of privately owned social media platforms. 

There is however a key somewhat hidden, somewhat integrated fifth estate that we rarely talk about in Zimbabwe.  In other countries this is sometimes referred to as the for example Eisenhower ‘Military-Industrial Complex’ (USA) or in the global east as ‘oligarchies’.  For our purposes we will limit ourselves to the ‘fifth estate’. 

It flourished quite well under Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI) Rhodesia as it sought to bust sanctions.  It also did fairly well in our first ten years of post-independence. It floundered with the introduction of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the 90’s due to the opening of the ‘free market’ floodgates.  And things got worse for it when the executive, parliament and judiciary teamed up to implement the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) and the Indigenization Act predicated on radical populist black nationalism.  In order to try and keep its head afloat, it dabbled in opposition politics to create a counter-hegemonic narrative to Mugabe’s radical nationalism.  To all intents and purposes it hijacked the labour backed mainstream opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) social democratic narrative to suit it more to its interests.  But it grew tired of the MDC’s lack of electoral success for whatever reasons and probably began to see some sort of light in what it considered its arch nemesis, Zanu PF. 

And this is where we can arrive at explaining that Zimbabwe’s fifth estate is private capital.  The rise of Mnangagwa and his deliberate overall policy of the ‘ease of doing business’ has given this fifth estate new reason to reconsider its interests and allegiances.   It definitively no longer has an interest in opposition politics because of the neoliberal stance adopted by the current Zimbabwe government.

But more interestingly it is no longer a shadow player in the state ‘estate matrix’.  It is now a key player as encouraged by Mnangagwa.  Both in its local and global formats.  The infrastructure development programmes have seen it take centre stage in state contracts.  Even if they are linked to Chinese investment.  The repealing of indigenization laws has opened up new opportunities for private capital to put its money where its mouth is. Be it in mining, manufacturing or tax havens (Victoria Falls). 

All of these developments embed private capital with not only the executive but a vested interest in the ‘checks and balances’ of the exercise of state power.  And because private capital always protects to the best possible extent its property rights, the open sesame they have been given by Mnangagwa means they are now intrinsically part of the state.  And they know that based on the promises the executive is making to them and to the people, they are increasingly indispensable.  Especially where and when they are sold for example previously state owned gold refineries or have first rights to the discovery of oil.  All they have to guarantee as the fifth estate is some sort of ‘trickle-down effect’ to their accumulation of private profit. That is, to guarantee support for the standing executive or its future leaders in order to maintain this neoliberal status quo in Zimbabwe. 

And this brings about a final question.  Who is running who in the current state of affairs in Zimbabwe? Is the executive running private capital or is the reverse true?  At the moment it would not be incorrect to assume that there is, for now, a mutually beneficial relationship.  Almost a ‘you scratch my back, I scratch yours’ sort of scenario.   Especially and only if to guarantee another 5 years of this elitist mutually beneficial relationship post 2023.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)