Imagining, Desiring Many Zimbabwes : A Brief Conversation

 By Takura Zhangazha*

There are many ways of perceiving, imagining and even desiring Zimbabwe.  Be it from lived experience in-country, assumptions of enlightenment (education) or an outsider/external comparative eye view.  What is evident is that the narratives hitherto and thereto are many. Some more historical or organic, others more populist and others that may be considered to be somewhat condescending. 

Because this is a relatively complex subject matter, I will try to be fairly straightforward.  In the contemporary narratives on what sort of country Zimbabwe is, there are many versions and perspectives.  Either as propagated by mainstream global media or as portended through social media platforms by different individuals, 'influencers' and above all else, permitted algorithms.

The most dominant narrative particularly since the neoliberal economic reforms by Mugabe in the 1990s  has been that of imagining Zimbabwe as a completely failed/failing state.  This initially was a relatively organic, even popular, perception of what Zimbabwe was becoming as led by the trade unions, grassroots and student movements of the time.  Culminating in the formation of what was then referred to as a working peoples' opposition party, the then Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).  

At the turn of the 21st century and arguably due to the highly political, nationalist and arbitrary Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) this real or imagined failing Zimbabwe was accentuated and became almost run of the mill in global narratives. Largely from the perspective of a liberal interventionist global hegemony as led by key Western superpowers such as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UKGBNI), the United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU).  Because of Mugabe’s long duree rule and insistence on defying what were accepted international human rights norms as given by global liberal interventionism, this narrative of imagining or even desiring a continually failing Zimbabwe under Zanu Pf rule has not gone away.  Particularly where in the last twenty years, Zanu Pf has retained a hold on power despite its perceived and real sins. 

A stubborner imagining of Zimbabwe is to be found in the ruling party Zanu PF and an historical/ ideological Pan Africanism found mainly in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and significant pockets of the African Union (AU). In this, it links the liberation struggle past with the present in an almost Manichean and even binary fashion. While the historicity of such an approach is understandable, its primary fault lies in its inability to recognize its own faults and complicity in having Zimbabwe still being imagined and perceived in powerful circles as failing. Arguments around human rights abuses, flawed electoral processes are not without merit or proverbially, there would be no smoke without fire. Despite the historical significance of liberation struggles against settler and global colonialism.  It however remains an important counter-hegemonic narrative because it reflects an irrefutable fact in the development of nations anywhere in the world, that is, a people cannot either wish away their own organic history. Warts and all.  It is a narrative and imagining of Zimbabwe that should always be taken into account.

In the third instance, there is a less ideological but highly materialist re-imagining of Zimbabwe. And this is largely found in relatively young people in and outside of the country.  Or as motivated by those that are influential and that also understand the changing political demographics of Zimbabwe.   It is an imagining of a Zimbabwe in which, never mind the ideologies’ or the historicity of events/issues, there is a desire for jobs, commodities and recognition of individual wealth accumulation.  It is also a fashionable one as enabled by social media and the medium itself determining the message and/or contrived realities.  At its heart is a desire to be part of any success stories as the relate to globalization, entrepreneurship and the accumulation of wealth in its many commodified and even temporal forms.  In this, its most convenient default ideological home remains neoliberalism and an intrinsic admiration of societies in the Global North, inclusive of ardent and at most-times tragic efforts to emigrate there.   Not necessarily because of the latter’s, for example, education or social welfare systems but primarily for the ‘good life’/ consumption that those societies exhibit. Again via mainstream global media, social media or in the latest case, streaming platforms such as Netflix.  As a result, young people’s activism and imagining of Zimbabwe shuns history or ideology.  It seeks more the immediate from multiple platforms, multiple heroes and again a recognition of ‘belonging’ from the global north in one form or the other. Regardless of the contradictions that are apparent about ‘universality’ as evidenced by for example the rise of radical nationalism in the global north or the startling reality of the need for a #BlackLivesMatter movement in the same countries.

Depending on either one’s consciousness or sense of belonging and preference, we have many imagined Zimbabwes.  I have only outlined three that I consider to be in vogue over and about the story that is Zimbabwe.  As presented in the mainstream global media.  As preferred by ruling party apparatchiks or as argued by global superpowers.  And even as probably imagined by young Zimbabweans at home and abroad via social media and other online streaming platforms. The key however might be how to retain context and be able to look ourselves in the mirror. Without asking someone else to judge our own reflection and imagine a people-centered Zimbabwe for everyone who organically claims it as their own.. 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com) 

Critical Conversations with Zimbabwe’s Diaspora: Beyond the Money

By Takura Zhangazha*

It is an interesting historical fact that most of the newer/modernist thinking around Zimbabwe’s liberation emerged from the Diaspora.  Or at least from experiences by those who were to become leaders of the same either as nationalists, war veterans and activists in one form or the other.  This was mainly via them either getting their education, military training or in some cases jobs (such as in hotel and catering, teaching) outside of the country.   

In their lived experiences of being in the Diaspora many liberatory ideas, experiences and new understanding of the situation back home emerged. So if you are looking at the first major waves of emigrants from Zimbabwe to South Africa mainly to work in the mines, hotel and catering as well as in some cases to get an education at for example Fort Hare university among other vocational training institutions that were allowed to enroll black students, you find a new consciousness.  

It was from this first wave of our Diaspora, upon their return to then Rhodesia that we encountered more and more waves of unionism (for example Clements Kadalie or subsequently Benjamin Burombo), nationalism and even by the 1950’s a youth led urban radical nationalism (crosscheck the City Youth League).   

Even as the liberation struggle progressed and changed formats from nationalism to ideologically socialist guerrilla warfare, the Diaspora not only as a community but in relation to actively being hosted by friendly neighboring (Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia) and distant countries (USSR, China, Egypt, Algeria, Yugoslavia, selected communities in the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Nordic states, among others). 

In post independent Zimbabwe, there was an initial natural return back home for many of those based in the Diaspora.  Not just as former liberation fighters or activists but also those that found hope in the promises of independence.

By the early to mid-1990s however this confidence in the post-independence project had begun to wane largely due to difficult economic conditions as caused by the World Bank sponsored Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). Combined with an attendant repression of political dissent by the state. 

It is around this time, and in particular at the turn of the century (2000s) that a significant wave of emigration by Zimbabweans to countries such as Botswana, South Africa, Australia, the United Kingdom, USA and some Middle East states began. And has not really stopped ever since. Save for when the aforementioned countries have fortified their borders against immigrants. 

For a greater majority of those who left Zimbabwe during that time it was the definitive desire for better livelihoods, job remuneration and opportunities that motivated their departure. A significant number nevertheless left on the basis of seeking political asylum, particularly if their intended destination were countries in the global north. 

And this contemporary Zimbabwe Diaspora has done wonders in relation to sending remittances back home and also investing in housing and other properties. To the extent that they are now a very important player in our national economy and the everyday lives of many Zimbabweans. 

I have given this elaborate historical background largely because it is important to try and put issues into some sort of historical perspective.  But more importantly and in the contemporary, recent conversations with colleagues and friends based in the Diaspora have indicated a visceral anger at what is currently obtaining in Zimbabwe.  Particularly in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic.  Questions such as ‘what sort of country is that?’ Or in other instances highly personal and emotional narratives about how relatives and friends are unable to access health care despite having received money sent to them for treatment. And it is all understandable. 

These conversations inevitably take a political turn with a majority insisting that only a change of government will make Zimbabwe better.  But at the same time expressing misgivings or even disappointment about divisions in the mainstream opposition.   All the while trying their best to push specific pro-change narratives on social media, particularly WhatsApp, where they get more immediate information on what is happening politically or with their own families.  

In some of these conversations however I have begun to ask questions about their holistic vision for Zimbabwe.  Because the colleagues are wont to comparative analysis of the societies they currently live in, I also ask about whether the equivalent of what they experience around say for example, if they are in the UK, how a National Health Service (NHS) would work in Zimbabwe?

Or their views on public education, public transport, land,  national housing and even social welfare programmes for the poor.  In most cases the answers I get are ambivalent but again understandable. Mainly because there is a deep mistrust of the Zimbabwean government and also government led initiatives to engage the Diaspora.  Most of it based on their experiences with  Homelink or the latest  Diaspora Zimbabwe initiative  administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 

The key issue that emerges for me is that the positioning of the Diaspora as important primarily in relation to their ability to send remittances is unsustainable and unjust. Especially given the fact that a majority remain either technically or at heart Zimbabwean citizens.  Even more significantly is that historically the Diaspora has always led to new perspectives on an envisioned better Zimbabwe for all.

This entails interacting with the Diaspora beyond remittances and beginning with values and principles around a fair Zimbabwean society for all.  A proposition that would also require the Diaspora itself to begin to interact more with values and principles as the Zimbabwean opinion leaders that they are.  This entails outlining their propositions on for example health, education, transport and social welfare in Zimbabwe.  Either as they have experienced it in better frameworks in the countries they reside or as they ideally and pragmatically prefer it to be back home.  More like the equivalent of establishing a Zimbabwe Diaspora Charter of values and principles to share with those back home.  Given the diversity of our Diaspora, this may be a hard ask but it is worth a try.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Zim's Land Compensation Deal: Ahistorical Sanctification of Private Property and Inequality

By Takura Zhangazha*

The Zimbabwean government in July 2020 signed what it referred to as a Global Compensation Deed (GCD) with ‘former farmers’.  The latter being mainly former white commercial farmers as represented by, in the agreement, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), Southern African Commercial Farmers Alliance (SACFA-Zimbabwe) and Valuation Consortium (Private) Limited (Valcon). The GCD was signed after what can be considered an exclusive 24 July 2020 referendum where members of the above cited organizations with a whopping 94% vote count (2801 voters) accepted the Zimbabwe government’s offer.

This agreement, it turns out, has been long in the making including previous negotiations that involved the late Robert Mugabe’s administration. All as a result of the international political and private capital outcry over the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) at the turn of the century.  

While a full summary of GCD's contents and timeline are available on NewZWire website, there are some that I will highlight for the purposes of this short write up. For example, the GCD establishes that  Zimbabwe will ‘compensate’ the white former farmers for physical farm improvements, biological assets and land clearing to an agreed cumulative total of US$ 3,5 billion.  With half of it expected to be raised and paid out in the next twelve months. And thereafter quarterly payments depending on the funds raised. With the expectation that some of the money will be raised via a debt instrument with a 30 year guarantee on the international market from the Zimbabwean government, a development that immediately turns colonial injustice into public debt of those that struggled against it. And that the CFU will be key in assessing claims by the former farmers. 

Current Zimbabwe president Emmerson Mnangagwa also described the GCD as being one that, “brings to closure the national land question, while affirming our government’s commitment to rule of law and respect for property rights…”  He adds, ‘Our land has been permanently reunited with the people and the people permanently reunited with their land.  The land reform programme is thus irreversible.”

In the midst of an escalation of Covid19 and clampdowns on political protest, the GCD has understandably but unfortunately not elicited much public interest or debate.  Although some social media influencers/activists have referred to it as a betrayal of the objectives of the national liberation struggle. In official opposition circles this one has generally been an avoided topic.  For the probable reason that they would not necessarily have a different approach to this issue of ‘compensating’ white farmers.  In one or two instances the key question raised by some opposition activists was the rhetorical “Where will the government get the money?”

What remains more important in my view is the ideological justification of the GCD which is a full on embrace of neo-liberalism by the Zimbabwean government.  And the intention by Mnangagwa and globalized financial capital to treat this particular development as inevitable. While forgetting that inevitability does not make for historical social and economic justice. 

On this I have to make reference to French economist, Thomas Piketty’s latest book, Capital and Ideology because of the manner in which he ably illustrates the ideological elite alliances between those in power and those with the greatest share of capital or in our case, a hold on the national wealth.  And also where he illustrates that in historical moments of political ‘revolution’ or significant political change, there is always the fear of doing away with the right to private property.  No matter if the previous ownership frameworks of the same would have led to the revolution. With a litany of historical examples, including, that of Haiti or even closer to home, South Africa.  All in which the revolutionary expectations of the masses are eventually arm twisted, in one way or the other, by global (in our case) or state capital to compensate previous holders of capital acquired via historical political and economic repression.  With limited attention as to how they actually acquired it. 

Mnangagwa’s re-engagemgent strategy/approach, contrary to opposition disparagement is fundamentally about a re-engagement with global financialised capital in the contemporary. It is a commitment to what Piketty refers to as the ‘sacralisation of private property’ in protecting the idea that eventually, individual ownership of things within the context of the free market triumphs.  The elite desire for stability in order for private property to prosper becomes the sine qua non of all societies.  As opposed to revolution. And in this, societal inequality becomes justifiable in so far as it relates to the fundamental protection of private property by those who historically may have been unjust as long as they work in tandem with the contemporary wielders of power in its intellectual/political, military, propertied or religious formats.

The touted ‘irreversibility’ of the FTLRP is therefore essentially to lay claim to a nationalism that panders more to historical identity than it seeks organic social and economic transformation. And the key justification for this approach is evidently the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Section 295) which technically allows for white former commercial farmers to be compensated for ‘improvements’ to the land the lost under the FTLRP. 

Without a doubt, at some point within the proposed first payment period of twelve months the public debate on the GCD will become a bit more apparent. It will however be couched in the neo-liberal discourse that the ruling Zanu Pf party now prefers.  With an assumption of inevitability about it based on wanting Zimbabwe to be perceived as a ‘normal’ private property respecting country by global superpowers and hegemonic private capital. 

This also means historical and popular/populist assumptions of ‘race’ being an enabler of inequality will probably not go away in the short and long term in Zimbabwe.  Where GCD is presented by Mnangagwa as an economic necessity so too will other perceptions from within his own ruling party and others emerge as counter-narratives. But I guess the key will be the ability of the people of Zimbabwe to seek a more equitable society outside of the lenses of neo-liberalism and the ‘sacralisation of private property’.  And that is where the alternative will be found.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)