The Electoral Scramble for Zimbabwe's 60% Young Vote

 Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) chairperson, Justice Priscilla Chigumba recently made an important national announcement.  Speaking at a Parliamentary committee on Justice and Legal affairs organised meeting, she made it known that thus far in the Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) process of the 5 million plus number of registered voters, 60% of them are between the ages of 18 and 40 years. The significance of this figure may have been limited where it not for the fact that Zimbabwe, again according to ZEC, has harmonised elections scheduled  the months of July and August 2018.  

If one expected the mainstream media to go apoplectic with this officially announced statistic, it didn’t happen.  Across the state and the private media in Zimbabwe.  At least in the immediacy of Justice Chigumba’s statement.

Social media on the other hand went slightly haywire. And this is particularly with reference to users sympathetic to the mainstream opposition MDC-T and its informal offshoot, the MDC Alliance. They expressed their optimism in lieu of the new ascendancy, controversial as it may seem , of one of the appointed acting presidents of the same party, Nelson Chamisa. 

The ruling Zanu Pf side of social media was understandably somewhat muted.  Probably because shooting from the hip about age and political capacity may be a slightly vulnerable point for them.  At least on social media. 

In both respects, and no matter how much raving, ranting or muting that may occur on social media platforms, I am certain that the main political parties that will contest the 2018 harmonised elections, should they be serious about their political ambitions, are probably frenetically crunching the electoral numbers.  And this should be in at least three respects.

Firstly, they need to crosscheck their own numbers (membership lists and so on) against those that the biometric voter registration process has produced so far.  That is to say, on their membership and supporter estimates, how many young people of the same did they get to finally become registered voters? In this they must then cross check their own figures with those of ZEC.  By polling station, ward, district, province.  

Then after putting together their figures and again, by way of the mathematical calculus that is ‘probability’, measure the likely voter turnout in what they perceive to be their respective strongholds.  And after such a serious process, work on the figures they perceive they do not have in areas that they know are not their traditional strongholds.

I know its a hard ask especially of a divided but more significantly deliberately repressed Zimbabwean political opposition.  Whether it be in the form of newfound attempts at an ‘Alliance’ or as various splinter or new parties. 

For the ruling Zanu Pf party, it’s an easier ask.  Mainly because it is a ruling party, an incumbent.  Even after a ‘coup-not- a –coup’ in November 2017.  It however has to contend with queries as to who mobilized the voter registration process in its own rural strongholds. And whether it can claim these new registered young voters did so as mobilised by the party or as a result of its own factionalism. And in the latter, which faction in or out of power can persuade them to vote for the party in its own perceived traditional strongholds. 

The second key consideration for political parties in the 2018 harmonised election is the fact that they have to think about the social aspects of the 60% young voter demographic.  Who exactly are these young people?  What do they do? Where and why? What is their gender?Where they understand this, they then fashion out policies that relate to solving problems that these young voters face in aide of giving democratic value to their campaign requests for support from these young voters. 

Should the political parties  hunker down to these key questions, they will find that a majority of young Zimbabweans are looking to survive.  Not only by way of subsistence (vendors, kombi drivers) but on a more ambitious, desired lifestyle basis (money-changers, car-dealers, informal wholesale suppliers, tobacco farmers, ranchers, urban transport/kombi owners). In their wildest dreams they want the materialistic lifestyle that benefactors can offer them.  

Or they want to be left in political patronage ‘peace’ to get there via the many patronage, religious and other networks that they are invariably part of.  

The third and final consideration is that of not forgetting the 40% by ostracising it in favour of the young voter.  This is particularly because in most instances the 40% remains decisive in ‘political’ opinion leadership and where it concerns the rural vote is in the great majority of socio-economic leadership positions (chiefs, headmen, teachers, businessmen, and clergy). But more importantly, there is no single political party that can win a majority of the 60% young voters. They will require significant chunks of both the 40% and 60% to win the presidency and have a majority in parliament. 

And even if ZEC’s final figures reduce the proportion of young voters to older ones, it will not be far from its initial registered young voters count of 60%.  Given our political realities that 60% alone will not win it for a singular party. But any serious political party will know that it has its work cut out to get a majority of these registered young voters on their side.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

The Emerging Supremacy of the Political Party in Southern Africa

By Takura Zhangazha*

Southern Africa is politically unique on the continent.  A majority of its countries underwent anti-colonial liberation struggles or directly assisted those that did so.  This also meant that these liberation struggles had a direct effect on the regions peoples and continues to do so to this day.

And this influence is purveyed through former liberation movements and parties that have retained state power in the post-independence and post-colonial era. 

Of significance these parties are the Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the African National Congress (South Africa), Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Tanzania), Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo), the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), South Western African Peoples Organisation (Namibia) and the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (Zanu PF).  Other parties such as the Patriotic Front of Zambia also claim to be offshoots of former liberation movements. 

Over the years these parties have fortified their political hold on their respective countries and the region through formal and informal regional bodies as actions of solidarity.  The most formal of these regional bodies is the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which in the beginning was the Frontline States (again a bloc established to further the liberation struggle cause in the in regional and to counter apartheid South Africa’s regional dominance).

It has generally looked out for its own in relation to how the region formerly interacts with the rest of the continent and the world. And in this, it retinas a relatively strong liberation struggle solidarity and value system.  Hence it has peculiarly found ways to prevent direct innervation in Zimbabwe during Mugabe’s last twenty years in power.

The more informal side to these ruling parties and former liberation movements is that they have regular meetings based on who they define themselves as. And there was an intention to set up a liberation struggle institute for the region which at some point former South African president announced in one of his state of the nation addresses.

I have illustrated the formal and informal elements to these regional former liberation movements cum ruling parties because of tow key developments.  The first being their acceptance of the resignation/removal of Mugabe from power in Zimbabwe and the resignation of Jacob Zuma in South Africa. Both of which appeared to be against both leaders' wishes.

One thing that these parties now appear to have embraced is a template that ensures that there is a regular change of party leadership.  There now appears to be an aversion albeit reluctantly and in controversial circumstances to long duree leadership of the party.  In this, the probable new dictum is that the party is supreme. And that it is the party that is in power, not the individual at its helm.   

Further to this, there is a resurgence in some parties of the narrative of ‘veterans’ of the struggle being the close equivalent to custodians of the party and ‘revolutionary’ history.  And this is a key element for now with almost every other leader having either been in the liberation struggle or very close to those that were/are its iconic figures.

But this does not mean that these parties are preoccupied with the past.  It is primarily an internal legitimation process that also helps them to establish some sort of power hierarchy to determine who is next in line for leadership. 

Externally the attempt popular appeal through government programmes that either lead to patronage or allow them to be viewed in good light by the international community.  On the latter point, they appear to have agreed on neo-liberalism as their economic selling point.  And they are willing to utilise their political power collectively to make it a regional reality. But also to ensure that their political policies at home are not over scrutinised by global capital and its parent powerful governments.  Essentially their angle is to present to global capital the Southern African region and its peoples as a ‘market’.     

In all of this, the parties that are ruling and also former liberation movements are intent on being hegemonic, at least politically.  They are working with younger politicians to ensure continuity to their long rule and ensure that while opposition to them may exist, it will hardly be strong enough to challenge them for power. 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Countering Neoliberalism by Embracing Contextual Social Democracy In Zimbabwe

By Takura Zhangazha*

A friend once vehemently argued that neoliberalism was good.  This was at an afternoon lunch with other activists where I had made what I thought were fair points on the new importance of what I referred to as contextual social democracy.  Both as an ideological mechanism of understanding the current challenges Zimbabwe faces  as well as a key pointer as to the nature of a preferable people driven and democratic state.

What I however did not immediately discern was that my friend had used the ‘liberal’ part of ‘neo-liberal’ in relation to arguments about human rights.  That is, his assumption was that as long as there was the word ‘liberal’ it related to human rights, a subject that was very close to his heart. 

And its not my friend alone.  It is a general and probably somewhat genuine mistake a lot of people make.  At least in Zimbabwe where they conflate issues to do with political ‘liberty’ and economic neo-liberalism. 

It however helps to put issues into perspective. The first being that liberalism is indeed about the individual.  And their rights to exactly that, being individuals.  In Eurocentric narrative, it means that the individual is always wary of the role of the state. And how it affects their (very) individual well being.  So liberals are generally skeptical of the state in respect of their rights.  As individuals. 

But this does not end in the sphere of political or civil liberties.  It also extends to the socio-economic sphere where liberalism then refers to how individuals must be allowed to undertake economic activities with limited interference from the state.  In this, the ‘free market’ becomes supreme and the state must retreat. 

It is closely tied to capitalism and regrettably in our African context tied to repressive political orders where certain rights were more significant than others in pursuit of profit/happiness.  Hence the slave-trade, colonialism and neo-colonialism. 

So when we discuss 'neo-liberalism' in our own African context, we need to understand that the concept is as political as it is economic.

Political in relation to its philosophical underpinnings of the democratic rights of the individual.  Economic in so far as it has become part of a hegemonic discourse that not only protects but also promotes global capitalism and its attendant free market (liberal) economics.

As we fought it during our own liberation struggles and our post independence struggles against poverty and (comparative) underdevelopment.

But if I revert back to my colleague and his (with respect) simplistic understanding of neo-liberalism, there are broader perceptions or lack of them that relate to the same political-economic concept.  Because we are so enamoured with an admiration of individual success that comes with assumed individual effort, we are prisoners of a false and non-contextual consciousness. (Ditto our new found popular and alarmingly superstitious religiosity.)

My colleague's acceptance of neo-liberalism as a progressive ideological pretext to resolve Zimbabwe's ( Africa's) economic problems essentially point to a trapped consciousness that does not intend to think outside of the postgraduate university qualification, economic conference and a ubiquitous consumarist lifestyle television/ social media output.

In itself that is not a bad thing.  The only problem is that when it comes to leading public opinion makers (such as my friend), it has a tendency to muddy the waters of a necessary search for progressive social democratic consciousness.

The rhetorical question that is asked by those that would accept neo-liberalism not only as an ideology but a way of life is what is the alternative?

In our Zimbabwean and African context, the alternatives are limited due to (again) the global hegemony that neo-liberalism has become.  Especially as maintained by global capital(ism).

But they exist and there is one key one that would take into account both the historical social and economic injustice that was colonialism and also the contemporary socio-economic challenges of our post independence polity.

I refer to it as contextual social democracy. That is an ideological framework whose characteristics are the organic intention to establish a social welfare state that respects human/individual rights but embraces a purposive belief of giving every Zimbabwean a fair start in life.  The latter would be an access to social and enabling services such as health, education, transport/communications, water, land and energy.  Such a fair start then enables the broader  pursuit of innovation that does not undermine the broader public interest in its democratic economic and political form.

At its heart is a people-centered understanding of our common humanity and equality.  And a society in which receiving medical treatment, going to school/university, moving from point A to B, talking on the telephone/internet and owning basic housingor turning on the tap for water is not viewed as the privilege of the few. But the rights of the many.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Saving the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC)

By Takura Zhangazha*

The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) is a public asset. Initially moulded along the same sort of lines as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) as the then Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation (RBC) it sought to serve the news and entertainment interests of a white minority.  These latter interests took on a propagandist tone during the war of liberation. When the struggle against settler colonialism ended our new liberators decided to prioritise the propagandist elements that they had seen with the then RBC. 

And they have never looked back. ZBC has had many things done to it since independence.  It has been commercialised, left for broke (amid allegations of corruption) and above all else, made to abandon any pretences at being a public service broadcaster.  Its role, as defined by those that have been in charge of government and the state owned media has been to prop up the ruling party at all costs. 

This is despite numerous advocacy and activist attempts to change its role from being a state propaganda outlet to being one that serves the broadest democratic public interest. 

Such attempts even led to a court challenge by Bernard Wekare and Musangano Lodge as to the constitutionality of a mandatory payment of license fees.  While the court challenge ruled in favour of the state broadcaster (yes its compulsory, at law, to pay ZBC license fees) it was a judgement that made and still makes it more urgent that it’s management and purpose be democratised.

But that did not happen in the Mugabe era. Instead ZBC became more embedded in the urling party’s factional fights and its electoral campaigns that specifically sought to malign the mainstream opposition. In this, ZBC became more apolitical broadcaster than it sought to provide public interest balanced and fair information/news or entertainment.

In the aftermath of the military intervention/coup it would appear ZBC has also not changed.  Or that there are no quick intentions to do so on the part of the ‘new’ administration. 

The only sign of potential change as indicated by the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Media, Information and Broadcasting Services, George Charamba, is to bring in new players into the television broadcasting sector.  In early January 2018 he was quoted in the local media saying, ‘In a matter of months from now, I'll be dealing with licenses for new TV stations, such that this whole fascination with ZBC with cease to matter, to ensure the playing field is level".

The reality of the matter is that Zimbabweans are correct to be ‘fascinated’ with ZBC.  Not just because they must pay licences for it a t law but more significantly because its role is not akin to would be private and for profit television stations that are now set to be licensed.

The public service role of ZBC-TV should not be sublimated with profit motivated or market driven arguments. Especially before it has been changed from a state/ propagandist broadcaster into a democratic public service one.  

We have witnessed what has happened with the licensing of free to air radio stations that now compete with those run by ZBC.  The news content and angles is largely restricted to target audience entertainment and little time is committed to either investigative news or content that does not push the numbers and the profit margin. 

The evident intention of government is to make television commercial and to fundamentally treat the media as a business.  And in this it is increasingly evident that those poised for private television station licenses are already in other forms of broadcast and print media.  For example the Zimbabwe Newspapers Group (Zimpapers) already owns other radio stations such as Star FM (national free to air) and Diamond FM  (local commercial). 

Private players in the media also intend to do the same or have at least tried to do so.  AB Communications the proprietors of ZiFM national radio have not hidden their intentions to go into television as well.

What all of these manoeuvres by already established media companies’  and government's policy thrust point to is an emerging elite (and political) consensus on sharing media market spoils and creating media monopolies that are never in direct contradiction to the political wishes of government as the regulator.  It is also an undemocratic consensus of would be and existent media oligarchs in Zimbabwe.

In order to do this, they intend to get away with the democratic media value that is public service broadcasting.  Banking on a clear lack of popularity of ZBC, they would have us believe that their intentions to subject it to direct competition will improve it. This is a regrettable case of powerful persons being dishonest to the public. 

ZBC needs a radical transformation from within. It needs to embrace the democratic values of a public service broadcaster.  These values would include a democratic and transparent public service broadcasting charter, a legal and political guarantee to its editorial independence and maximum public accountability for its state and license fee funding. 

    

To put it out to the wolves is to commercialise and privatise the public interest dimension of news and entertainment.  It is also to seek to stave off responsibility for biased political content on our airwaves with the obnoxious reply, ‘its what the market wants’. A phrase that already is oft used in mainstream print media to the great detriment of independent, ethical and professional journalism. 

We already know that ZBC is coming from a bad place. And that the public’s trust in it, let alone its ability to get that trust beyond political partisanship, is a difficult ask.  But we cannot throw out the baby with the bathwater.  Transforming ZBC into a true public service broadcaster will not only help Zimbabweans remain true to themselves but will help deliver public interest information and entertainment for all sectors of our society regardless of class, gender and age.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)