Commodity Fetishism/Politics: An (Dis)Honest Closure to Zimbabwe’s 2018.

By Takura Zhangazha*

Over the Christmas break, while travelling, I had to crosscheck the Marxian term ‘commodity fetishism’.  That is mainly in our Zimbabwean contextual ‘intrinsic’ valuation of specific goods/commodities –in their post-production and availability or a lack thereof to consumers. And in part how this contributes to defining our political, economic and social behavior.   

This was because mainstream and social media were agog with stories of how there were shortages of all things associated with a ‘happy Christmas’.  Or the lack of it.  These ‘things’ included fuel, Coca-Cola, local beer and the happiness associated with them.  And as is generally said in this part of the African continent, ‘the struggle is real’ in attempts to secure these commodities and the possessive personal satisfaction they can bring.  Even if we, as majority and mere consumers are not in control of their means of production.

If you have a personal vehicle, access to fuel was and still is a personal hassle.  Especially the fuel that you get at the local currency (bond note, mobile money or bank transfer) rates.  The queues at petrol stations were and still are a pain to experience especially if one is on a journey to a rural home or touristy holiday destination.  Where the fuel was available, albeit briefly, the likelihood of you getting to the pump after a long stint in a queue was limited.  Even if there were a few cars ahead.  This was mainly because there were the ‘special ones’ that could always get more than they need for their local or long journey use.  From touts to parallel market fuel dealers, the fuel was and is a profitable bargain.   They purchase it at what is clearly a locally discounted rate in large quantities, store it and wait for those desperate enough to be willing to pay for it in United States Dollars (US$).  Or at triple the pump price in local currency. 

For the other Christmas ‘happiness’ commodities such as Coca Cola and local beer, the prices fluctuated depending on the supply or supplier.  And it turns out if you had local currency as with fuel you may have had to pay double or triple the price to get your family’s drinks of choice. 

In all of this there are those that made a phenomenal profit.  Even in fuel queues the joke was that if you check out those who had the jerry-cans and drums, they would be be able to buy up market residential stands by the end of January 2019.  (It is now being reported that some of the fuel dealers are being arrested). 

But back to commodity fetishism.  The value of the Christmas happiness goods (fuel, drinks, clothes) was reflective of a national tradition about how the year should always end on a high note. Almost also as a carry over to how (black) labour and capital would define its relationship in terms of national happiness both in colonial and post-colonial/independent Zimbabwe.   With a possible summary statement being ‘If we don’t (nationally) get the happiness we always get at the end of the year, then things are not going well. Especially if government and private capital do not deliver or if the former does not enable the latter!’ 

I know that the public perception may not be as complex as the preceding statement.  The point however is that it helps explain the general public disappointment and pessimism.  Together with a curiosity of what underlies our culture of consumption as the equivalent of happiness. 

In abstract conversations with comrades, discussions on this particular matter have tended toward explaining our national social (political and economic) culture as increasingly self-centered or individualistic.  And also very much nostalgic of what would be perceived to have the ‘good times’ which regrettably do not exclude colonial Christmas time experiences.

 

The key emerging issue is that the Zimbabwean government’s approach to the national economy is failing to meet these expectations which are historically and popularly perceived or appreciated.  Not that it ever can, given the ‘policy’ fact that it has chosen a ‘free market’ approach to these matters, a market which for now is not (and will not be) delivering as popularly expected.  For some reason best known to itself the state assumes that with all this ‘pain’ there shall be ‘gain’.  Something that can only be qualified as an ahistorical truism.

But private capital also comes into the fray.  Despite US$ subsidization by government (queue to the Reserve Bank for US$ anyone?) big and informal business is failing to pay adequate homage to the ‘free’ market by profiteering and creating narratives that aver from the favours it is getting from the state.  All mainly based on the unofficial currency exchange rate and waiting upon the implementation of further fiscal reforms beginning January 2019.  As far as private capital is concerned, profit is profit and opportunity is exactly that, opportunity.  Never mind issues of business ethics as they do not relate to profiteering rackets. 

Again if the Leninist question of ‘what is to be done’ emerges as it should, the key issues are about countering an increasingly entrenched Zimbabwean individualism that looks at self-actualization as occurring in isolation as opposed to being part of the national collective.  Even if the year 2018 was one of national anger/high emotions, we will always need to take a step back and remember that worshiping commodities/ consumerism will not solve our national problems.  Neither will a neo-liberal government that pretends to be concerned about peoples’ welfare and yet focuses on the free market with abysmal failure, even by their own standards.   

What is required is a more contextual, structural approach to the national economy.  One that ensures that the role of the state is not subsumed by the vagaries of a rampant profiteering and an informal ‘free market’. 

And also that, in the final analysis, Zimbabwe requires its own solid national currency.  Even if popular perception and political mistrust gives greater value to the US$ as is the global norm.  Except that our problem is that we use it as if it’s our own. 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his own personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Zims' 2018: A Year in Which Anger was Never Going to be Enough.

By Takura Zhangazha*

At some point almost every adult Zimbabwean could easily be defined as being angry in the year 2018.  And all for different reasons. A majority of us were apoplectic about the state of the national political economy as accompanied by the promises of Mnangagwa’s ‘new dispensation’.  Not that expectations were that high.  It was more to do with promises made, and promises that were clearly going to be difficult to meet.  All accompanied by populist electioneering in the aftermath of the death of the main opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai.  And a very serious intention at retention of political power by the ruling Zanu Pf party despite having ousted its long serving leader Robert Mugabe.

So the anger remained fundamentally political in character.  There were those that were angry at the ruling establishment and its failure to work miracles with the economy or its financial component of the United States dollar (US$) versus the local bond note.  There were those that were angry with opposition leaders for not subsequently recognizing the electoral result. Others too were angry at Robert Mugabe for capitulating to the ‘coup-not-a-coup’ of November 2017 or for endorsing the main opposition’s presidential candidate. After the July elections there were to be those that were angry at the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) for allegedly ‘rigging’ the election, anger which also got transferred to the constitutional court for arriving at a judgement that kept Zanu Pf in complete power.

It should have ended there but it didn’t.  The anger continued  in the post electoral period with the Monthlante Commission of Inquiry into the August shootings in Harare becoming a central purveyor of such politicized frustration and a search for carthasis.  Not only by way of its public hearings but also its recent final report and recommendations. 

Even then the national political economy did not change for the better and the national anger escalated as a result of a new monetary policy as introduced by the ministry of finance.  The steep rise in prices and shortage of basic commodities caused by astronomical unofficial exchange rates with the US$ had a lot of people in national panic mood. The hoarding of basic commodities by those who could afford them and the withdrawal of regular production cycles by private manufacturers did not help matters.

Not surprisingly Mnangagwa’s government did not and has not shown signs reflective of the national panic, let alone anger.  Instead it has all the while kept insisting that if there is no ‘national’ pain, there will be no ‘national’ gain.  And they insist on ‘austerity’ i.e. the free market/neoliberalism as the only solution to the chronic challenges that the national political economy is faced with.  This means there is method to their proverbial ‘madness’.  

It is essentially the equivalent of ‘shock economic therapy/ shock doctrine ’ where government works closely with willing and in search for massive profit private capital to reinvent a national political economy in keeping with free market principles and values such as privatization and limiting the role of the state. And for this they have the support of local and more significantly components of global private capital. All with the intention of ensuring that Zimbabweans get used to this way and become individually more competitive with a national consciousness that no longer values the role of the state as the primary guarantor of citizens’ social and economic rights.

Given this determination by state and private capital to embrace elite motivated neoliberalism it is important to emphasise that anger or claims at youthfulness was/is never going to be enough. It may help in bringing people affected by similar emotions together but without a structured alternative to counter the neoliberalism the anger will only serve a cathartic role.  Or give the impression of momentum that with hindsight will be viewed as performance politics/activism.   Both of which tend to be more ephemeral than organically long term. Or where people become enamoured to increasingly superstitious and materialistic religiosity/livelihoods that is always on the lookout for the next messianic figure or big gamble paying off (crosscheck millennial capitalism)   

So the political year that was 2018 was a national emotional roller coaster.  No matter which side of the political divide one found themselves in.  And depending on political loyalties accompanied by an initial assumption that the governments ‘ease of doing business’ may temporarily pay off or fail, 2019 is likely to remain another highly emotional national year. Especially for a majority of poor Zimbabweans who will still be subjected to multi-tier commodity pricing, the emergence of a new ‘informal’ currency and the vagaries of privatizing social services.

Except that the anger may not just be with the state and private capital’s unholy partnership(s) but the entirety of the structure of the neoliberal and free market ideological framework being used as a solution to addressing the problems with the national political economy.  For this challenge to the under construction neoliberal hegemony (as orchestrated by the state and private capital) to have greater success new alternatives, not just as of the traditional conservatism versus socialism/social democracy but more people centered and contextual ones.  Or those that understand even more global dynamics at play but remain grounded in realities that place people at the centre of their proposed solutions.  Over and above a desire for recognition for challenging the ruling establishment(s) only to pursue the exact same regressive neoliberal economic policies.  Here’s to wishing cdes a happier 2019.  Optimism is key.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

US$8 million for Zanu Pf and MDC Alliance: An Annual Sharing of State Electoral Spoils.

By Takura Zhangazha*

Understanding the raw political ambitions of individual Zimbabweans is a complex exercise.  One that is full of familiar dictum's/accusations such as they want ‘power for power’s sake’ or ‘they are in it for the money’.  On the rare occasion comments about how certain political leaders ‘mean well’ in their pursuit of political power. Or that at least they are ‘one of our own’ and the now ominously familiar, ‘they have liberation war credentials’. 

These individuals invariably join/form political parties to better enable their intentions at some form of power.   The parties that they form or are a part of are also queried as to their intentions with power.  In the case of the ruling party the general accusation is that even if they may have been all about liberation, their long rule has made them appear to be all about self aggrandizement.  With the main opposition the occasional accusation is that they are also in it for the perks but also, luckily for them,  they would still be perceived to be the metaphorical ‘better devil’. 

The prevalent view it would appear is that politics and political ambition are linked to some sort of benefit(s) from the state.  And that whatever happens at the top of the political ladder, lower level leaders and supporters get some piece of the pie.  This would also be known as political patronage. 

What has been interesting has been the legal role that the state is obliged to play in support of those that would publicly be perceived as only motivated by milking from it. 

This week the ministry of finance and economic development announced that it has allocated a total of US$ 8 million (lets not argue about currency here as I am certain they all have ‘nostro’ accounts) to the ministry of justice for distribution to the political parties that are in parliament.  This is done periodically in terms of the Political Parties (Finance) Act.  In this act, each political party that got at least 5% of the total votes cast for its members in the last general election shall be entitled to an equivalent percentage of the total money allocated to political parties in each financial year.

So the ruling Zanu Pf party is going to get at least US$6million and the opposition MDC Alliance is certain to get US2 million.  At least according to the ministry of justice permanent secretary Virginia Mabhiza. 

The act does not advise political parties what the money is to be used for.  It is entirely at their discretion save for when the relevant minister issues out regulations as to how these monies are to be accounted for.  And as far as I recall, these regulations are yet to be publicized.  Nor has any minster of justice previously tried to make it an accountability issue beyond accusations of foreign funding which incidentally is not quite disallowed. 

The long and short this act is that apart from other motivations such as getting actual executive power (the presidency) in terms of current Zimbabwean law, there is definitely money to be made by running as a political party, for parliamentary office. All you have to do is to get at least 5 percent of the total vote count for candidates in the National Assembly (which also entails actually wining some first-past the post seats/ constituencies).  And as it turns out, it can be a lot of money just for your party (and as controlled by the party leadership). 

This would not always be a bad thing if it was clearer as to what the money was being used for.  Preferably this state funding  would be intended to help political parties strengthen their internal democratic processes and represent their constituencies better. Even if its not stipulated in the relevant act or in existent supporting regulations. 

In reality, experience shows us that these monies are largely unaccounted for and tend to be under the direct control of political party leadership. 

This would probably explain why the public may be skeptical of such state funding arrangements for political parties in a time when government is talking about ‘austerity’ (unpopular as it is).  Moreso given the amount the ruling party is being allocated.

This state funding of political parties has not promoted internal party democracy, a national democratic culture or seen a flourishing of issue based politics.   And that is why the Political Parties (Finance) Act must be amended to include in its parameters how state funding is intended to contribute to the enhancement of intra party democracy, public accountability and issue based political practices.  This should be done in tandem with removing/reforming the constitutional clauses that allow political party leaders to dismiss MPs without due procedure. 

Zanu Pf and MDC Alliance would probably not agree with the above proposition for a number of reasons.  The utmost being that it would limit their ability to practice political patronage over parliament.  It would also seek to make them more intra democratic and as a consequence contribute to a better national democratic consciousness that sees beyond just our five year electoral contests. 

Smaller opposition parties may also be wary of such reforms because they would feel that they would never have a chance of winning against parties that receive state funding.  A gentle reminder to them would be that at least in its beginning the MDC (as then called) did not receive such funding and gave Zanu Pf more than just ‘a run for the money’. 

Civil society organizations that work on elections, democracy, accountability and human rights would be advised to take this up more concertedly.  Because this might be an opportunity to help direct our national democratic consciousness into less personalized and more institutionalized understandings of a people centered polity.   

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot

Zanu Pf's New Arrogance, Not Expecting a Fall.

By Takura Zhangazha*

It is worth repeating until enlightenment. Zimbabwe’s current government is keenly intent on neoliberalism.  And it is increasingly arrogant about it. Note the language of the minister of finance Mthuli Ncube on CNN talking about how ‘Zimbabwe is Africa’s best buy’.  Or alternatively the acting minster of public services, labour and social welfare, Kazembe reading out a statement threatening ‘politcal’ NGOs with bans just after a cabinet meeting.   Or when the ruling Zanu Pf’s party war veterans and women’s wings almost casually announce an intention to raise the minimum presidential age limit from 40 years to 52.

Even when motorists are stuck for long periods at a time in fuel queues, the government has not panicked.  They believe in the market even though they are quite literally bailing out a number of private suppliers by giving them priority access to US$.  (Yes that’s austerity for you, ‘ringfencing private capital’ while praising the ‘free market and deliberately passing on escalating living costs to the poor). 

And expect more of this arrogance as Zanu Pf holds its annual 2018 conference to demonstrate not  only a firm grip on power but commit itself internally and externally to neoliberalism.

It is this commitment that has many opponents to Zanu Pf in happy denial that it can pull it off.  And their most favourite saying is that ‘you cant rig the economy’.  The latter being a fair point if you too like the Zanu Pf leaders are a believer in ‘free market’ economics.  

Those that support this ‘free market’ economic template both from an ideologically informed bias or just a perusal reading of motivational books on ‘how to get rich quickly’ do not think the market will respond in Zanu Pf’s favour.  The only setback to their hope is that private capital appears to be favouring this neoliberal policy fundamentalism of the ruling party.  Not for political reasons in the strictest of senses but in order not to miss an opportunity of a government that is essentially placing state/public capital on the global auction floor, i.e to the highest and risk averse bidder. 

So directly political questions of the governments legitimacy are of limited domestic consequence.  And by domestic I mean both in country as well as on the African continent and to the global east. It becomes a dangerous combination of private capital and a colluding state political leadership that once it sees that the myth of ‘there is no alternative’ is publicly accepted, then they can quite literally weather any other political storm. Especially if its one that comes in-between elections.  And that once done, they can have the establishment of a very real 'revolving door' between the state personnel and owners of private capital.  

While their presidents new found maxim of ‘no pain, no gain’ is being only painfully felt by many Zimbabweans, their aim with it is to assuage private capital that they will not abandon ‘austerity’.  And this includes ensuring that there’s a newfound commitment to private capital and protecting its private property rights while allowing it a regular look-in as to what to nitpick from state capital via privatization.

And this is what is fortifying Zanu Pf.  An assumption that if they follow the dictates of private capital or the free market, at least at macro-economic policy levels, then they will stay their own version of a political course.  The only catch is that the pain element may also occasionally extend beyond the economic and back to the political if they meet organic and people centered resistance to the neoliberal economic order that they want to fortify in Zimbabwe. 

The much more difficult proposition as to how to challenge this under construction hegemonic project.  Backed as it is by global capital. The suggestions are many but the actions of those that would be in opposition and challenging for state power need to be clearer on how they are an organic ( ideologically grounded to the left, people centred and intra/internally democratic)  alternative to the ruling Zanu Pf establishment. 

And this fact must regrettably be repeated because not only is it relevant but it would be currently the only alternative to counter the abstract and ahistorical rhetoric of there’s no alternative except to cozy up to global capital. Even if for now the national consciousness is currently crippled by personality driven political awareness and an urgent concern for the immediate.  The latter being even still crippled by the inverse relationship between incomes and lifestyle (expectations).

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Africa and Assumptions of Global Homogeneity as Equality.

By Takura Zhangazha*

There was a Global Citizens’ Festival in Johannesburg, South Africa this week.  At the recommendation of my wife I watched a decent chunk of it on television.  A number of the big stars of the North American entertainment industry pitched up and performed very well.  All with a lot of support from the thousands of their, quite literally, screaming young South African fans. 

Apart from the fundraising for charity and very evident entertainment value of the concert there were also a number of speeches and a number of slogans in remembrance of the iconic Nelson Mandela.  And I mean the more globally preferred Mandela in this instance.  As opposed to the one that went on to defend his and the still ruling African National Congress’ relationship with Fidel Castro, Muammar Gadhafi as individual leaders and also other ‘pariah’ governments that had contributed significantly to not only the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa but the liberation struggles of the African continent.

What was striking about this concert was how it was as popular as it would be reflective of those that attended or watched it aspirations of what it would mean to be a ‘global’ citizen.  

The South African president Cyril Ramaphosa had to be cautious about the length of his speech because he was delaying the arrival of ‘Queen Beyonce’.  

The inimitable TV screen ‘queen’ Oprah Winfrey also appeared to be cognizant of the fact that she was not the main attraction even if she is sponsoring charitable schools in South Africa (or elsewhere).  And our very own returning ‘son of the soil’ Trevor Noah in his The Daily Show comedy series went on to do the equivalent of a ‘rags to riches’ story by showcasing his grandmother.

Billionaire (by global standards) Patrice Motsepe also took the opportunity to wade into the land reform debate in South Africa with a pledge to fund what would, for now, turn out to be a peaceful and orderly  processes around land re-appropriation. 

And there are many ways to try and bell the cat.  Or at least capture the audience and popular imagination.  Brilliant as the Global Citizens’ initiative may have been to many, there are issues that should raise many an Africans eyebrows. 

These are not many but they remain consciously important, even outside of the entertainment and goodwill gestures of those that would perform for us.

The first being that we, as Africans, have to contend with the reality that a lot of our young people greatly (popularly) appreciated seeing international artistes perform.  If only to reaffirm how we aspire to be as successful/rich as they (artistes) are and to command the attendant attention. 

 And that in a Gramscian cultural/‘hegemonic’ sense we are the sum total of these same said aspirations. To be ‘global citizens’ as envisioned and valued by those in the global north.  Or to wish that one day we can be Beyonces or Jay Z’s while knowing full well that it is not possible. At least in our lifetimes. Even if we tried, it would never be allowed to happen without the consent of global capital and its geographical epicenters as we colonially remember them.  This is a perception/feeling I thoroughly fret about but also realize I/we are relatively powerless, for now, over.  (It is really hard to counter the medium in favour of the message in the global south).  Suffice to say, unless the Ushers, Beyonces’ , Farells’, Coldplays’ and others become more familiar or similar to the rest of us we will always be in awe of them.  Barring a global scandal of sorts.

The latter point would bring me back to the title of my blog.  The import of the Global Citizens concert must be reviewed in its cultural hegemony aspects. That is to say, it does not come on its own but with a serious focus on demonstrating to many what is a globally dominant culture. One that reflects the axis of of capital, culture and intentions of demonstrating superiority. We can only be equal if we are to all intents and purposes similar or suit what is palatable to the global north.  

I would hazard to argue,  much to the happiness of those that would want to keep the global south in its place, that acts of kindness toward the African continent and its people would essentially be a ‘throwback’ to colonial dominance and an attempt to remake the African in the image of the ‘modern other’.  Hence the titular phrase, in this blog, of assumptions of ‘homogeneity as equality’. 

The angst that many an academic/activist on Africa and African studies would face is that of answering the Obamanian question of human  ‘universality’.  That is, a universality of human rights and the acceptance of the global world order. One that embraces the very fact of the United Nations as a global human equality arbiter as the forbearers of what would be African liberation and independence such as Amilcar Cabral originally imagined.  

The cold reality of the matter is that, despite the fact of Africa’s history of complicity in its own exploitation, it does not have to fawn at the altar of neoliberalism and neocolonialism. 

The advent of the radical ‘fortress’ nationalism of the global north means we are probably back to where we started from.  At least from an African perspective.  Except that this time it is not as political but more economic. 

It is broadly anticipated by the global north that we, as Africans, will accept, especially with governments as desperate as my own (Zimbabwe), neoliberalism as an economic panacea to the problems that we face without argumentation/agency and in return for either retention or ascension to political power. 

The intention is not so much to shock us into acceptance of a false ‘end of history’ but to argue that we, as Africans, need the equivalent of 'hand holding' in order to be able to make our own history in these ‘internet enabled’ globalized/modern times.  

This being a reason why most African governments will not argue with the IMF and the World Bank about what (in Leninist terms) is to be done about the state and African economic revolution .  Or why African leaders continue to mimic the troubled European Union model of regional economic (free market) integration at a time we should be following the ideological footsteps of those that founded the Organization of African Union (OAU),

In part, this explains why and how in Zimbabwe, at the moment, we are undergoing ‘shock therapy’ about our national economic policies.  The intention of the government is to shock us into acceptance of the supremacy of the ‘free market’.  No matter how many times promises to guarantee the supply of foreign currency to the petroleum services sector.   

What is evermore apparent is that we, as Africans,  are on the lower rungs of the global economic order.  Not just by way of assumed right but by way of better knowledge production systems and a more contextual global historical narrative.   Our strength however remains our ability to struggle. 

But we must learn to re-talk back. Negotiate better and demonstrate a better contextual understanding of where we were, are and where we can be.  In our own reality and our own imagination.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his own personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Examining Zim’s Shortening Attention Span. From the Library to Social Media.

By Takura Zhangazha*

In recent conversations with some colleagues, we reminisced about libraries.  Especially those libraries that if you grew up in urban Zimbabwe would be close to a local district or post office.  And where you had to get your parents consent and joining fee money to become a young member.  These libraries tended to have two uses, at that time (in the 90s).  Because we didn’t have 24 hour tv (if you had a TV in the first place) or mobile telephony let alone the internet.  The libraries tended to serve at least three basic functions.  They were safe spaces for reading school textbooks or secondly, socializing (we would play football or just hang about us friends afterwards). 

The third aspect about the libraries and their function was that they were also about enhancing one’s creativity or at least one’s ability to think outside of the school textbook/examination box.  That is if one wanted to do so.  My method was to read the books that were not in the school syllabus.  That is how one tended to encounter more African writers or wider thoughts on what I didn’t know to be either philosophy or political-economy.  

The encounters with those books and their ideas went on to help me have a more systemic approach to then personal challenges as well as seek to understand why Zimbabwean society was structured the way it was.  In this, my attention span when trying to review certain events or issues as they emerged (for example the advent of the mobile phone and its then ridiculous costs and new lifestyle import). 

And then there was the internet.  By that time we were already at university and were hearing of ‘email’, ‘yahoo’, Microsoft and ‘websites’. 

All capped up with something that we didn’t understand that was to be called ‘Y2K’ and how it posed a threat to worldwide communications.  The library and more systematic attention spans on issues was beginning to get wobbly for many of us.  Books, especially for the purposes of a critical consciousness, were no longer the ‘in-thing’.  The world wide web was.  Even if one had wait for the connect sound of the dial up internet on a cumbersome and blinking screen of what was referred to as the ‘personal computer’. 

The rest is history.  The mobile phone and the internet with its now almost but inevitably ubiquitous social media component now rule our national and personal attention spans.  And it’s not a bad thing.  It can just get a little problematic in relation to seeking out the bigger picture (any bigger picture of your choice- be it personal, political or social).  This is because it is generally designed for us to consume as much new content as possible (again be it personal or otherwise).  And as social media generally occurs in the immediate it holds your attention for an effective short period so you move on to the next thing or it can create it for you even if it’s not there.  While helping you finding or confirming what exactly you prefer to hear/see/ or read (even if briefly). 

In doing the latter however social media can make you question less and conform more.  Or it can create a homogeneity of thought and opinion that resonates with feelings/emotions than it would with assumption of systematic rationality. As would for example a book like Fanon’s ‘Wretched of the Earth’. In the process it becomes a mixture of anger, angst and intuitive action.  Or just simply entertainment (in both its enjoyable moments or occupation of (brief) time perspective).

This however does not mean our shortened attention spans are not responding to given realities and real time events as they occur.  Social media is just helping with interpreting this reality, at speed. And in this we may sometimes, again, miss the bigger picture let alone motivation for such interpretation of the said reality.  Hence in our political and economic real context, most of us have become more impulsive and perpetually in search of an urgency and agency that culminates in (brief) personal but at the same time collective ‘catharsis’.

Going forward we may need to understand, as some colleagues in the global north are beginning to, that the medium is not the message.  Or it does not to be.  And on this, I almost always joke with young colleagues and cdes that I interact with by asking what is the first thing they look for in the morning when they wake up?  In good humour the answer is almost always, ‘my phone and the messages I have received, if I actually slept at all without it’.  Almost as though their mobile phones are essential parts of their bodies or at least similar to necessary bodily functions. 

The key issue however is to use the medium to enhance our ability to understand our society better. And not just social media but the internet as a whole.  Or as I began this particular write up, with an appreciation of the systematic and even ideological reasons as to why our country is where it is today. With robust debate and discussion on ideas (not as a religion), issues and realities as we are placed in the world.  Almost as though we are back at the library, except at greater speed.  That way we can still raise the democratic national consciousness.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com) 

German Minister for Africa’s Selective and Neo-Colonial Amnesia

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)  recently had an online news feature titled, ‘Can Voluntary Colonialism Stop Migration to Europe?’.  While the title itself is more a suggestion than a question what was shocking in the article were comments attributed to Germany’s Minister of state for Africa, Gunter Nooke.  

He is reported to have said the following, “The European Union, or a body like the World Bank, should build and run cities in Africa in order to boost job creation and development on the continent.” The report then highlights that these remarks were made in the context of Nooke outlining ‘his thinking on how to stem migration to Europe.’

To its credit the African Union is also reported as having dismissed such a suggestion.  

And of course there will be so called ‘rationalists’ from Africa who may agree with Nooke. While it is their right to do so, they would be well advised to recall what exactly colonialism was, what neocolonialism is and how neoliberalism is a direct offshoot of both.

This does not mean that Africa has no problems that cause push factors in migration.  But the majority of these are as a direct result of interventionism on the continent in one form or the other. Be it economic, military or political.

And examples of these are many.  Both historically- actual colonialism as formalized by the Berlin conference of 1884(-8) through to former colonial powers' broad complicity in destabilizing post-independence African governments directly or indirectly.  Add to this the deliberate playing out of one African country against the other in the context of the Cold War and eventual imposition of neoliberalism on the African political economy. 

Where we analyze the contemporary causes of African’s northward migration to Europe, again we will come back full circle to military interventions in Libya the Sahel region.  While the complicity of African governments remains  unquestionable with regards their domestic political and economic policies they will in most cases be following economic templates provided by, to the greater extent, international financial institutions such as the World Bank.  The latter backed again by the superpowers of the global north. 

So Nooke's proposed solution is not only ahistorical but self-righteous and condescending toward not only Africa in its geographical existence but more significantly, its people.  And here’s the rub.  There is a probable general assumption that Africans cannot manage their own affairs hence Nooke can casually make the claim of the EU or World Bank buying land from African governments and building enclave cities that will prevent us from migrating to their countries in what they consider large numbers.  

The intention is also probably not to see this actually happen in the short term.  It is to ensure that the narrative of ‘voluntary colonialism’ gains traction in European anti-immigrant discourse.  And that the same narrative can be made to appear to have some profitable business sense for global capital to consider finding pliable African governments that would take up this ridiculous and historically revisionist idea. 

On our part as Africans, there will be others who, while being outside of government, will want to see the ‘entrepreneurial’ side of this.  At the same time while conveniently turning a blind eye to how rascist and neocolonial it is.  Or in turn over-politicising the matter to being about the ‘bad governance’ of African governments and therefore it would, in their neo-colonial view, be better if we sold off cities or land to the World Bank. At the same time forfeiting sovereignty and with it the right to self-determination that was a fundamental objective of liberation struggles against colonialism. 

While our opinions as Africans may not matter for much in global debates around migration as a ‘political and economic problem in the global north’s metropoles and fortresses, we should always be conscious of the fact we are not in any way, as Africans, the cause of it.  And even if I am gladly accused of still being a Walter Rodney acolyte, there are still some in the global north who would not see Africans let alone the African continent as an equal global player and partner. Some out of willful ignorance others more because of misplaced nationalism and assumptions of racial superiority.  And would be only too happy to perpetuate Africa and Africans in the mythical colonial narrative of either the dark continent and its peoples as ‘children’ who must be hand held.  Thankfully these still remain a general minority (though radical, racial nationalism is rising in the global north).    

For many of us Africans, the proposition by Nook may appear to be a storm in a teacup. Especially after it was correctly dismissed by the African Union.  Or we may decide to let sleeping dogs lie lest we appear to be unreasonable.  The truth and urgency of the matter is that we must always be able to talk back with a conscientiousness that demonstrates our own organic understanding of our humanity and equality in the world.  Economically poor and historically oppressed as we are. And that most certainly our cities or land are not up for ‘voluntary colonialism’. 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blgospot.com) 

Perception and Pessimism: Zimbabwe’s 2019 Projected State (Not Private) Capital Budget.

By Takura Zhangazha*

There are questions that a number of those that are perceived by family, friends and acquaintances as well informed or knowledgeable have to occasionally answer.  On matters that at basics are about national political, economic and social issues.  All as they emerge in convivial and now regularly partisan discourse.

Key conversations or questions that emerge are generally the same.  And they are somewhat like this: 

‘Do you think the economy will improve with these guys (Zanu Pf) in charge?’

“What do you think the international community (read as global north governments) will say about their policies?’

‘Will investors (also read as global private capital, as long as it is not Chinese) come to a country like ours and create jobs?”

And finally the big one,  ‘Will we (still)  get access to United States dollars and what will happen to the bond notes in our bank accounts/ that we had saved/ that we hope to get?’

These are questions that thanks to the personal experiences of many during the hyper-inflationary period of the first decade of the 2000s, cut across class, geographical location and generational perspectives on what is or was better. 

I generally have no straightforward answers to the first three questions.  On the fourth, I tend to pause a bit and make a statement that brings great opprobrium.  This being the broad and patently unpopular assertion that we do not own the United States dollar (US$). 

Nor do we trust the bond notes brought about by the Zanu Pf government. 

But we most certainly need our own monetary currency as it reflects our global economic value. In competition to how others perceive the same. Somehow. 

Even if a majority still do not trust the economic, let alone monetary policy intentions of Mnangagwa’s five year tenure government (for now). 

It is against such political and very public skepticism that the current Minister of Finance, Professor Mthuli Ncube is presenting his projected state (not private) capital budget for 2019. 

And obviously the media, elite/educated/wannabe middle class (by way of lifestyle) will be closely watching his presentation before Parliament on Thursday 22 November 2018. (Keeping in mind trickle down not only consciousness but also assumptions of materialism)

Not to also mention the crass opportunists, who will, in keeping with the mantra of the ‘ease of doing business’ take thorough advantage of those who do not even begin to understand what the concept means.  Ideologically and technically.  So long they get a triple dollar and dime on the return of investment that comes with taking a gamble on things that they never intended to understand. Let alone support (that’s contemporary global capitalism, in Africa, for you)

The government of Zimbabwe is (happily) aware of this.  Hence its Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP, 2018-2020) that seeks among other things to ‘ring-fence’ private capital.  Not only as a precursor to its 2019 national budget presentation before Parliament but also as a performance measurement guarantee to its more important  ‘client’,  private global capital. 

Hence a week before the budget is presented, Mnangagwa argues in a local weekly, that there is a financial ‘cost’ to negative reporting on the Zimbabwean situation.  This is a perspective I personally disagree with but I will respectfully leave to experts on media freedom and assumptions of its democratic ‘cost’ to those that know better on the same matter to argue it out with the state/government.

While the latter remains Mnangagwa’s highly politicized opinion, it is not enough to either limit free expression on his planned investment policies let alone the capacity of his government to deliver on his electoral policies.

 Even where he argues, as he recently did in the Financial Times of the United Kingdom, that his economic reform trajectory is Thatcherite and therefore correct.  All without application to domestic economic context and organic leftist linkages to a liberation struggle/movement in which he claims he played a significant political role in or at least justified as a reason why he took over the helm of the ruling Zanu Pf party.  All as dramatically as he did in November 2017.

What we know is that the Zimbabwean government intends on a private sector led economy in its annual budget for 2019. Almost like a second version, in a generation, of a World Bank/ International Monetary Fund (IMF), Breton Woods supported and ‘sponsored’ economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP).  Or as some unionists and occasional economist refer to it, ‘ESAP 2.0’.

At the fault of sounding repetitive (in previous personal blogs) we have been here before.  As individuals and as a country.  It all came to naught.  Instead of getting jobs, we lost them.  Instead of getting more affordable health, education, transport and/or other welfare support, we lost it. What we will however most certainly get is a 3-tier commodity pricing system. In 3 different 'currencies'. (If you haven't already experienced the same, wait a bit.) 

Mthuli Ncube in his budget presentation (as definitely approved by Cabinet)  needs to understand that history is not as abstract as his principal(s) would have us believe.  Nor is the 'free market' , as contemporarily given, a panacea to Zimbabwe’s challenges. 

He should argue better on behalf of a people entered political economy.  But then again, we may not be able to say it as easily as we should, Mnangagwa’s government while having won a disputed electoral victory in July 2018, does not espouse people centered economic policy reform.  Nor does it intend to.  It is firmly pro-business/private capital and does not worry about the questions we have attempt to answer, badly so, when we are assumed to be people in the know of the goings on in our country, Zimbabwe.

So back to the same queries I and probably you as a reader (in your assumed expertise) of this blog occasionally have to respond to in real-time or online. 

“Will this government with its tenure of five years be able to deliver on the economic expectations of a majority of Zimbabweans?”

 My basic answer is, “No it will not’.  Not with its current neo-liberal economic model that panders to private capital by selling off state capital at limited socio-economic justice return to the people of Zimbabwe.  Or at least not without its own authentic, trusted national currency of exchange.

But as will be the case with (Finance Minister) Ncube’s ‘state capital’ budgetary statement of intent, the ‘political state’ is persuaded it can get away with a proverbial ‘murder’. Warts and all.  And regrettably,  on behalf of private capital. But then again, you hear what you prefer to hear, see what you prefer to see,  touch what you prefer to touch and speak what keeps your limited capital 'safe'. 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

One Year After Mugabe: A Revolution Still not Televised

By Takura Zhangazha*

On 15 November 2017, Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s longest serving ruler was confined to his private residence in the affluent suburb of Borrowdale in Harare, Zimbabwe.  This, while armed soldiers took control of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation's (ZBC) headquarters major stations and patrolled the streets of the capital city.  

In what was self-evidently a 'coup-de-tat' but euphemistically referred to as a 'military assisted transition', the country had entered into a period of potential serious political instability.  All instigated by succession and factional battles in the ruling Zanu Pf party at the end of which an emboldened Mnangagwa faction and its military actors took a risk that Mugabe (and his wife) never thought possible.  Also one that SADC probably thought would never happen.  At least not in Zimbabwe. 

By 18 November 2017 the military and ruling party members were exhorting Zimbabweans to march on the streets.  And by 19-20 November 2017, march/gather in Harare, they did.  

The ruling Zanu Pf party, for the first time without Mugabe readily available to lead it, took advantage of the popular support and called for a central committee meeting that resolved to remove him from power.  And where he would refuse they also undertook to use the constitutional option of an unprecedented Parliamentary impeachment.  

In the meantime, the military was negotiating with its would be commander in chief (at least legally)  to resign.  

Mugabe refused.  

And again Zanu Pf functionaries aligned to Mnangagwa threatened mass action and impeachment.  Mnangagwa himself also issued a statement calling on the president to resign promising his now arch rival protection.  

As it turns out, it was only when Parliament had started impeachment proceedings at a local hotel that Mugabe’s resignation letter arrived.  What were rather contrived and real celebration were seen occurring on the streets of Harare with the military's permission. 

But perhaps more significantly in what remained of the ruling party as seen when Mnangagwa became president thereafter. Not only via his party but also a very public swearing in ceremony attended not only by the then chair of SADC but more importantly by the main opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. 

Less than six months on from these events those behind the removal of Mugabe’s ouster managed to perform another shocking political feat.  They won a general election even as the opposition decried the results as not being truly reflective of the will of the people. Opposition marches were held and tragically lives were lost (the subject of former South Africa president Kgalema Montlante’s Commission of Inquiry as appointed by Mnangagwa.) 

The international observers that were present noted electoral discrepancies but the most important ones fell short of rejecting the electoral outcome.  The constitutional court's judgement finalized the matter with a unanimous ruling in favour of Mnangagwa thus paving the way for him to serve as president for the next five years. 

Many Zimbabweans, especially those sympathetic to the opposition or with an intense dislike of the ruling party have refused to accept this political reality.  Those of the other factions of the ruling party either known as the ‘Generation 40’ (Mugabe)  or ‘weevil’ (former Vice President Mujuru) factions have remained not only bitter on social media but also actively supporting anyone who opposes the current ruling establishment.

Whatever their feelings, hindsight now favours those who are in power.  The future not so much so.  This is because the ruling Zanu Pf establishment owes so much to so many global players.  The latter being those that are close to private capital in its local and global economic and political parameters. 

For local and relatively powerless ordinary Zimbabweans who never really had a direct influence on not only the coup-not- a-coup events of November 2017 but the complicated dynamics of the 2018 general election, there’s a general tragedy of expectations.  

Assumptions that the departure of Mugabe would lead to some sort of better change, ill-defined as it was when people marched the streets in support of the ‘coup-de-tat’ or the July 2018 elections, have come to naught.  What has emerged and broadly spoken for, is a sense of not only de-ja-vu but more significantly a return to an ephemeral national consciousness that waits for elite driven political events to occur first. All before intentions and questions are asked about those that would seek political power are addressed or answered. 

There are however four specific realities that Zimbabwe is faced with going forward.  

The first being that the ruling Zanu Pf party is in power, for the umpteenth time and  for another politically controversial five years. And in its exercise of power, its primary target is performance legitimacy.  Not necessarily with the people of Zimbabwe but more significantly with private global capital.  All with the aim of being seen to return to international legitimacy via the West, East and the Global South.

Secondly, the fact that there is a loose coalition of the opposition which is never going to proffer an ideological let alone issue based alternative to the ruling establishment leaves a lot to ponder.  

Save for a shallow populism, again seeking endorsement, like Zanu Pf, from global capital and its political backers in the global north. All in the vainglorious hope that time (age), economic collapse and a potentially distrusting global capital will spur them on to an electoral victory in the next elections in 2023, the opposition remains hapless. And all mixed with what can only be described as ephemeral religious political fervor akin to ‘waiting for Godot’, to quote Samuel Beckett.

Thirdly and as a direct result of the above immediately mentioned two factors, is the reality that the Mnangagwa government has no intention of being people centered let alone behave in any way that would be harmful to business (private capital).  As long as the latter forgets (and possibly forgives) their previous transgressions when they were under the tutelage of a radically nationalist but unfocused Mugabe.  Zanu Pf is intent on ensuring it courts back big business.  Therefore, its understanding of what it calls a new dispensation is effectively neo-liberal. 

So when people argue that this is in reality not a new dispensation, they misconstrue the new to be more political than it is economic. Or they misread the assumption of the new residing in the political as opposed to the pro-business economic policies that will be announced next week in the projected national budget for 2019.  ‘Liberal politics’ will be benevolently permitted but it is ‘liberal economics’ (free market) that will be the supreme priority.

Being ‘open for business’ will not translate to being open to organic challenges for state power.  And with the support of private global capital and its local offshoots, so long they both get want they want. That is, profit or as politely put, ‘returns on investment’. Fourthly (and finally) is the question that emerges from a 'between a rock and a hard place'.  Is there an alternative? There always is. Given the internal contradictions of neoliberalism and the emergence of a progressive global and local left.  With or without Zimbabwe’s faltered, faulty not so  new dispensation. If it ever was one. But alternatives will always remain in vogue. As Gill Scott Heron once sang, 'the revolution will not be televised. 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his own personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Muzarabani's 'Black Gold', No Rush + Capital Wagging State's Tail

 By Takura Zhangazha*

The government of Zimbabwe held a press conference at which the president initially announced that a private company Invictus had made oil and gas discoveries in Muzarabani district.  No more that  a day after the presser, the company whose representatives had been at the press conference issued a statement refuting an actual discovery of oil and gas contrary to what the mainstream state controlled media had published.. It stated that it was only doing an exploration of oil and gas in Muzarabani.  The government later on, through the minister of Mines, Wilson Chitando, also retracted any claims at ‘discovery’ and emphasized the issue of exploration.

Social media while not quite going apoplectic over these awkward statements from the government and its new oil exploration partner, did query the veracity of the claims.  As well as raise issues about the integrity of the company. 

A couple of friends of mine were delighted at the changed news that there was no oil or gas discovery.  Or at least the tentative possibility that the ruling Zanu Pf party would not be able, in the immediate, to profit politically from it. 

For the most part the general public did not trust the announcement.  Not least because of their mistrust of how government handled the Marange diamond fields where allegations remain about not only looting and self aggrandizement of politically connected individuals but also the violence that accompanied the extractive process.

Investment analysts were also quick to comment about how such projects should be handled by government.   They cited for example the fact that the Invictus outfit was looking for investors via its stock exchange listing and therefore was trying to stall the competition over its competitive find in Muzarabani.  

Or alternatively that the government should have kept the deal under wraps, at least for a while. In the interests of the company (stalling competition or questions of transparency) and preventing what would be a black gold rush in the long neglected valley. They preferred that the the company issue its own statements and then government enter the fray.

The reality of the mater is that both government and the private investor messed up their public relations on the matter.   But this ‘messing up’ is obviously done with purpose.  I would not know whether it was deliberate to have a whole president announcing an initial confirmation of oil and gas in Muzarabani.  But it would be clear that the end effect still favours government and the primary investor/ owner of the special oil exploration permit. 

The fact that it is now in the public domain, means that there is a serious possibility that there shall be fracking of the basin by 2020. And therefore that the scientifically arrived at assumption of probability that there is oil and gas is not a prophecy or a rumour.  The only catch is that, in relation to the investor and less so government, is it profitably feasible in terms of the current global petroleum markets and standards?

It is a question I do not have an answer to.  But I certainly perceive that where capital wags the governments investment policy tail (refuting a presidents press statement and getting a confirmation retraction), then the caution points to control as opposed to clarity. 

Further,  the exploration exercise/confirmation, as it begins now and is projected to be finalized in 2020, the fracking exercises that will be undertaken there will have serious consequences for the environment and the local population that relies on the valley for their livelihoods. So what better way to keep environmental activists at bay than to claim no oil discovery but just exploration?  

What is clear is that there is a definite escalation of oil and gas exploration that is going to happen in Muzarabani that will change its land use and attendant political economy. While this suits the ruling party's narrative of bringing investors into the country as per electoral promise, it is the model or framework that should get all Zimbabweans worried. 

The government is utilising a neo-liberal economic model in order to garner the confidence of international capital. And this includes turning a blind eye to the environmental effects of onshore oil drilling as well as protecting private capital while selling state capital simultaneously.    Hence the over enthusiasm and quick fire press conference on the purported discovery and exploration of oil and gas.  All in order to demonstrate either the ‘ease of doing business’ or to prove to a domestic political audience that the government is working closely with global capital.  Especially via companies that are linked to the Sydney (Australia) Stock Exchange.

We can politicise the exploration (and likely 'discovery') of oil as much as we want but there is certainty to capital's intentions.  And governments willingness to play ball, even ifit appear to be in sixes and sevens.  We should ask for greater transparency and accountability of all of the exploration that is intended with a full scale environmental impact assessment and guarantee of the protection of livelihoods of the people in Muzarabani and surrounding environs.  Even before the 'discovery' is eventually made.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Media Strategy for Zimbabwe: Strategic Issues Going forward.

 A presentation to the Media Alliance of Zimbabwe, 2018 Annual Media Stakeholders Conference

02 November 2018, Sapes Trust , Harare, Zimbabwe.

By Takura Zhangazha*

Colleagues, cdes and friends,

I have been asked to discuss, albeit briefly, strategic issues of the media in Zimbabwe, going forward.  I am not sure how far forward we should look.  But I would assume that so long we look forward, it helps. 

And perhaps that has been the primary fault of the media sector, an inability to perceive or even try to predict what the future may look like.  Not only in terms of the issues that I understand were discussed yesterday, for example the new interface or even competition between social media platforms and the mainstream media.  Or the debate around how public broadcasting, in both its national and community broadcasting sense, has to have its definitive parameters redrawn.  As well as how journalists welfare and unionism impacts on their professional an ethical conduct against the backdrop of allegations of media capture, editorial control and neo-liberal assumptions of the media as profitable business. 

But what is in vogue for many media stakeholders is a specific political reality of a newly elected government that has said it is ‘open for business’.  The primary assumption being that it is also open for the business of discussing the media, and its primary concerns. Or at least what the media and media stakeholders expect from government. 

What I would definitely agree with is that the media stakeholders conference, judging by the statements of the relatively new Minister of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services (MIPBS) Monica Mutsvangwa, should not look a gift horse in the mouth given the assumption that she/government means well.

But just to give a key reminder that media stakeholders have been here before.  That is, a situation where government promises reforms, extends their implementation period and then claims success over its own ineptitude or lack of political will to implement what it has consultatively promised. 

That is why at the back of media stakeholders minds we are still whispering about the Information and Media Public inquiry (IMPI) recommendations ( as numerous as they were). 

But in an Alpha Media Holdings Conversations (AMH) facebook live discussion I participated in with co-panelists Mr. Nyarota , Ms Patience Zirima and the deputy minister of MPIBS, Honourable Energy Mutodi, I mentioned that we cannot revert to past narratives of how government interacts with the press.  Mainstream or emergent in the form of new social media motivated platforms of access to information. 

Strategically considered, Zimbabwe’s media in all it various facets (mainstream, social, mediums/technological, legal) must begin to chart a new path in the best public democratic interest.  The latter being defined largely as a media that does not flinch from being more robust, self correcting, technologically savvy and democratically conscious of its role in furthering Zimbabwe’s democratic values and principles.

 In the context of the Media Alliance of Zimbabwe’s work, this would require a contextual reinvigoration of its annual media strategy to not only suit our technological times but also expand the democratic value proposition of freedom of expression and access to information. 

The broad thematic arenas of MAZ have been media policy an reforms, media plurality and diversity (and its sub themes of alternative media, freedom of expression, independent mainstream media , sustainable community media , public service media),  media professionalism and ethics and finally safe, equitable and enabling environments for journalists. 

In our national context these thematic focus areas remain relevant not only by way of reference but more significantly in reality.  We still do not have, as cited by stakeholders here present adequate media policy reforms.  Nor do we have media plurality and diversity.  Let alone media professionalism and ethics nor an equitable and enabling environment for journalists and media workers.

On the basis of the above, there is therefore no need to reinvent the wheel.  It basically means we still have to address these primary challenges as enunciated in the MAZ Media Strategy Framework for Zimbabwe. 

The key question is do we use the same methods for the same problems?  The easy answer would be indeed we should. 

The caution however is the speed at which we arrive at our envisioned destination.  Whereas we have been cognizant of the opportunities that come with an incremental change template to the media environment, we have lost sight to the fact that the media is increasingly losing its democratic value proposition in the best public interest.  And that the Zimbabwean public may still perceive the media more as an elitist institution that serves the interests of those in power (be it in politics, business and religion) more than it may be focused on playing its independent and critical democratic role.

Hence the public in part has turned to social media platforms to seek their own version of the truth or to confirm the news that they would prefer to hear.

It is in this context that media stakeholders must undertake some strategic changes to their approach to Zimbabwe’s media reform agenda.

Top of these strategic reconsiderations is to understand the media from a political economy perspective.  That is to initially emphasise its organic political reason for its existence which remains to enable and enhance freedom of expression and access to information in the democratic public interest.  And this from an entirely holistic perspective (print, broadcast, social media, medium- technology).

In this same framework to then strategically look at how the media must be sustained in order to achieve its overarching political and economic objective.  This is the economic side of the media.  While I am aware that MIPBS has already announced its broad ‘media as business’ policy intentions, we must be cautious in arguing for a solely profit motivated mainstream and new media strategic framework.  This sort of framework leads to multi-media ownership as is the case now in Zimbabwe with the larger media companies beginning to monopolise the sector’s various media formats (radio, print, television, new media).  And this includes telecommunications companies that are also entering the broadcasting fray via the internet or provision of the mediums (data and fibre optic) without due consideration to issues of costs and its impact on public access.

These economic considerations should be also undertaken with a democratic understanding of the still important role of the public media.  And how to get the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation out of the clutches of a partisan editorial policy and the profit motivated intentions by government of putting it out to dry against better equipped and soon to be licensed private broadcasters. 

We have already seen this encroachment into the public service community broadcasting sphere where the licensing of commercial private local radio stations has quite literally taken over the significant strides that some community radio stations had made.  We need only look at what happened to Radio Dialogue in Bulawayo and the awkward takeover of its actual studio space by SkyzMetro FM.

As I outlined earlier, in relation to the actual MAZ strategy the focus areas of stakeholders remain key.  They however tend to lose sight of the bigger picture where and when stakeholders either act in silos or compete for their sectoral interest either with government or international partners. 

What is strategically required is a greater unity of purpose and shared understanding of the urgency of an organic political economy approach to media reforms in Zimbabwe.  One which understands that the current government’s economic policy of being open for business should not translate to media freedom, freedom of expression and access to information being sacrificed at the altar of media for private profit model.

Thank you very much and all the best.

*Takura Zhangazha spoke here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)