Observing Mnangagwa’s Contemporary Leadership Characteristics

By Takura Zhangazha*

There are not that many narratives about Zimbabwean president Emerson Mnangagwa’s leadership style or character.  Although there are many stories about his alleged roles in Zimbabwe’s political history as told by either his praise singers or his naysayers.  In this blog I focus mainly on the contemporary style of his political leadership based on more recent political events. 

Observing his leadership style from his current tenure as president is however a little bit more difficult.  Mainly because during his predecessor Robert Mugabe’s tenure he may have appeared to be reclusive about his ambitions. While at the same time steadily rising through his party’s ranks to the level of vice president. 

At least not until Mugabe made it politically clear that he did not want Mnangagwa as his successor in 2017 by not only firing him from the vice presidency office but also forcing him into temporary exile.  And this is perhaps where we begin to see part of the contemporary leadership characteristics of Mnangagwa. 

Based on the events that unfolded in November 2017 it is fairly clear that he does not act alone in his approach to his party and/or national politics.  And he probably looks at issues from a stakeholder interests’ perspective with the option of playing one against the other in order to advance his own team’s interests.  Hence for example before the November 2017 coup it was reported in the media that he had already deployed emissaries not only to SADC but also the African Union among others. But also that he is also a political actor who has a tendency to either play the high risk hand or wait until the last hour to make a political move.  Ditto 2017 and the 2018 harmonized elections that point to this where against generally received wisdom he was neither primed to succeed Mugabe or win what turned out to be a disputed general election.  But all the same he took the risk(s). 

More important however is where to place Mnangagwa ideologically.  Based on his policy pronouncements since assuming power such as the ‘ease of doing business’ or ‘international re-engagement’ with global private capital, he is clearly a right leaning, pro-free market/capital and therefore neo-liberal nationalist. That means while he attempts to find a home in a generic Pan-Africanism (where he generally has no choice in the matter) he is still keen on trying to get Zimbabwe out of its pariah status with global private capital.  An issue that the mainstream opposition political leaders know only too well.  

Where we turn to assessing his leadership character in greater detail on the domestic front, it appears that he has a zero-sum game approach. In this because he clearly had challenges to overcome around not only the 2017 takeover of power but the subsequent election and the opposition’s challenges to his legitimacy, he has sought to make it clear he is very much in charge.  And that is if you are not with him, then you are definitely on the losing side.  Not only in relation to electoral processes but to all other facets of the Zimbabwean political economy.  

While he generally gives the impression that his leadership approach is inclusive, he however retains a stronger control element around what this 'inclusiveness' means.  And it revolves around recognition and acceptance of his leadership while at the same time fitting into his neo-liberal ideological framework.   Hence his engagement of opposition political parties has been clearly predicated on doing away with any questions around his legitimacy.

Or where one represents private capital’s interests, he has ensured that the state engages with those that focus on opportunities that emerge from his national economic strategy plans.  Especially where they involve public-private partnerships in infrastructure development, mining, energy and even monetary policy.  

In this the default end result that he probably desires is a public perception that there is no real or better alternative either to his own leadership or at worst to the retention of power by the ruling party.   Hence for example the rather dramatized ‘defections’ of some leading opposition figures to Zanu PF at Zimbabwe House. While at the same time retaining an anti-sanctions narrative that can still conveniently be used against stubborner opposition leaders.      

Or his continued engagement of religious leaders at the highest possible level (i.e with himself) to ensure that there is no emerging stronger counter narrative to his leadership from their multitudes of followers. 

One could argue that all of this is rather Machiavellian in the sense of ‘The Prince’ keeping his potential enemies closer.  What is however more prescient to observe is the fact of the attitude of global private capital to Zimbabwe and his leadership approach.  Ever since he has moved from the more radical black nationalism of his predecessor and given a green light to private capital that wants to risk it in Zimbabwe there is an assumption of a return to some sort of political economy normalcy.  All of which works in his favour. For now.  Not least because his political opponents have become weaker either by way of internal divisions or rumored interference by the state. But also more because the structural profit motivated expectations of global private capital, be it from the east or west do not seem, in the immediate, to be under threat from him.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogpost.com)

Critically Debating 'Ubuntu' and 'Black Tax' in Zimbabwe

 A Brief Presentation to the 2021 African American  History Month Online Commemorative Event 

As Organised by LitFest Harare and  US Embassy Zimbabwe

Wednesday 10 March 2021.

By Takura Zhangazha*

Let me begin by thanking Litfest Harare and the US Embassy’s American Spaces for inviting me to this very important online discussion to commemorate Black History month for 2021. It is always a great pleasure to meet and share ideas on key issues as they relate to historical and contemporary experiences of black lives. Not only in the United States of America but broadly in the Diaspora and also particularly in Zimbabwe.  And to do so together with other panelists such as the eminent Zimbabwean feminist Bella Matambanadzo as well as prominent poets and musicians. 

In addressing the topic given by the organizers of "Expressing Ubuntu vs Black Tax" it is important to define the key terms under consideration.

My perspective on for example ‘Ubuntu’ or alternatively ‘hunhu’ is as generally understood to mean that we exist with a consciousness and concern for the welfare of all other human beings in our respective societies. Be they within our immediate community, country but also even where they are across our continent or in the world. 

It is however a term that has various meanings for various people.  In a number of cases it has tended to either be viewed in highly individualistic terms in assuming that it quite literally focuses on individual behavior in society. As opposed to creating a collective value framework in our politics, economics and other social relations.  It has also been viewed as a traditional philosophical approach that talks to Africa and black identity which however is far from the periphery of what is considered the better ‘modern’ ways of life.  Though oft times it is instrumentalised by political leaders to lay claim to populist uniqueness while concealing their true repressive intentions.

I would hazard to argue that while Ubuntu does not strictly speaking represent an ideological outlook in the contemporary, it most certainly, by inference would be close to a democratic socialism framework.  One in which the intention of perpetually recognizing the human equality of each other regardless of race, colour or class in political economic and social spheres remains a collective obligation of our communities, countries and international relations. 

So I tend to look at the term Ubuntu in very clear ideological terms in our contemporary lives.

Where we turn to the issue of ‘Black Tax’, upon first encountering it I immediately asked myself the question whether there is a ‘white tax?’  Because it pre-supposes an opposite. I even watched an episode of a South African television series on Showmax of the same title.  And in it was clear that the inferred meaning of ‘Black Tax’ is the unofficial tax of the black African who has to look after their extended family.  And in most instances this black person is in the urban, having to deal with his mainly rural kinsfolk who look up to him for monetary support for basic amenities such as education, food and also paying other rural taxes. Or coming to live with them in city against the wishes of the successful black urbanite.   But I will come back to the white tax issue a little later on.

Where we combine the question of Ubuntu versus the assumed black tax we are really questioning fundamentals of our Zimbabwean and also African societies.  Or our ways of living in post-colonial political economies where our cultural lifestyle where looking after the family or keeping the welfare of the village in mind as you undertake your economic activities was the norm rather than the exception.  With the advent of colonial modernization which included forced migration and forced labour to the urban, there was a tragic disruption of our ways of life that in part broke up these given cultural practices. And wherein traditional values or assumptions of the original ‘Ubuntu’ were institutionally denigrated and undermined with urban expansion and admiration of the urban consumer lifestyle. 

Hence the turn of phrase ‘black tax’ essentially refers to a burden on the assumedly more successful urban black person.  As they relate to their poorer, less economically successful black relatives who in most cases reside in the rural areas. 

I am persuaded that in the contemporary we need to review such an approach to what would be black families and how we consider the urban as the epitome of material success.  In other words we should not be complicit in the denigration of historical black tradition even if we live the ‘faster, individualized’ lives of the better parts of our cities. 

But more importantly where we consider Ubuntu as still integral to our being then  we must find ways in which we make it as pragmatic as possible for all of us.  This includes beginning the arduous process of creating a more humane Zimbabwean state that makes basic services such as education, health, transport, running water, food security and electricity available to all. Inclusive also of other human rights that relate to free expression, freedom of assembly/association and gender equality among many others that are justiciable.  Such an approach will not only make any assumptions of a black tax a thing of the past but it will also allow us to value our culture without envying the lives of the other. Or regrettably trying to wish away our still important extended families because we live and work in the post-colonial city.    

Finally let me return to what I wrote above as assuming that there’s a black tax, what would be its opposite?  Given the turn of phrase this would be the ‘white tax’.  With the key question being, does it exist?  Of course it does though it is rarely referred to as that.  And also that it is viewed as the normal or preferable form of tax that you pay to the state as PAYE. 

But there’s another angle to it here as it relates to the white family.  In this it normally takes on the form of working for inherited wealth/capital.  Both in the colonial past as in the post-colonial contemporary.  While keeping the family in mind.   It is also a historically privileged form of tax in our Zimbabwean context because of the legacies of wealth accumulation during colonialism as carried over into post independence Zimbabwe and how this type of 'white tax' is invariably considered to be different or materially better. But perhaps that is a topic for another day. 

*Takura Zhangazha spoke here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com) 

Remembering Zanu Pf's G40 Faction

 By Takura Zhangazha*

The year 2017 will always stand out in Zimbabwean history. At least the post-independence political side of it.  Not that previous years since 1980 were not dramatic, populist or in some cases tragic.  But the events that unpredictably led to the ouster of Robert Mugabe will probably leave those who witnessed or celebrated them with many more questions than answers about the passage of political time. 

And I have a few of my own.  What we now know with the benefit of hindsight is that Mugabe was hoist by his own petard.  Having led the ruling Zanu Pf party in government since 1980 and played many of his political rivals against each other, he allowed his own succession politics to reach a tragic crescendo in 2017. Risking not only himself, his family but the stability of the country in the process. I use the turn of phrase ‘allowed’ because before he became frail he quite literally held a tight grip over the internal and external affairs Zanu Pf.

But his own succession politics was not a decidedly one sided affair.  Where he sought to play one faction against the other, the same factions also played against each other in their own opportunism and attempt at being favoured. 

The one faction that eventually triumphed over all the others during his tenure was the one that was referred to in the mainstream print media as the ‘Generation40’ or by its more popular acronym ‘G40’ one. 

How it came to be closer to Mugabe in his last years of power is something that historians and political scientists will write about with greater accuracy. 

That it assumed a prominent role in Mugabe’s latter day politics became relatively self evident when the former first lady Grace Mugabe was rumoured to be backing it. And when she entered the succession political fray. 

As its media designated ‘G40’ title suggested, this was a faction of Zanu Pf that positioned age or youthfulness as its sine qua non.  Not just by way of its assumed leaders but its projected politics.  It was probably confident about the ‘political’ demographic of Zimbabwe. In so far as it related to the ‘youth’ voter component of our national politics.  In this they had probably done some mathematical calculations about the voting population for the next scheduled elections in 2018 and noticed the exponential rise of young versus older voters.  Hence they were likely comfortable with referring to their faction as a ‘generation 40’ one. 

In doing so they were also looking at their counterparts in Zanu Pf and knowing the popular national sentiment decided to position themselves as the youthful successors to an ageing Mugabe.  To do this, they needed to get those they considered geriatrics out of the way. Especially war veterans who were laying historical claim to be in line to succeed Mugabe. 

What was a little astounding was how G40 then placed Grace Mugabe at the center of their succession strategy.  She became instrumental in enabling Joice Mujuru to become the first female deputy president of the country.  And subsequently in also making her the first female deputy president to be removed from office in 2014. Paving the way for her eventual arch nemesis, Mnangagwa to replace her. 

While we may not know Robert Mugabe’s direct role in all of this, the mathematics of a possible future election victory for the ruling party were however probably clear in the minds of G40 functionaries.  Remember the issue of demographics?  Mugabe’s government introduced a raft of youth focused initiatives under the then indigenization policy which included loans, expanded tertiary education and populist cultural productions designed to endear it to young Zimbabweans.  The only problem was that the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under Morgan Tsvangirai also commanded support from young people in Zimbabwe.  But G40 probably thought they would eventually work it out with the opposition. One way or the other as long as they were firmly in the driving seat of Zanu Pf. 

But as we now know with hindsight the plan fell apart with what would have been their final masterstroke of enabling the dismissal of Mnangagwa and purging war veterans from the mainstream leadership of Zanu Pf. 

In their pursuit of what has been referred to as Africa’s ‘youth dividend’ they perhaps forgot that age, while politically important, is not as decisive in shaping politics in and of itself.  And they also probably forgot history’s lessons of former first ladies who tried to play pivotal roles in the succession politics of their long ruling husbands.  From Russia through to China.  And how even if initially successful, it all turned to tragic end.  Not just for themselves but also those that worked with them.

My memories of Zanu Pf’s G40 faction and its multiplicity of players remain focused on what really motivated them to assume that Zimbabwean politics can be that simple.  Even as they rode on Mugabe and his wife’s coattails?  Or as they honed in on the mathematics of what they considered a ‘youthful’ electoral victory in the expected 2018 general/harmonized election. 

Or how after their primary handler Mugabe had been ousted via a popular coup, they still sought to push the demographic dividend through a post Tsvangirai MDC for the 2018 harmonised election.

Which begs the question about the extent of their ambition.  Or in some cases, their naivety.  Again that’s one for the historians and political scientists to answer or theorize over. 

What is however clear is that projecting political futures on the basis of demographics is sorely inadequate.  Being young in mind or heart does not cut it.  It’s the values, principles in tandem with physical placement that matter more. And that make up for ‘generational praxis’. 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)