Preparing for 32 years of Zimbabwe’s Independence.

Preparing for 32 years of Zimbabwe’s Independence.*

By Takura Zhangazha.^

As has been the practice since 1981 the Zimbabwean government shall play the lead role in choreographing the meeting of our contemporary politics with memories of our liberation struggle. This will be done on 18 April  2012, the country’s Independence Day. In so doing leaders in government will seek to use the occasion of these commemorations to demonstrate what they perceive to be their ‘democratic’ commitment to the historically definitive values of our national liberation struggle. Some more than others, but all the same, they will all insist on having played or intending to play a role relevant to the purposes and values of our national independence.

It is however necessary to point out it is not the sole prerogative of our national leaders to remember and commemorate our national independence. Indeed they may lead official state functions to remember the same, but recognizing the significance of our freedom from minority rule is the task of every Zimbabwean. This recognition is not however a call to joining the political party led messaging for propagandistic or electioneering purposes. Instead, we should recognize the national significance of independence on the basis of the initial fact that it was an historical and nation defining occurrence. This especially after a drawn out and painful liberation war.

In the second instance, we must all celebrate our national independence with the intention of insisting that ‘never again!’ shall we or our children bear witness to such repression either by way of racism (of any kind), social and economic injustice or the wanton killing of innocent civilians and deprivation of human rights to all. This is regardless of whatever government is in charge of the Zimbabwean state at any given time in the past, present or the future.

Thirdly, we must recognize our national independence in order to understand the historical and progressive democratic reasons why the Zimbabwean state was established. While the political parties may give their own politicized reasons, our collective understanding should be pre-disposed to understanding that we raised our national flag in April 1980 with the explicit intention of ensuring a democratic and better life for all Zimbabweans regardless of race, colour or class. It is from such a premise that we must measure, even 32 years afterwards, to see if our country and its successive governments (though dominated by one party)  have adhered to this key noble intention of our independence.

This would include taking into account the policies that have been implemented since 1980. These would include the expansion of social service provision by the state, the establishment of a justiciable bill of rights (however flawed), the tragic conflict that was Gukurahundi, economic structural adjustment, the continually repressive political environment as well as the continually disputed and historically politicized land re-distribution and indigenization programmes.

Some would argue that the verdict is easy, meaning that perhaps 32 years on, we are yet to realize the objectives of our national independence and liberation struggle. That however would be to potentially fall into the trap of continually politicizing our collective history just as some political parties have consistently sought to do.

Many mistakes were made and continue to be made across political lines since 1980 to present day. Indeed it is the liberation parties that took and remain in power that are most culpable for real and perceived failures that are associated with our post independence society. But it must now become increasingly clear that the country should no longer be viewed as being the responsibility of these movements alone. It belongs to all who live in it, and therefore we all have a responsibility to ensure that it pursues the path of making progressive and democratic history. It is no longer adequate to merely claim political party membership  as the reason for seeking recognition as an  active citizen of the republic with claim to the legacy of the liberation struggle.  This is particularly so for the younger generations of adult Zimbabweans who may not have seen or participated either in the liberation war or the independence celebrations at Rufaro stadium in 1980.

As a fourth and final point it must be emphasized that the path that Zimbabwe must now pursue is one that while being conscious of our history must not be imprisoned by it. In celebrating or commemorating 32 years of our national independence, we must think more of the future than the past. We must grasp that our existence as a country is based on what were essentially struggles for the freedom of all and not the few. In so doing, we must carry forward the burden of the mistakes made more honestly and with the clear intentions of ensuring that these mistakes never occur again of our own volition. This means that as we await 2012’s independence day commemorations we must be conscious of the challenges that we face collectively and approach them with the necessary historical and social consciousness that returns our country to a social democratic path.

*This article is a prelude to Notes on 32  Years of Zimbabwe’s Independence: Essays on the  Future and our National Historical Consciousness to be published electronically on 11 April 2012.

^Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity. takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com

Chikane's biased but brave take on Mbeki and Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement.

Chikane's  biased but brave take on Mbeki and Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement.

By Takura Zhangazha *

The former director general in the South African office of the Presidency, Reverend Frank Chikane has recently published an interesting if not controversial book. The title of the book, Eight Days in September. The Removal of  Thabo Mbeki  is indicative of its content and story line. In reading the book, it seems that there are two main perspectives that Reverend Chikane makes apparent in his writing.

The first perspective being that the ouster of Mr. Mbeki from the office of the presidency of South Africa was, on the basis of procedure, unconstitutional. In fact, Chikane makes reference to it being at one point or the other having been referred to in some circles as a potential ‘coupe de tat.’  He however avers that it was Mbeki’s revolutionary leadership that seems to have saved the day as the latter did not utilize the constitutional options open to him by ‘magnanimously’ following instructions from the African National Congress (ANC) post Polokwane leadership. 

This, according to the author, was because Mbeki was aware of the necessity of unity within his party and not being seen to be acting in his own personal interests. This is an issue that is also raised within the context of the author warning that it was evidence of the ANC taking over the role of the South African Parliament and therefore blurring the distinction between a sitting government and a ruling party’s leadership.

The second point that is put across in the book is that Mbeki’s presidency seems to have made the wrong sort of impression internationally, particularly with global powers. While Chikane does not claim any direct hand in the role of these same said global powers in the ouster of Mbeki, he mentions more than once that he was worried over the safety of the then president.  The argument given is that the former president’s foreign policy was rubbing a number of former colonial powers and international pharmaceutical companies the wrong way.  In this argumentation, Mbeki is compared to Ghana’s founder Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah ( with a chapter dedicated to this comparison).

For Zimbabweans however, this book will be of particular interest in that the author makes reference to the fact that the week that the Zimbabwe’sGlobal Political Agreement (GPA)  was signed, was the same week in which a ANC National Executive Council meeting to recall Mbeki was  scheduled to take place. In mentioning this Chikane argues that the South African media sought more to focus on statements attributed to the post Polokwane ANC  leadership concerning the matter of ‘recalling’ Mbeki from the office of president of South Africa than the foreign policy triumph that was the Zimbabwean GPA. 

Reference is also made in the book to statements attributed to former United States Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Jendayi Frazer.  In the referred to statements, Frazer is quoted as denouncing  the GPA, a development that the author hints to as being part of the unfortunate lexicon of the vilification of Mbeki’s foreign policy.  The author makes it clear that he views the GPA as a major African diplomatic success (under the mediation of Mbeki)   and further emphasizes that there were other vested global interests that sought to impose a leadership on the people of Zimbabwe.

For any Zimbabwean, this is a controversial point on its own given the fact that there are divergent views  on Mbeki’s role in the formulation of the GPA, particularly from the leaders of the political parties that constitute the inclusive government. What is apparent however is that it is time for Zimbabweans to assess the role and legacy of the GPA, Mbeki and SADC as the country anticipates elections by March 2013.  This is why Chikane’s take on Mbeki’s ouster is probably an important book for those that seek to understand the progression and politics of the inclusive government established under Mbeki’s mediation. 

This is because while Chikane writes mainly for a South African audience, his assessment of the Zimbabwean crisis and the remedies sought via Mbeki’s role remain important. Indeed the Reverend may be viewed as arguing more in defence of Mbeki but that does not mean his views are dismissible. This is particularly so given the fact that author served as cabinet secretary to Mbeki for both of the latter’s terms as South African president. 

What is however of greater significance to Zimbabweans is the necessity of beginning to assess the impact of the GPA in the broadest and particular political performance terms. This should not necessarily be done within the ambit of Chikane’s opinion of the same, but in aide of a much more honest political assessment of what have been the advantages and disadvantages of the GPA.  

This is even more important because the inclusive government has come full circle and at best, barring an amendment to the Constitution of Zimbabwe, will come to a conclusion in the first quarter of 2013. While I may not be in a position to make the rather extravagant comparison of Mbeki with Nkrumah, we are all well within our right to measure whether the former’s legacy should be accorded the recognition that Chikane seems so keen on.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity.  takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com

Africa is not a movie script Mr. George Clooney!

Africa is not a movie script Mr. George Clooney!

By Takura Zhangazha.

American Hollywood celebrities are good to watch in the movies or the television series that are now available on many African television channels that would want to capture the attention of a decent audience. In recent years, like celebrity sportspersons, they are now also involved with international humanitarian organizations efforts (such as UNICEF) in increasing global awareness of the many disasters that afflict our shared global world.

Some  Hollywood celebrities may have however probably decided that it is not enough to just be Goodwill Ambassadors for these  important international relief organizations. On occasion they have decided to wade into the choppy waters that are those of ‘liberal interventionism’ in aide of one political cause or the other. The latest example of such a celebrity has been the famous American actor, George Clooney, who seems to have made it a personal endeavor  to represent some of the people of Sudan at the highest levels of international diplomacy and/or American government.

Recent reports indicate that he was arrested, with others, in the American capital of Washington DC while on a picket about the civil war in the Nuba region of Sudan (not to be mistaken with the Republic of South Sudan). It also turns out he has been involved with issues around the Sudan for some time now, particularly in the Darfur region.   Mr. Clooney’s activism is however not without its own controversies.  An eminent Ugandan academic, Professor Mamdani has previously argued that a campaign on the Sudan that  the actor was involved in was not necessarily based on historical and political fact.

Regardless of these controversies it is a given that Mr. Clooney is within his right to express his opinion on what he perceives to be human rights violations occurring in Sudan.  Indeed the reports of these have been many, but in the aftermath of the Kony 2012 video, it would be necessary to advise the American actor to be cautious of becoming the central public American narrative on the plight of the Nuba region in the Sudan. This is because at this rate, he may become the global spokesperson for the people of Nuba Sudan, particularly those that he insists are facing ‘systematic killing’ in the same country. This while he is in the comfort of his home country. 

It is obviously a role that Mr. Clooney takes very seriously given the fact that he has visited the Nuba region recently and been arrested on behalf of the same region. It is however also indicative of an unfortunate trend wherein famous individuals from the north/west are beginning to exhibit problematic quasi-messianic streaks on behalf of people who might not or will never know who these people ‘fighting’ on their behalf are.

Whereas in the African struggles against colonialism, international attention and acts of solidarity  to repression and human rights violations were generally the collective act of many citizens of the West, the newfound tendency by movie or music celebrities to almost singularly seek to bring attention to contemporary sites of political conflict is borderline ‘feel good’ political activism. It may bring global/American attention to perceived atrocities but in the long run may compromise long term African political solutions to the same. This is because the primary solution to the Sudanese crisis resides in the ability of the Sudanese people to address the crisis in the Nuba region. To seek to bring attention to it in Washington DC is not a bad thing and given the fact I neither have the celebrity status nor the backing of a global power’s media hegemony, I would be mistaken to dismiss his actions outright.  I can however only argue from the point of view of an African.

Mr. Clooney’s actions are instructively indicative of the missionary functions of (colonial ) yesteryear wherein by default , he simultaneously  seeks to claim the moral high-ground on what indeed may be actual human rights atrocities and at the same time do so on the basis of having urgently come from Africa (read as the ‘dark continent’) . This would include, like the missionaries of old, calling upon the all powerful metropolis of origin or center to take to arms and go forth to go save the ‘natives’ by (eventually) conquering  the ‘barbarians’.

Of course Mr. Clooney could not have gone to the African Union immediately as this would be less befitting of his status, and in any event if he has limited locus standi to do so it is least likely he would have pursued that path with as much urgency.

It would however be helpful to instruct Western celebrities that Africa is not a playground for intermittent  demonstrations of their assumed moral or political uprightness when they cannot at the moment demonstrate reasonable commitment to their own country’s poor and disadvantaged. Indeed celebrities like Mr.Clooney are representatives of the global cultural dominance that is Hollywood, but they must understand that while they may mean well, Africa and African problems are best resolved by cooperation and not missionary exhibitionism.

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity. He is a human rights activist based in Harare, Zimbabwe.  

Zimbabwe’s Discordant Linkage of Foreign Direct Investment and the National Economy.

Zimbabwe’s Discordant Linkage of Foreign Direct Investment and the National Economy.

By Takura Zhangazha.*

On March 1 and 2 this year, the Ministry of Economic Planning and Investment Promotion held an investment workshop in Gauteng Province, South Africa. The    conference was held under the theme ‘Realizing Zimbabwe’s Investment Potential’ and was primed to attract the South African and the broader  international business community to invest in our country. It turns out that the most contentious issue in the aftermath of the conference was that of the government’s policy of indigenization. This being particularly evidenced by the public spat generated when the Minister of Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment, Mr. Kasukuwere referred to statements made by Prime Minister Tsvangirai at the same conference as being characteristic of a ‘lose cannon’. It is probably not only in Zimbabwe where one minister attacks a senior member of cabinet with such brazen vitriol, but that is probably a full indication of how fractured the inclusive government remains.

The bigger issue however is not related to what can only be viewed as a public display of insubordination by Minister Kasukuwere to the office of the Prime Minister. Instead it is to query the motivation of the inclusive government, via the relevant ministry to host an investment conference without being clear within its own cabinet on the short, medium and long term effects of indigenization of the economy. This is because courting the South African and in the same process, the broader international business community to invest in Zimbabwe is obviously a matter that merits a common and collectively responsible  investment  approach from any serious government.

There are three  quick probable  answers as to why the government went ahead with hosting this conference regardless of evident policy disagreements. The first being that  the ministry responsible  probably wanted to be seen to doing the right thing by way of the government work programme. Secondly, there is obviously an intention by the ministry which is run by an MDC-T minister to demonstrate its commitment to what has come to be viewed as the ‘best practice’ courting  of private-public sector partnerships and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

The third reason why cabinet as a collective and with at least four ministers in attendance agreed to host this conference is that Zanu Pf probably wanted to prove a particular political point to both South African business as well as its reluctant  bedfellows in the inclusive government. This being that regardless of the investment conference’s  or international capital’s concerns, it was not going to change its globally controversial indigenization plans. This was a point made even more poignant by the very Minister Kasukuwere’s very public insistence that mining giant, Zimplats concede to ceding shares to the government the same week the investment conference was due to be held.

All these probable and somewhat political reasons are however only symptomatic of a larger problem that faces the ‘matrix’ (to use our Finance Minister’s terminology) of the state, foreign direct investment and the national economy. It is functionally an ‘inorganic ‘matrix thus far into the tenure of the inclusive government. This is  primarily because of its heavy emphasis on the extractive nature of FDI in Zimbabwe without social investment conditionality on those international conglomerates that are being courted. And this, if one takes the examples of the diamond mining industry, has been done with what can reasonably presumed to be collusion between state elites and international mining concerns.  The outcome of these not so clear  deals and mining concessions, has been negligible in relation to progressive societal or public infrastructure  impact. 

To compound matters further, the inclusive government seems over-obssessed with public-private partnerships without clearly delineating the expected broader national development impact of the same. This may be because some ministers are somewhat overkeen on demonstrating their ability to grasp World Bank or IMF concepts even where the same said concepts or strategic economic interventions are inapplicable to our national context or where they have proven to be a failure elsewhere ( a key example is that of biofuel agriculture in Chisumbanje, which has been discredited as disempowering to peasant farmers and damaging to the environment in parts of Latin America). 

The inclusive government, particularly the ministries that are responsible for trade, mining, promoting investment and finance need to learn to drive a much more transparent and publicly accountable FDI bargain. Indeed while the national economy has suffered over the last ten or so years from the flight of investment, it remains necessary that we do not negotiate on a platform of complete desperation for any sort of investment. Be it from the East or the West. 

A firmer FDI negotiation platform would be strongly assisted if the government sets out social responsibility frameworks for potential and current international companies that are in Zimbabwe. This would include making FDI acceptable where it is linked to the development of public infrastructure that will benefit not just the military but also our hospitals, transport networks (especially our national railways) and our education system (with emphasis on transfers of knowledge to Zimbabweans). And in all of this, our ministers must be cautious about seeking international recognition merely because they have come to grasp seemingly complex financial and investment concepts. They must be more focused on our local contexts when they court international capital in order that it also finds progressive meaning to all Zimbabweans and not just those that are in proximity to state power.

Ends//

*Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity. 

Government must urgently pre-empt the evident 2011-2012 drought.

Government must urgently pre-empt the evident 2011-2012 drought.

*By Takura Zhangazha.

There is probably nothing as forlorn as watching your crops wilt in January and February  2012 for the subsistence communal farmer in Zimbabwe. This is because it is these two months that are most indicative of  whether one will have a successful harvesting season or not. In our country’s instance, the rains have been poor during the 2011 -2012 planting season and the plants have been a disappointment for many a subsistence farmer. This is particularly so for the most drought prone Zimbabwean geo-political provinces of Matebeleland, Masvingo, Midlands and in parts of Manicaland and Mashonaland West. It  is however important to note that it is information relating to such a potential development was available to our government.

The Famine Early Warning System Network (Fewsnet) had already projected that there would be serious resource mobilization challenges for food assistance programmes for those that it refers to as the ‘food insecure population’.  Even though the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Climate Services Center had already indicated that this season’s  majority  rainfall for Zimbabwe would occur between November and December, it is now apparent that the amount that fell to date has been inadequate. It also appears that even the projected outlook for rainfall is low for the period between February and April 2012.

So as it is, it is fairly evident that there is a drought pending in greater parts of Zimbabwe this season. Whereas in some instances the fault for empty domestic silos may be the fault of bad farming techniques by individual farmers, it would be fair to say that for the majority it is the fault of nature. It simply did not rain adequately and therefore even the hardest working subsistence farmers are now vulnerable to the threat of hunger and loss of some sort of income for their livelihoods.

And this is a point that must be made very clear to the inclusive government and other powerful agricultural stakeholders. In the occurrences of droughts over the last ten years, the state has had the wrong approach of seeking to react to the occurrence of the event in its aftermath as opposed to pre-empting and preparing thoroughly as the rainy season progresses. This is regardless of  the fact that there is generally a direct reliance by the government on the assistance of international aid donors to provide food aid in the occurrence of the drought. Whereas the government  has been told to prepare for drought relief and has had a drought relief strategy, its ability implement such programmes has lacked the necessary urgency that would reduce the inhumane trauma of famine.

Further to this, the government has generally suffered from the mistake that sometimes afflicts those with the power and ability to help drought stricken nations and societies. This is the mistake of being too slow to react even in circumstances where the warning signs of a pending famine have been clear. An example of this, though our situation is nowhere near being as dire, is the famine in Somalia which was reported by Oxfam and Save the Children as having been exacerbated by an overall slow response by the international community.  

To make matters worse, recent statements attributed to the provincial governor of Masvingo, Mr Titus Maluleke relating to the banning of, amongst others,  food aid related international non-governmental organizations point to the politicization of drought relief assistance.  Such statements that place politics at the heart of food aid and agricultural/ water reticulation development assistance is as negative as it is most unfortunate. They evidently point to a government that is insensitive to the inhumane and degrading experience that famine or food shortages visit upon all citizens regardless of political affiliation.

Regardless of the politicized nature of food aid during droughts, it is imperative that it be brought to bear on the inclusive government that the issue of drought related hunger is an urgent national matter. Any form of procrastination on it will lead to the needless suffering of the country’s citizens, particularly a population majority whose livelihoods are dependent on subsistence agriculture.  Central, provincial and local governments have to revisit whatever drought mitigation strategies that they have in order to pre-empt the adverse effects of famine in greater parts of Zimbabwe.

This would also include immediate public announcements by relevant ministries and the highest political offices in the land as to the nature and gravity of the drought that has affected the 2011-2012 agricultural season as well as an urgent call for outside help if we do not have adequate food reserves to feed the people of Zimbabwe.

In this it would be particularly important that the inclusive government de-politicizes the drought for selfish political benefit and approach the matter with the fortitude of a leadership that is responsive to the needs of the people it claims to lead.  It would be even more important that all this debate and public acrimony on constitutional reform or elections not be allowed to interfere with drought relief processes. This can be done by setting up an independent Drought Relief Agency to tackle not only this nascent 2011-2012 famine but any such future famines.

*takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com

President Mugabe’s ambiguous revolution by political default

President Mugabe’s ‘ambiguous revolution by political default’

By Takura Zhangazha

On the occasion of  his eighty-eighth birthday, President Mugabe gave what appears to be two separate interviews where he talked on matters to do with his political and personal reflections. The first interview which appeared in the Sunday Mail seemed to be less rehearsed while the second one which appeared on the state controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC)  television seemed to be a bit more cautious and diplomatic particularly with regards to his counterpart political parties in the inclusive government.

 But overall the interviews had the same intention and probable effect to his supporters of presenting the Zimbabwean leader as a ‘revolutionary’ who is keen on being known and remembered as such. That is well and good since we all have the right to be persuaded by one political idea/individual or the other. 

And since President Mugabe said in his ZBC TV interview, we are all ‘sons and daughters of the soil’ and are entitled to different opinions, I have an opinion on his leadership and the issues he has raised on his 88^th birthday. 

My initial point of analysis is with regards to his reference to the revolutionary intentions of the current policies of his party, Zanu Pf. This, he argues, is via the ‘taking back’  of the land and now the ongoing indigenization processes in mining and other sectors of the economy. On paper, the language appears revolutionary and talks to what can be considered nationalist sentiment stemming from the liberation struggle. In reality and practice, the policies that have and are being undertaken have been largely indicative of ‘revolution by default.’  

This should be taken to mean that the land redistribution was done under specific political pressure that made it more of a political survival strategy than a value based revolutionary one. But the land redistribution exercise has occurred all the same.  It however remains a ‘default’ policy position which is now controversially being undermined by the Mugabe government’s ambiguous commitment to leasing off large tracts of land to bio fuel companies, safari operators and mineral exploration companies. This has led to the eviction of villagers as well as negatively affected the environment. As a result, there is a growing chasm between the nationalist rhetoric of the president and the realities on the ground. 

Where the president mentions indigenization of the national economy as one of his policy priorities he has not done a clear ideological examination of what exactly he means. It is inadequate to merely equate the 51% taking over of a multinational company or bank by indigenous Zimbabweans as revolutionary in and of itself. There must be clarity as to the ideological purpose of taking over such companies as well as the expected societal end product. 

The current rush by big business in offering communities shares in mining concerns is more indicative of a new found ‘elite cohesion’ around wealth accumulation and does not particularly point Zimbabwe toward a more equitable and economically just society. Wanting a share in a company on the basis of 'indegeneity' is the stuff of identity politics and nowhere near being positively revolutionary. Given the fact that there is a new found global ‘new scramble forAfrica’ Zimbabwe’s political economy is likely to lean further toward an African neo-liberal and unjust framework. In so doing, the indigenous business people will be more of a ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ for global capital, no matter whether it is coming from the West, the Chinese or the South Africans. 

A second point of analysis about President Mugabe’s interviews is where he outlines his views on the contentious and problematic issue of leadership succession in Zanu Pf. In both interviews he contends that he is still capable of leading. It is however in the Sunday Mail interview where he comments on how the matter is a serious cause of division in his party, a point which indicates his rather convenient claim to championing his party’s unity in place of leadership succession. It is a convenience that he must know will not last, not by dint of age but by the fact that political parties that have been in power for as long as Zanu Pf have always had an evident successor (even his erstwhile friends the Chinese have an evident  successor). It is therefore a serious indictment on his leadership style that it is not evidently so for his own party, no matter how many congratulations he may get on his birthday. 

On the other matters that relate to elections, the constitution and his colleagues in the inclusive government, the President’s views have been known for some time now. Save to say that his insistence on elections is now clearly based on the constitutional prerogative of the President to call for them as he states in the ZBC TV interview. Essentially he indicated that he has no problem with unilaterally calling for an election this year, with or without a constitution. Whether that becomes a reality or not is probably dependent on the ability of the other GPA principals and the SADC appointed facilitator  to dissuade him from calling for them  in 2012. 

Finally, it is evident that President  Mugabe has great admiration for Fidel Castro of Cuba and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. He makes mention of the two leaders to stress the need for exemplary leadership or to make an historical point in relation to either sanctions or the African Union. In this, he may be indicating how he might want to be remembered but I wouldn’t know if like Castro, President Mugabe is persuaded that ‘history will absolve him’.

Zimbabwe’s "Unemployed and Poverty Occupied 80%."

Zimbabwe’s "Unemployed and Poverty Occupied 80%."

By Takura Zhangazha.*

Zimbabwe’s national economy is increasingly becoming a very complicated arena, particularly for those that are in government and influential  positions in the business sectors. It has many  twists and turns that mainly derive from the inclusive government ‘s holistic economic policy as defined by the ministries of finance, economic development, trade and commerce, and other institutions such as the Reserve Bank and state owned development/economic investment corporations.

The mantra of those that head either the relevant ministries or institutions is that the economy is ‘work in progress’. This is particularly so if they are not arguing about which political party in the inclusive government initiated the current multi-currency monetary policy or blaming each other for the economic sanctions that remain in place for Zimbabwean individuals and selected corporations.

There is however a component of the national economy that they rarely argue about loudly or acrimoniously. This is the component of Zimbabwe’s  rate of unemployed(and poverty occupied) 80%. This is not to say the issue of unemployment is not mentioned in policy documents or by policy makers. Indeed the last time it was mentioned was in the 2012 national budget that was presented before parliament in November 2011.

In it, the government, through the Ministry of Finance, proposed that there shall be at least three funds that will be set up by government to ostensibly tackle unemployment. These are given as the youth fund, a jobs fund and a small to medium enterprises fund. It is yet to be announced whether the millions allocated to the three funds have been disbursed from treasury but that is not the crux of the matter.

The key issue has been the politicized narrative around these funds as if every unemployed citizen of Zimbabwe is a member of  a political party or is generally  expected to mollycoddle one of the three parties in the inclusive government. The attendant culture to such  politicised processes inevitably becomes one of partisan political patronage as well as the unsustainable  ‘feeding at the trough’ of the few.

And this also means the 'unemployed 80%' are not going to disappear. They will remain without jobs throughout the lifespan of the inclusive government and beyond because they are continually sidelined to the periphery by those with power, access to power as well as access to resources, however acquired.

It is however necessary to explain the nature of the unemployed and therefore poverty occupied sections of Zimbabwe’s population. They are unemployed because they do not have formal jobs. Where they are in the informal sector as it is referred to, they remain at the mercy of those with political power and influence in order to remain in business. As a result, the same 1 in 8 unemployed become ‘occupied’ by a vicious cycle of political patronage, a politicized informal economy and an unsustainable social process of living from hand to mouth, even if on every other day, the hand has nothing to forward to the mouth.  The consequences of this sort of occupation has been the emergent decadence of Zimbabwe social and democratic societal fabric to the extent that it is no longer democratic values that count. Instead it becomes how close an individual is connected to a particular powerful politician or political party.

This is even more problematic in the sense that it is Zimbabwe’s younger generation that is most affected and is beginning to lose hope as to their lives ever getting better.  In a number of instances, young Zimbabweans upon leaving school or tertiary level training have been unable to find decent jobs, decent housing and access to basic health care.  Some have resorted, whether with degrees or not, to cross border trading (which the government seems intent on reducing without providing a viable alternative).

Others have taken to making it a life priority to leave the country of their birth while others have resorted to commercial sex work and general crime as a way of making ends meet.  Those that consider themselves lucky normally find themselves embedded to one political party or the other in order to get access to a gold-panning or diamond  field (only to be chased away after an election) or to become a part of the very politicized policy of economic indigenization. The latter policy which is already showing signs of being not so much about new found entrepreneurship among indigenous Zimbabweans but more about who gets what government tender or contract/account.

As it is, Zimbabwe has its own unemployed 80% which is also occupied by poverty, state and political party patronage, as well as a lack of a clear sign of hope on the horizon. Whether they will decide to follow the route of the 99% in the north who formed, for example, the Occupy Wall Street  Movement (OWS) is yet to be seen. But that they will at some point begin to make specific political noises of disgruntlement is a given, unless the inclusive government demonstrates a new found and democratic seriousness at addressing their plight. 

*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity. (please attribute takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com if you use this article)