The Problematic Vagueness of Mnangagwa’s ‘Fourth Chimurenga’
By Takura Zhangazha*
Tuesday 5 May 2026.
Zimbabwe’s president Emmerson Mnangagwa recently made reference to a familiar narrative from the ruling Zanu Pf party. He was speaking at the burial of national liberation hero retired Air Commodore Bere at the national heroes acre.
In his remarks he made reference to the thematic narrative of ‘Chimurenga’. He advised the mourners in a familiar historical narrative that Zimbabwe has undergone a first Chimurenga against direct colonialism. A second Chimurenga for ‘political independence’. A third one for the repossession of land.
He then added a new one that has not been formulated as such in previous official statemetns from the government. One that he referred toas a ‘fourth Chimurenga’ for economic control of our national wealth.
The curiosity is an assumption of ‘continuity’ of phases within Zimbabwe’s liberation narratives. Or the political assumption that all these now four time based aspects of ‘liberation’ in Zimbabwe in inherently inter-linked.
And by way of the same logic, therefore organic to what occurred in the time periods between the first and now the fourth ‘chimurengas’.
On the face of it this is the easier argument to make. Especially if it is couched in a necessary and historical nationalist narrative as it relates to our struggles against colonialism and repression.
It is a given historical argument across time and across the entirety of the African continent that experienced direct or indirect colonialism and won liberation either via war or negotiated settlements.
And the same goes for any reference to a first or a second ‘chimurenga’.
This was the case in countries such as Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Tanzania, South Africa, Mozambique in which there were many versions of a first pre-colonial or second(directly anti-colonial) ‘chimurenga.
While the first struggles are recognized as sowing the mustard seed, the second have tended to be more historically significant in their political meaning due to the fact that generally brought about majority rule. Both as a political fact and also as a new vision for the future of a free and liberated Africa.
And in the majority of cases these second chimurengas’ were ideologically leftist in outlook. In fact they did not have much of a choice given the manner in which they had been fought and the promises that had been made when they were being waged.
Zimbabwe’s uniqueness begins with the narrative of a ‘third’ chimurenga in the year 2000.
And Mnangagwa here is correct in making reference to it as being about land. But it was defended largely by war veterans, rural farmers and a ruling party that was faced with a legitimacy crisis.
More as a reaction to a potential loss of state power to a nascent labour backed opposition, the then Movement for Demcoratic Change.
So the third Chimurenga was a default position after almost 20 years of national independence stemming from the second one. With the latter having also had the intentions of that which the third was beginning to claim.
Despite the international approbation, sanctions and economic meltdown that Zimbabwe experienced between 2002-2013, the third chimurenga as defined by the ruling Zanu Pf party, came to create a new elitist state.
One which was characterised by land barons, foreign exchange specualtors, money launderers, speculative financialised capital and a US dollar cash economy that has largely benefitted those that are politically connected.
Or simply put, the 3rd chimurenga created a new base for elitist consolidation of patronage and a new alliance between political actors, private actors and global middle men in the fields of mining and agriculture.
Hence we even had at some point the expansion of the indigenization programme under Robert Mugabe’s leadership. One in which Mnangagwa still played a major role as a deputy president.
So while the third Chimurenga had its rural and urban beneficiaries, it did not demonstrate an organic sequence with the first and second ones.
Or at least not enough of it to the extent that popular opposition to Zanu Pf policies remained nationally high between 2013 and 2023.
It was never considered nationally holistic by the people. Instead, as it still historically does today, it was seen as highly partisan and in many cases repressive to the democratic intentions of the first and second chimurengas.
Now we are being told of a fourth chimurenga. One which we assume is sequential in its narrative. As though we have solved the objectives of the first, second and third!
What is apparent is that this recent claim at a fourth Chimurenga may not quite be intrinsic to the Zanu Pf narrative. Mainly due to the fact of their very evident divisions about Constitutional Amendment Bill no 3 (CAB3) and the extension of the term of office of the current president.
Or more significantly their public arguments about the meaning of the ‘one man/one vote!’ slogan that they assiduosly promoted during the second chimurenga!
So if the fourth chimurenga is about Zimbabweans owning the economy its disjuncture with previous ones is found in the key questions, “for whom?” And also “by whom?”
Given the now popularized term of ‘zvigananda’ one that has its origins in the second chimurenga, it is speculatively apparent that the ‘fourth chimurenga is less about the people and more about those with proximity to power (political, economic and financialised capital).
With the intention of creating a ‘trickle down’ economic system that functions on distributing material patronage for political support as Zanu PF seeks to transition from its own liberation war ethos.
Not only ideologically but also by way of generational praxis and doing away with the direct role of war veterans in its historical and contemporary narratives.
So remember this when you next hear a jingle about a ‘fourth chimurenga!’
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity
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